Developments in Africa and the Americas (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Cuban intervention in Angola and Ethiopia
Background: Cuba's foreign policy shift
Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, relations between the United States and Soviet Union improved, but hostility between America and Cuba persisted. The USA remained fearful that communism would spread further into the Americas, particularly the Caribbean. American foreign policy continued to support anti-communist regimes throughout the region, even when these governments engaged in brutal repression, whilst simultaneously working to undermine nascent socialist and communist movements.
Cuba's foreign policy underwent a substantial transformation during this period. Although Cuba maintained its alliance with the Soviet Union, it increasingly prioritised the export of revolution, primarily focusing on Africa rather than Latin America. This shift reflected the ideas of Che Guevara and represented Cuba's commitment to supporting anti-colonial and socialist movements worldwide. Most African states gained independence during the 1960s, but the withdrawal of European colonial powers frequently left these new nations with weak governmental structures and unresolved ethnic tensions stemming from artificially drawn colonial boundaries. Civil conflict often erupted, creating opportunities for Cuba to provide support to political movements advocating socialist or Marxist ideologies.
Remarkably, Cuba deployed more troops abroad during the Cold War than any other nation except the USSR and USA, demonstrating the island nation's outsized role in Cold War conflicts despite its relatively small size and population.
Angola: decolonisation and civil war
Portuguese colonialism and independence
Portugal maintained colonial control over Mozambique and Angola in Africa, facing resistance from Angolan nationalists since the early 1960s. The prolonged and expensive war of independence continued until April 1974, when a right-wing government in Lisbon was overthrown. The newly installed leftist government promised independence to Angola.
Competing nationalist factions
To facilitate a smoother transition to independence, the Portuguese attempted to establish an interim government comprising representatives from different nationalist groups, with the goal of achieving full independence by 1975. This coalition government included three main factions:
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) was a Marxist movement that received support from Cuba and the Soviet Union. This organisation formed the ideological heart of the independence movement and advocated for a socialist transformation of Angolan society.
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) represented a nationalist, pro-US faction, though it initially held Maoist leanings. Led by Jonas Savimbi, this group positioned itself as an alternative to Marxist rule.
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) was a nationalist organisation initially backed by China, and later by the USA. This group drew its support from different ethnic bases within Angola.
These three factions shared the collective aim of achieving independence from Portugal, but once the Portuguese withdrew their authority in 1975, disagreements over Angola's political direction erupted into civil war.
Foreign intervention and the escalation of conflict
Foreign powers quickly became involved in Angola's civil war, transforming a domestic dispute into a Cold War battleground. In June 1974, China dispatched 120 military advisers to assist the FNLA. The USA provided $300,000 in covert funding to the FNLA in January 1975, demonstrating American interest in preventing a Marxist government despite receiving aid from the Soviet Union. This American support aimed to undermine the MPLA, which was obtaining arms and assistance from the USSR.
Cuba responded to this foreign involvement by sending military instructors to support the MPLA. The ideological battle lines were clearly drawn between competing visions for Angola's future. In July 1975, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger convinced President Gerald Ford to escalate American involvement, sending $25 million in supplies and $16 million in arms to the FNLA. Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) also provided aid, determined to prevent a Marxist government from establishing itself in neighbouring Angola.
Key Definitions:
African National Congress (ANC): At present, the governing party in South Africa, but in the 1960s it provided the backbone for both armed and peaceful opposition to the white regime in power.
Apartheid: The policy of racial segregation imposed in South Africa from 1948 to 1994 when the Boer Nationalist Party dominated South African politics.
South Africa shared these concerns, fearing that an MPLA government would provide a base for the African National Congress (ANC) - an organisation that led both armed and peaceful opposition to South Africa's white minority government and its apartheid system of enforced racial segregation that dominated South African politics from 1948 to 1994.
Cuban military intervention
In October 1975, the FNLA, supported by South African forces, advanced towards the capital city, Luanda. At this critical moment, Cuban forces intervened decisively to protect Luanda and the beleaguered MPLA. By late January 1976, approximately 12,000 Cuban troops were supporting the MPLA, providing substantial military capability that enabled the organisation to achieve final victory by March 1976.
The MPLA proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) as early as November 1975, though other African states did not formally recognise it through the Organisation of African Unity until February 1976. This international recognition legitimised the new government and confirmed the MPLA's political authority.
Agostinho Neto and Cuban-Angolan relations
Agostinho Neto (1922-79) became Angola's leader and proved instrumental in shaping the nation's trajectory. Neto had achieved a result of victory in the civil war and met Che Guevara in 1965, establishing early connections with Cuban revolutionaries. Though described as a committed nationalist and socialist rather than an orthodox communist, Neto responded ruthlessly towards political opponents within Angola. His leadership style combined ideological commitment with pragmatic political calculation.
