Vietnamisation (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

Vietnamisation

Nixon's approach to Vietnam

When Richard Nixon assumed office in January 1969, he inherited a war that had severely damaged American credibility. The USA had failed to secure military victory in Vietnam, and domestic opposition to the conflict was mounting. Nixon pledged that he would not simply withdraw and leave South Vietnam to collapse, as President Johnson had done. Instead, Nixon sought what he termed "peace with honour" in Vietnam. This meant ensuring that South Vietnam remained an independent, non-communist state even as American involvement diminished.

The policy of Vietnamisation

Vietnamisation refers to Nixon's policy of withdrawing US forces from Vietnam whilst simultaneously strengthening the military capabilities of South Vietnamese forces so they could defend themselves against communist aggression. Lyndon B. Johnson's Americanisation policy had failed, and Nixon brought it to an end. This policy formed a central component of Nixon's strategy for extracting America from the conflict.

The policy had multiple aims. Nixon hoped that withdrawing US troops would reduce rising domestic criticism of the war and thereby strengthen his position as president domestically. He also calculated that Vietnamisation would strengthen America's negotiating position with North Vietnam. By demonstrating that the USA was willing to withdraw whilst simultaneously building up South Vietnamese military strength, Nixon aimed to persuade the North Vietnamese that South Vietnam was secure against any threats. This would, he hoped, show the USA's willingness to withdraw and fulfil a primary goal of the North Vietnamese.

However, this diplomatic approach was reinforced by Nixon's reintroduction of bombing campaigns and the extension of the war into Cambodia and Laos. His entire strategy aimed to encourage North Vietnam to negotiate a settlement, but it was backed by military pressure designed to force North Vietnam into accepting a negotiated compromise.

Nixon outlined his position in November 1969 in an address to the nation. In this speech, broadcast on national television, he formally announced his policy of Vietnamisation:

We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence. The defence of freedom is everybody's business – not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanised the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamising the search for peace. Now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam. After five years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing men home. Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States.

Implementation of Vietnamisation

Nixon began withdrawing US troops according to a phased programme. The numbers demonstrate the scale of this withdrawal:

Date	US troops in Vietnam
June 1969	543,000
January 1972	156,800
June 1972	47,000

Vietnamisation was not simply abandonment of South Vietnam. It formed part of a broader approach designed to limit American engagement in foreign conflicts that were unwinnable. Nixon adopted a more pragmatic stance, but he did not intend to leave Vietnam without some measure of success. He poured resources into strengthening South Vietnam's forces. This investment led to troops being paid more, career structures being improved, benefits being increased and service conditions being modernised.

The equipment of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) was updated with the introduction of the M-16 Armalite rifle. There was an increase in other weapons, including military vehicles, planes and helicopters. The USA ensured that the South Vietnamese Army was ready for action and prepared to manage its own war. The ARVN increased substantially in size from 82,000 in 1968 to one million by 1970.

The impact of Vietnamisation

Vietnamisation appeared to transform the South Vietnamese military into a more effective fighting force, enabling it to preserve stability in South Vietnam and resist aggression from the North. In 1972, North Vietnam launched its Spring Offensive, which served as a critical test of Vietnamisation. The ARVN resisted this offensive and although it suffered approximately 8,000 casualties, the North suffered almost five times that number.

The ARVN was supported by a US bombing campaign during May to October. Operation Linebacker I saw 150,000 tons of bombs dropped on North Vietnam, in addition to bombing North Vietnamese troops operating in the South. These actions by the USA served to boost morale amongst the ARVN and to indicate to the North that Vietnamisation had not reduced the pressure on the South and its allies.

However, despite these apparent successes, chronic problems facing South Vietnam continued. The morale of the ARVN remained low. The relatively high casualty rates reinforced this feeling. In addition, endemic problems of corruption and favouritism were not resolved. Vietnamisation was rushed through by Nixon. The ARVN had, since 1965, assumed a secondary role whilst US forces conducted the war. Building the size of the ARVN and equipping it with modern weaponry was merely superficial. Vietnamisation made the ARVN dependent on the USA and it remained a force fighting a political war rather than a force capable of effective combat.

This dependence was reinforced by continued corruption, which meant that officers were selected based on their loyalty to the Thieu regime, rather than on their ability. Vietnamisation did not address this weakness. US casualties declined but those of the ARVN greatly increased, and the rate of desertions was very high amongst ARVN troops. Vietnamisation did not increase a sense of patriotism amongst the ARVN. Therefore, the ARVN essentially remained an ineffective fighting force.

Vietnamisation had some positive outcomes domestically for Nixon, but it did little to strengthen America's overriding aim of achieving "peace with honour" in Vietnam.

The extension of the war into Cambodia and Laos

Cambodia

In March 1969, Nixon instigated a military offensive in Cambodia. Operation Menu was a bombing offensive designed to target those parts of Cambodia regarded as safe by the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong. It was hoped that this would:

• Sever the supply lines based on the Ho Chi Minh Trail
• Pressure North Vietnam into agreeing to an acceptable peace settlement for South Vietnam
• Compensate for the planned Vietnamisation programme and retain the confidence and commitment of South Vietnam

In March 1970, Cambodia's Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was overthrown by the pro-US General Lon Nol. North Vietnam increased its presence in Cambodia by backing the anti-Nol communist movement, the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot. Nixon feared the possibility of a communist regime being established in Cambodia as the Khmer Rouge and Vietcong allies, marched towards the capital, Phnom Penh, during March 1970. Communist control of Cambodia would undermine Nixon's Vietnamisation strategy because US forces would be needed to counter any pro-North Vietnamese assault on South Vietnam from Cambodia.

Nixon also reasoned that a show of force in Cambodia would reinforce his intention to prove to the North Vietnamese that the USA was still committed to South Vietnam, and this would add pressure on them to compromise in diplomacy and thereby strengthen America's negotiating position. This resulted in South Vietnamese forces, with US air support, carrying out cross-border raids into Cambodia. In April 1970, the USA committed 20,000 ground troops to Cambodia.

However, this show of support was negated by an announcement by Nixon later that month, in which he stated that 150,000 US troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam within one year.

The Khmer Rouge

The Khmer Rouge was the Communist Party in Cambodia. In 1975, it became the ruling party and up until 1979 it implemented social engineering policies. Enforced self-sufficiency and the random execution of so-called subversive elements formed the basis of these policies. The educated and professional classes of Cambodia were almost wiped out in what came to be seen as genocide.