Relations with China (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Relations with China
Background: The Sino-Soviet split and strategic opportunity
By the late 1960s, a Sino-Soviet split had developed, creating a substantial opportunity for American foreign policy. Despite sharing a communist ideology, China and the Soviet Union experienced growing hostility from 1960 onwards. This tension became publicly visible and intensified throughout the decade. Mao Zedong even criticised the Soviets over their handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, whilst Soviet and Chinese troops clashed along the Sino-Soviet border. By the late 1960s, China had become concerned about its international isolation and began seeking improved relations with Western powers.
The Sino-Soviet border clashes of the late 1960s represented a dramatic escalation in tensions between the two communist powers, transforming ideological disagreements into military confrontations that threatened regional stability.
The split between the two communist powers meant that China's voluntary withdrawal from international engagement brought no benefits. Chinese leaders realised that self-imposed isolation was worsening Sino-Soviet relations rather than improving China's strategic position. This recognition prompted China to explore opportunities for easing tensions with the West.
Nixon and Kissinger's strategic vision
President Nixon and his principal adviser on foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, identified the strategic benefits available to the United States through improved Sino-American relations. Both men understood that China represented more than simply another communist state. Nixon recognised China as a developing nuclear power and a major political and strategic force in Asia. More importantly, China operated as a communist power independent of the Soviet Union.
Nixon was the leading advocate for transforming American policy towards China. In 1968, he stated that the US should seek opportunities to engage China in dialogue and actively pursue changes in the relationship. This represented a substantial shift in thinking, as previous administrations had maintained strict isolation of communist China. Kissinger supported this vision and worked to develop the diplomatic framework that would enable such a transformation.
The strategic logic was clear: exploiting the Sino-Soviet split could place pressure on the Soviet Union by forcing Moscow to consider threats from both the West and the East. This triangular diplomacy offered the United States greater leverage in its broader Cold War competition.
The 'artichoke' approach: Gradual easing of tensions (1969-1970)
The first practical steps towards improved relations began in July 1969, when the USA removed some trade controls and relaxed certain travel restrictions. This marked the beginning of what became known as the 'artichoke' approach – a strategy based on the gradual peeling-off of restrictions layer by layer, rather than wholesale removal of controls. The metaphor captured the patient, incremental nature of the process.
The 'Artichoke' Strategy in Practice:
The artichoke approach worked through careful, sequential steps:
- Layer 1 (July 1969): Remove some trade controls
- Layer 2: Relax travel restrictions
- Layer 3: Establish diplomatic contacts through intermediary nations
- Layer 4: Create formal communication channels
Each layer was carefully removed only after the previous step had been successfully implemented, preventing dramatic changes that might provoke opposition.
Nixon managed several diplomatic contacts through intermediary countries including France, Romania and Pakistan. The aim was to use their established diplomatic connections with China to promote the possibility of direct US willingness to work towards improving Sino-American relations. By early 1970, initial diplomatic connections between China and the USA had been established in Warsaw, providing a formal channel for communication.
These tentative steps demonstrated American seriousness about transforming the relationship whilst avoiding dramatic gestures that might provoke domestic opposition or alarm regional allies such as Taiwan.
Chinese domestic politics and policy shifts
China was simultaneously making progress in improving relations from its side. A decisive development occurred in August-September 1970 when Zhou Enlai, China's prime minister, achieved a major victory (led by Lin Biao and Zhen Boda) over those opposed to opening improved relations with the USA. This internal political shift proved essential for advancing the relationship.
The victory represented a move away from dual confrontation – simultaneous hostility with both the Soviet Union and the USA – towards recognition that the Soviet Union posed the greater and more immediate threat to China. This policy shift was not publicly acknowledged until 1972, but it fundamentally altered Chinese strategic thinking.
Mao's Strategic Calculation:
A central issue in China's moves towards improved relations with the USA was Mao's realisation about the changing balance of power between China, the USA and the Soviet Union. Mao did not reject the USA as a threat to China, but he increasingly saw the Soviet Union as presenting greater and more immediate danger. Therefore, forming an alliance with the USA made strategic sense in order to address the short-term immediate threat from the Soviet Union.
This calculation drove Chinese willingness to explore rapprochement with Washington.
High-level diplomatic engagement (1971-1972)
American military action in Cambodia in May 1970 and subsequent action in February 1971 in Laos, as part of the US military strategy in the conflict in Vietnam, slightly delayed developments. However, these operations did not have the same detrimental impact as the USA had already begun implementing its policy of troop withdrawals from Vietnam.
In July 1971, Kissinger visited Beijing. The most substantial outcome of this trip was an agreement to establish a presidential visit and a Sino-American summit meeting in early 1972. This represented a diplomatic breakthrough, confirming that both sides were prepared to pursue high-level engagement.
Removing Barriers to Diplomacy:
A further barrier to improved Sino-American relations was removed with the unexpected death of Mao's designated successor and opponent of Sino-American relations, Lin Biao, in September 1972. This development strengthened Mao's and Zhou's ability to improve relations with the USA.
In October 1971, Kissinger made a second trip to Beijing in preparation for the Nixon visit.
Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 marked a historic moment in international relations. The visit received substantial global attention and symbolised the transformation of Sino-American relations. A contemporary political cartoon published in the Daily Telegraph on 21 February 1972 captured the moment's significance, showing Nixon descending from an aircraft to meet Mao, with the caption "That's one small step for a man - one giant leap for mankind". The reference to the moon landing emphasised how this diplomatic breakthrough represented a giant leap in international relations.
Impact on Vietnam peace negotiations
Despite these diplomatic achievements, Kissinger failed to persuade China to pressurise North Vietnam into engaging in a peace process. This limitation demonstrated that improved Sino-American relations did not give the United States direct leverage over Hanoi's decision-making. China maintained its support for North Vietnam and was unwilling to compromise this relationship to satisfy American demands.
Limitations of the Diplomatic Opening:
This reality had implications for Nixon's Vietnamisation strategy, which was increasingly failing to move the US towards 'peace with honour'. The lack of Chinese pressure on North Vietnam meant that the diplomatic opening to China, whilst strategically valuable in broader Cold War terms, did not provide the practical assistance Nixon sought in extracting the United States from Vietnam on favourable terms.
Key figure: Henry Kissinger
Henry Kissinger (born 1923) pioneered détente – the policy of easing tensions between nations – and particularly promoted the USA's relationship with China. Operating as a skilful diplomat, Kissinger developed the concept of linking international problems together to create collective solutions. He referred to this strategy as linkage. Kissinger's diplomatic approach and his vision of triangular diplomacy between the USA, China and the Soviet Union shaped American foreign policy throughout the early 1970s. His secret visit to Beijing in July 1971 paved the way for Nixon's historic visit the following year.
Key Points to Remember:
- The Sino-Soviet split by the late 1960s created a strategic opportunity for the USA to exploit divisions within the communist world.
- Nixon and Kissinger pursued the 'artichoke' approach from July 1969, gradually easing trade and travel restrictions layer by layer rather than making wholesale changes.
- Zhou Enlai's internal political victory in August-September 1970 shifted Chinese policy away from dual confrontation, recognising the Soviet Union as the more immediate threat than the USA.
- Kissinger's visits to Beijing in July and October 1971 prepared the ground for Nixon's historic visit to China in February 1972, marking a transformation in international relations.
- Despite improved Sino-American relations, China refused to pressure North Vietnam into peace negotiations, limiting the direct benefit of the diplomatic breakthrough for Nixon's Vietnam strategy.