Gorbachev as a Soviet Leader (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Gorbachev as a Soviet Leader
When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he inherited an economy in crisis and a political system resistant to change. His rise to power marked a turning point in Soviet history, as he recognised that the USSR's existing structures could no longer sustain its superpower status. Gorbachev's leadership would be defined by his attempts to reform an increasingly dysfunctional system through programmes of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), introduced at the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986.
The Brezhnev legacy: economic stagnation and structural failure
Under Leonid Brezhnev's leadership, the Soviet Union struggled with deep-seated economic problems that would prove resistant to reform. The agricultural sector, plagued by the failures of earlier policies, suffered a series of crop failures leading to food shortages. In 1972, the USSR experienced particularly poor harvests, forcing the country to rely on agricultural imports to feed its population. By the mid-1970s, when global petroleum shortages affected much of the world, the USSR attempted to increase oil production to capitalise on high prices, but this came at the expense of consumer goods production, generating public criticism of the government.
Military expenditure consumed enormous resources. Between 1964 and 1982, approximately 25% of Soviet GNP (gross national product) was spent on military supplies, driven by the determination to close the technological and military gap with the USA. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USSR had committed to upgrading its outdated navy and expanding its space programme, draining substantial resources from other sectors of the economy.
Brezhnev initially attempted to introduce reforms promoting market forces to determine production levels, but these initiatives were blocked by hardliners who feared the USSR would shift towards capitalism. He did achieve some success in reversing aspects of collectivisation (the policy of consolidating individual landholdings into collective farms), allowing farmers to return to working on state-owned plots. This gave them an incentive to keep or sell surplus product to meet their goals, representing the most successful element of agricultural reform and effectively negating socialist central planning principles.
However, morale and productivity declined as living standards stagnated. Brezhnev attempted to increase consumer goods production through the Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plans (1971–75 and 1976–80 respectively), but the availability of consumer goods remained severely limited except through the black market, which flourished. In 1975, yet another poor grain harvest exacerbated the economic distress. To maintain food supplies for Soviet citizens and Eastern Europe, Brezhnev had to increase agricultural imports further.
Although the Brezhnev era had been characterised by renewed repression, technological advances such as tape-recording machines enabled Soviet citizens to express their opinions more freely. High-profile exiles emerged, including physicist Andrei Sakharov and writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, but most criticism came from ordinary citizens who recognised there would be no return to Stalinist terror levels and felt safer speaking their minds.
Leadership succession and Gorbachev's rise to power
Brezhnev died in November 1982, leaving behind an aged and stagnant political leadership. He was succeeded first by Yuri Andropov, then by Konstantin Chernenko, neither of whom possessed the political influence to implement meaningful change. The aged authority was diminishing, and when Chernenko died on 10 March 1985, the path opened for a new type of Soviet leader.
Mikhail Gorbachev inherited this economic crisis. He grasped that the Soviet system, and indeed communism itself, was failing to deliver improvements relative to the West. As historian Richard Crockatt observed, 'No one would dare to claim in 1980 what Khrushchev had claimed in 1960: that within a decade the Soviet Union would match and even overtake the United States.'
Key figure: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev (b. 1931) served as general secretary of the Communist Party from 1985 to 1991, and as president of the Soviet Union from 1990 to 1991. He had been a member of the Politburo since 1980. Historians widely regard him as responsible for the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. In 1990, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in reducing international tensions.
The technological gulf and international competitiveness
By the early 1980s, the USSR lagged dramatically behind the USA in technological development. Statistical comparisons revealed stark disparities: whilst the USA had approximately 140 million telephones, the USSR had roughly 20 million; whilst the USA possessed around 180,000 computers, the USSR had only about 10,000. This technological gulf undermined the Soviet Union's ability to compete economically and militarily with the West, threatening its superpower status.
The scale of technological disparity between the superpowers was staggering. The Soviet Union possessed only around 7% of the telephone infrastructure and 5.5% of the computing capacity that the USA had achieved by the early 1980s. This technological gap wasn't merely symbolic – it represented a fundamental challenge to the USSR's ability to function as a modern superpower in an increasingly technology-dependent world.
Gorbachev's initial diagnosis: linking economy to foreign policy
Gorbachev identified mediocre economic growth as fundamentally connected to political, ideological, and foreign policy problems. He reasoned that if the economy could be made to expand and operate more efficiently, these related problems would diminish. By implication, if Gorbachev's economic aims failed, foreign policy problems would deepen as the economy proved unable to underpin foreign policy objectives.
Gorbachev perceived a direct link between the Soviet Union's economic performance and its capacity to maintain its superpower position globally. At the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986, he stated: 'Without an acceleration of the country's economic and social development, it will be impossible to maintain our positions on the international scene.' He believed economic growth would strengthen the communist system, which would be further enhanced by ensuring national security through ending the Cold War rather than through nuclear confrontation with the West.
The Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union served as the Party's official governing body. Though it met annually during Lenin's lifetime and sporadically under subsequent leaders, it functioned officially as the decision-making body. In reality, it operated as a forum where Party leaders announced new policies and gauged popular support. The 27th Communist Party Congress in February 1986 became the platform for Gorbachev to introduce his reform programmes to the Soviet people.
