Increasing Cold War Tensions (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

US Dominance in the United Nations

The foundation and location of the UN

The United Nations came into existence through a two-stage process in 1945. Member states agreed the United Nations Charter in June 1945, and the organisation formally began operations in October 1945. The decision to locate UN headquarters in New York City held considerable symbolic weight, demonstrating from the outset the extent of American influence over the new international body. This geographical positioning reflected the USA's emergence as the dominant Western power following the Second World War and ensured that American perspectives would shape the organisation's development and operations.

Western advantage through membership composition

The original membership of 50 states in 1945 did not reflect the ideologically divided world that was emerging. Instead, the composition overwhelmingly favoured Western and pro-American interests through several interconnected factors.

The regional distribution of members created a substantial pro-Western bloc. Twenty states came from Central and South America, all capitalist in orientation and firmly within the US sphere of influence. Middle Eastern members, including Iran, Iraq and Egypt, aligned with Western powers rather than the Soviet bloc. Greece, which had prompted the Truman Doctrine, joined alongside other Western European states. The Western European members would later receive Marshall Plan economic assistance, further cementing their alliance with the USA. Commonwealth nations such as India, Canada, Australia and New Zealand also joined, generally supporting Western positions.

The absence of newly independent states removed the possibility of a significant non-aligned or pro-Soviet voting bloc emerging within the UN. Only two African states held membership at this stage: Ethiopia and Liberia. The continued dominance of imperial European powers, who were themselves allied with the USA, meant that the interests of colonised territories found no representation in the organisation. This structural arrangement protected American dominance by preventing the emergence of alternative power centres within the UN.

The exclusion of Communist China

When the Chinese Communist Party defeated nationalist forces and established the People's Republic of China in 1949, the USA insisted that the new communist government could not occupy China's seat at the UN. Instead, the nationalist regime, which had retreated to Taiwan, continued to represent "China" in the organisation. This decision eliminated a potential challenge to US authority, given that Communist China had acted as an aggressor during the Chinese Civil War and had used force to establish control. The exclusion disqualified the new regime from UN membership on these grounds. More importantly, Poland remained the sole Eastern European state represented in the UN during 1945. The composition therefore weighted representation decisively towards pro-Western, capitalist and US-aligned interests.

Security Council structure and the veto mechanism

The Security Council operated as the executive decision-making body of the UN, consisting of five permanent members alongside a rotating group of non-permanent members. The permanent seats went to the USA, Britain, France, China and the USSR. This structure appeared to give the USSR equal standing with Western powers, but in practice it further enhanced American influence.

Veto power allowed any permanent member to block UN intervention by voting against proposed actions. Whilst this mechanism theoretically enabled any permanent member to prevent unwanted UN activity, the pattern of actual veto use revealed the true distribution of power. Between 1945 and 1955, the USSR exercised its veto 75 times, whilst France used the veto twice and China once. Britain and the USA recorded zero vetoes during this period. These statistics demonstrated not Soviet strength but rather the degree of Western cooperation and shared interests. The USA never needed to use its veto because other Western permanent members consistently supported American positions. The USSR's frequent veto use showed its isolation within the Security Council, forced to repeatedly block resolutions that commanded Western support.

American strategy for global intervention

The USA recognised the UN's potential as a vehicle for projecting power on a global scale, particularly within the context of Cold War competition. American policymakers sought to use the organisation to advance their own foreign policy objectives whilst presenting interventions as legitimate international actions.

However, the primary approach for acting as what American planners termed a "global policeman" relied not on direct UN authority but on US-influenced regional alliance systems. President Eisenhower particularly favoured this approach. The veto mechanism limited American freedom of action within the UN itself, since Soviet opposition could prevent authorisation of interventions. Regional alliances such as NATO bypassed this constraint, allowing the USA to act without requiring UN approval.

NSC-68, a classified national security document produced in April 1950, articulated the developing American self-perception. The document argued for "an immediate and large-scale build up in our military and general strength, and that of our allies, with the intention of righting the power balance". American planners hoped that "through means other than all-out war we could induce a change in the nature of the socialist system". This thinking positioned the USA as responsible for building military strength, managing alliance systems and fundamentally altering the international balance of power. The notion that communism represented a global threat requiring a global response became central to American strategic thinking during this period.

The Korean War as demonstration of dominance

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided clear evidence of American dominance within the UN system. When North Korean forces invaded South Korea in June 1950, the USA secured rapid Security Council action despite having no direct UN mandate for intervention.

At American request, and crucially in the absence of the USSR, the Security Council convened and passed a resolution demanding a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Northern forces back to North Korea. The Soviet representative had been boycotting the Security Council in protest at the continued exclusion of Communist China, meaning no veto could block the resolution. Without waiting for further UN authorisation, President Truman instructed General Douglas MacArthur to provide direct US military support to South Korea. The stationing of the US 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait represented another unilateral American action taken outside UN authority.

Subsequently, the USA manoeuvred a second Security Council Resolution through the organisation. This resolution called upon UN members to provide assistance to South Korea in its struggle against the North, framing the conflict as a threat to international peace. The pretext justified what became a large-scale military intervention. The resulting UN force consisted predominantly of American troops under American command, with General MacArthur appointed as commander. Whilst technically a UN operation, the Korean intervention demonstrated how the USA could marshal the organisation's authority to legitimise what was essentially an American military campaign serving American strategic interests in East Asia.