Relations between Cuba and both the Soviet Union and Angola developed positively following the civil war's conclusion. In October 1976, the Soviet Union ratified a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship with Angola. However, the strongest and most enduring support for the PRA and President Neto came from Cuba rather than the USSR. Although Cuba began withdrawing troops in early 1977, it promised continued military aid should the PRA face external threats, particularly from South Africa. Cuban forces were subsequently used to support Neto's suppression of an attempted coup by a rival leader, Alves. Cuba's intervention in ending this coup strengthened Angolan-Cuban relations whilst simultaneously weakening Neto's connections with the Soviet Union.
Cuba's relationship with Angola continued throughout the Cold War's duration. By 1988, Cuban forces in Angola reached an all-time peak of 52,000 troops. Beyond military support, Cuba provided substantial assistance in:
- Infrastructure development
- Health care provision
- Education systems
- Scholarships enabling Angolan students to study in Cuba
This comprehensive assistance programme demonstrated Cuba's long-term commitment to Angola's socialist transformation.
The USA's position on Angola
The non-intervention debate
By summer 1975, the US government recognised that the FNLA would not achieve victory in the power struggle. American policymakers faced a strategic choice: they could opt for non-intervention and allow events to unfold naturally, avoiding a costly involvement in a situation where the USA could not guarantee total control. This approach held particular importance given America's position in Vietnam during this period. Non-intervention would protect the USA from international criticism whilst avoiding further confrontation with the MPLA. The likely outcome of American neutrality would be Neto's establishment of a dominant position, pushing Angola further towards the political left. Zaire might conclude that America lacked interest in the region and adopt a stronger anti-American stance.
By this time, the USA had already begun questioning whether Soviet aid to the MPLA remained consistent with détente - the policy of easing tensions between superpowers that had developed during the early 1970s.
Continued covert support
Despite these considerations, even by November 1975 the USA did not regard Angola as a direct threat to American economic and strategic interests. The MPLA itself appeared more moderate than other groups operating during this period.
In December 1975, William Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, announced minimal differences existed among the competing groups in Angola. All factions could be characterised as 'independents' and leftists. When questioned why the USA had backed the FNLA, he responded: "Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA, is the simplest answer."
The USA had been covertly supplying military assistance to the FNLA, but escalating Cuban military aid and Soviet connections to this assistance forced America to reconsider its covert operations. The USA could not continue its own covert support for the FNLA because this would have created alignment with South Africa, which was simultaneously aiding the FNLA's campaign. This timing proved particularly problematic as black Africa was challenging the final remnants of white minority rule across the continent. Furthermore, growing international condemnation of apartheid in South Africa made the association politically damaging. The USA recognised that South Africa represented a political liability on the international stage.
Kissinger's concerns about détente
American policymakers faced a dilemma: the USA could offer no effective counter-action to halt the MPLA from benefiting from Soviet and Cuban assistance.
In Kissinger's assessment: "Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distance to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the United States has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet orbit."
His concern centred on international perceptions of America's apparent failure to take decisive and effective action in Angola. America's failure to respond could be interpreted as indicating a lack of determination to counter similar communist interventions in future scenarios.
This concern formed the core of the threat to détente. The policy could not survive if either side gained a unilateral advantage, as appeared to have occurred in Angola. If this interpretation of US policy was accurate, Kissinger remained convinced that the Soviet Union was employing Cuban forces as a proxy force to advance Soviet interests.
However, alternative interpretations emerged after the Cold War concluded and Soviet archives became accessible to researchers. In his 1999 memoirs, Kissinger offered an explanation of Cuba's involvement in Angola based on both Soviet records and an interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Korniyenko, alongside a secret briefing by US Secretary of State Alexander Haig in 1981.
According to this later analysis, Fidel Castro may have represented an unpredictable element in the situation. At the time, American policymakers believed Castro operated as a Soviet surrogate and could not imagine he would act so provocatively far from Cuba unless pressured by Moscow to repay the Soviet Union for its military and economic support.
Evidence subsequently available suggested the opposite interpretation: Castro functioned at an ideological level, positioning himself as the leader of a future wave of revolutionary movements. Castro dispatched an expeditionary force to Angola operating largely on his own initiative rather than under direct Soviet instruction.
The Soviet Union's position on Angola
The Sino-Soviet split and competition for influence
Due to the Sino-Soviet split of 1961 - the ideological rupture between the Soviet Union and China that fractured international communism - the Soviet priority in 1974 was preventing China from gaining influence at the USSR's expense in Angola. The Soviets appeared less capable and less willing than the Chinese to provide support for national liberation movements in developing nations. The Soviet Union's adherence to détente had, in Neto's perspective, created a connection between the USSR and USA that had diminished Soviet credibility in Angola.