Structural weaknesses of the Soviet economy
The Soviet Union's economic system rested on an inflexible structure of central planning, which determined output targets and tended to reject innovation. Management focused on centralised control rather than introducing new ideas to maximise productivity. Several factors had served to undermine Soviet economic growth, driven more by ideological conviction than by responsiveness to global economic realities:
Alcoholism represented a common feature of Soviet life. It resulted in productivity losses through worker absenteeism and frequent workplace injuries. In 1985, Gorbachev introduced alcohol policies attempting to address this problem.
A lack of foreign investment meant the USSR remained largely closed to external capital. This stifled growth and business innovation, as the state held an absolute monopoly over economic activity.
State controlled businesses operated under the monopoly the state held over all economic enterprises. This focus on centralised control and centralised planning meant little recognition of consumer demand. Businesses concentrated on meeting production quotas rather than responding to market needs.
Inflation and worker discontent created additional problems. Workers' wages rarely kept pace with inflation, generating unrest and frequent strikes, which in turn undermined productivity. The 1988 Law on State Enterprises represented an attempt to address some of these issues.
The Soviet economy faced systemic weaknesses that were largely the product of the inflexible ideological stance maintained by successive regimes. These structural problems could not be resolved through minor adjustments – they required fundamental transformation of the entire economic system, something that would ultimately prove impossible without dismantling the socialist model itself.
Gorbachev's 'New Thinking': recognition and reform
In his 1987 book Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, Gorbachev articulated his assessment of Soviet decline:
Gorbachev's Assessment of Economic Stagnation
In his candid analysis, Gorbachev wrote:
At some stage – this became particularly clear in the latter half of the seventies – something happened that was at first sight inexplicable. The country began to lose momentum. Economic failures became more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply. Elements of what we call stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism began to appear in the life of society.
He noted that in the final fifteen years of this period, national income growth rates declined by more than half, and by the beginning of the 1980s had fallen to a level close to economic stagnation. The USSR, once rapidly closing in on the world's advanced nations, began to lose one position after another. The gap in the efficiency of production, quality of products, scientific and technological development, and the use of advanced techniques began to widen, and not to the USSR's advantage.
At the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, Gorbachev presented his desire to transform economic programming in the Soviet Union. He acknowledged that implementing economic reforms required rejecting old stereotypes of thought and actions, with a clear understanding of new tasks. He specifically addressed resistance from functionaries who sought to maintain the status quo:
Every readjustment of the economic mechanism begins with a rejection of old stereotypes of thought and actions... It is hard, however, to understand those who follow a 'wait and see' policy, or those who do not actually do anything or change anything. There will be no reconciliation with the stance taken by functionaries of that kind.
This statement revealed Gorbachev's determination to confront bureaucratic resistance and his recognition that transforming the Soviet economy demanded fundamental changes in thinking and practice.
The practical implementation: perestroika and glasnost
At the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev formally introduced two interconnected reform programmes: perestroika (restructuring of the economy and political system) and glasnost (openness, allowing greater freedom of information and expression). These policies represented his attempt to modernise the Soviet system without abandoning socialism entirely.
The same year witnessed the Chernobyl reactor meltdown, which exposed the dangers of Soviet technological inadequacy and the lack of transparency in government communications. This disaster became a powerful catalyst for glasnost, demonstrating the deadly consequences of Soviet secrecy and technological failures. The government's initial attempts to conceal the scale of the disaster, followed by forced transparency, revealed the urgent need for the very reforms Gorbachev was proposing.
By 1988, Gorbachev's reforms had progressed sufficiently for the Law on State Enterprises to be passed, allowing more autonomy for businesses. The same year, the Soviet Union made the momentous decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, signalling a shift in foreign policy priorities consistent with Gorbachev's view that the Cold War needed to end to allow resources to be redirected towards domestic economic recovery.
The breadth of crisis by 1991
Despite Gorbachev's reform efforts, by 1991 Soviet citizens still queued for bread outside state-owned bakeries in Moscow, demonstrating that the economic crisis had not been resolved. The fundamental structural problems of the Soviet economy – rigid central planning, lack of innovation, insufficient consumer goods, and resistance to market mechanisms – proved resistant to reform, ultimately contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.
Key Points to Remember:
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Gorbachev became Soviet leader in March 1985, inheriting severe economic problems from the Brezhnev era, including food shortages, excessive military spending (25% of GNP 1964-1982), and a growing technological gap with the USA.
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He introduced perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) at the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986, attempting to reform the Soviet system by linking economic performance directly to the USSR's ability to maintain its superpower status.
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The Soviet economy suffered from structural weaknesses including inflexible central planning, alcoholism affecting productivity, lack of foreign investment, state monopoly over businesses, and worker discontent over wages failing to match inflation.
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Gorbachev recognised that the Soviet system was failing relative to the West and that economic reform was necessary to end the Cold War, rather than continuing nuclear confrontation, but faced resistance from bureaucrats committed to the old system.
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Despite reform efforts, fundamental problems persisted into 1991, with citizens still queuing for bread, demonstrating the depth of the economic crisis that would ultimately contribute to Soviet collapse.