The Soviet Union interpreted US and Chinese aid to the FNLA as evidence of a programme of Sino-American collaboration designed to gain influence in developing countries. Angola represented simply a springboard from which to launch this collective influence campaign. Furthermore, the Soviets remained convinced that Sino-American actions resulted from the improved relations that had been developing since 1971. In December 1975, Kissinger acknowledged that China and the USA held 'parallel views' on Angola, though no 'coordinated' joint action was occurring there.
Détente and liberation movements
The Soviet Union maintained that its own actions in Angola aligned with the spirit underpinning détente. For Soviet policymakers, détente did not mean simply maintaining existing conditions unchanged. The Soviet Union possessed a legitimate right to aid 'peoples fighting for their liberation'. This position closely matched Castro's perspective. Castro demonstrated commitment to socialist international cooperation in support of liberation and freedom.
In July 1976, Castro announced: "We have fulfilled our international duty with our brothers of Angola and we are proud of it."
Ultimately, the Soviets sought to avoid accusations that they would not support progressive and Marxist liberation movements, especially in developing countries. The Soviet Union aimed to expand its own influence within the developing world whilst simultaneously undermining the influence of both China and the USA. Soviet actions in Angola served multiple strategic objectives within the broader Cold War competition.
Ethiopia: the Ogaden conflict
Background and Mengistu's coup
Following the Second World War, British decisions unintentionally established conditions for conflict between Ethiopia and the future nation of Somalia. Britain awarded the traditionally Somali territory of Ogaden to Ethiopia, creating lasting territorial disputes. Somalia felt sufficiently aggrieved to reclaim what it considered its ancestral lands, invading Ogaden in July 1977.
In 1974, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie had been overthrown by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who established a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. Mengistu believed he could appeal to both the USSR and Cuba for support on ideological grounds following the Somali invasion. However, the Soviet Union was supporting the Somali government at that time. The Soviets withdrew support for the Somalian regime, and after some initial hesitation, Castro decided in November 1977 to assist revolutionary movements by dispatching troops to Ethiopia.
Cuban military support
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev congratulated Castro and offered 'our complete agreement with your policy. We are pleased that our assessment of events in Ethiopia coincides with yours, and we sincerely thank you for your timely decision to extend international assistance to socialist Ethiopia.'
By February 1978, approximately 15,000 Cuban soldiers were operating in Ethiopia. In March 1978, the conflict concluded when Somali troops retreated and a truce was announced.
Impact on US-Cuba relations
The USA accused Moscow of using Cuba to extend Soviet power in Africa. Any possibility of developing improved relations between the USA and Cuba suffered profound damage from this intervention.
This outcome proved disappointing from Cuba's perspective, as President Jimmy Carter's administration in the USA appeared interested in pursuing détente not only with the USSR but with Cuba as well.
Castro's response demonstrated his defiant position. In a 1978 meeting with Peter Tarnoff, a senior US State Department official, Castro expressed his opinion on the deteriorating state of US-Cuban relations:
Castro's Response to US Double Standards (1978):
"We feel it is deeply immoral to use the blockade [the US trade embargo against Cuba] as a means of pressuring Cuba. There should be no mistake: we cannot be pressured, impressed, bribed, or bought. Perhaps because the US is a great power, it feels it can do what it wants and what is good for it. It seems to be saying that there are two laws, two sets of rules and two concepts of logic, one for the USA and one for all other countries. Perhaps it is idealistic of me, but I never accepted the universal prerogatives of the US. I never accepted and never will accept the existence of a different law and different rules. I hope history will bear witness to the shame of the United States which for twenty years has not allowed sales of [American] medicines to save lives."
Castro's statement reveals his perception that America applied double standards in international relations, demanding Cuban compliance with American preferences whilst maintaining an economic blockade that caused humanitarian suffering. His reference to the medicine embargo highlighted what he viewed as American moral hypocrisy - claiming to support humanitarian values whilst denying Cubans access to life-saving medical supplies.
Key Points to Remember:
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Cuba sent approximately 12,000 troops to Angola in 1975 to support the Marxist MPLA against South African-backed FNLA forces, helping the MPLA achieve victory by March 1976 and establish the People's Republic of Angola under Agostinho Neto.
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The USA provided covert support ($25 million in supplies, $16 million in arms) to the FNLA but could not continue openly supporting them due to South Africa's simultaneous involvement, which created a political liability during the international condemnation of apartheid.
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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger worried that Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola set a dangerous precedent that undermined détente and suggested America lacked determination to counter future communist interventions, though later evidence suggested Castro may have acted more independently than initially believed.
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The Soviet Union's involvement in Angola was partly driven by the Sino-Soviet split and the desire to prevent Chinese influence whilst demonstrating that détente did not prevent supporting liberation movements in developing nations.
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Cuba dispatched 15,000 troops to Ethiopia in 1977-78 to support Mengistu's Marxist government against Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden region, which damaged prospects for improved US-Cuba relations under the Carter administration and reinforced American perceptions of Cuba as a Soviet proxy.