The Extent of Détente up to 1979 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Ostpolitik and the Helsinki Accords
Introduction to Ostpolitik
Ostpolitik was a new approach to East-West relations in Europe, initiated when Willy Brandt became Chancellor of West Germany in October 1969. This policy represented a fundamental shift in how West Germany engaged with communist Eastern Europe, moving away from decades of non-recognition towards a more pragmatic approach based on acceptance of territorial realities.
Ostpolitik marked a dramatic departure from West Germany's previous confrontational stance toward communist Eastern Europe. Rather than refusing to acknowledge the post-war reality, Brandt's policy sought to work within existing territorial arrangements to improve relations and reduce tensions.
Brandt aimed to recognise East Germany and acknowledge the territorial changes that had occurred at the end of the Second World War. This was particularly important regarding the Oder-Neisse border between East Germany and Poland. Rather than maintaining a rigid stance of non-engagement, Brandt sought a three-stage strategy: first, negotiate with the Soviet Union; second, settle the frontier with Poland; and finally, negotiate directly with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).
The Hallstein Doctrine
The Hallstein Doctrine was West Germany's longstanding policy of refusing to recognise the existence of East Germany. Under this doctrine, West Germany would not form diplomatic relations with any state (other than the Soviet Union) that recognised East Germany. This policy had been a fundamental barrier to European détente throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, as it prevented any normalisation of relations across the divided continent.
The abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine was crucial to the success of Ostpolitik. Without this change, no progress toward normalising East-West relations in Europe would have been possible, as the doctrine had effectively frozen West Germany's diplomatic options for nearly two decades.
Brandt's decision to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine opened the way for a new phase of East-West engagement. This represented a pragmatic acceptance that East Germany existed as a political entity, even if West Germany did not accept it as a permanent separate nation.
Key figures
Willy Brandt (1913-92) had been Mayor of West Berlin throughout the crisis years of 1957 to 1966, experiencing firsthand the tensions of the divided city. He became Chancellor in 1969 and served as the architect of Ostpolitik. His work in international relations and his commitment to creating a secure and stable post-war Europe earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971.
Brandt's experience as Mayor of West Berlin during the Berlin Wall's construction gave him unique insight into the human cost of division. This personal experience shaped his determination to find a pragmatic path toward improving East-West relations while maintaining West Germany's commitment to eventual reunification.
Erich Honecker (1912-94) was a committed communist who led East Germany from 1971 until 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down. In 1961, he had been one of the prime movers in the construction of the Berlin Wall. Unlike his predecessor Walter Ulbricht, who had been regarded as 'the last Stalinist', Honecker's leadership allowed for a shift in East-West relations. However, he remained determined to protect the communist system in East Germany and viewed Ostpolitik primarily as a means to achieve that end.
The development of Ostpolitik
Brandt's talks with the Soviet Union produced concrete results. In August 1970, West Germany signed a joint Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. This was followed in December 1970 by a treaty with Poland that recognised the post-war Oder-Neisse border, formally accepting the territorial changes that had occurred after 1945.
These agreements marked important steps towards establishing Ostpolitik and enabling eventual mutual recognition between the two Germanies. The breakthrough came in May 1971 when Walter Ulbricht resigned as First Secretary of the East German Communist Party and was replaced by Erich Honecker. This change in leadership proved decisive. Ulbricht had been regarded as 'the last Stalinist' and his rigid approach had made compromise difficult. With Honecker's appointment came a shift in relations that made it possible to accommodate the East German idea of two states alongside the West German notion of 'two states within one German nation'.
The concept of 'two states within one German nation' was a diplomatic compromise that allowed West Germany to maintain its long-term goal of reunification while accepting the immediate reality of two separate German states. This formulation was crucial to making the Basic Treaty acceptable to both sides.
This shift led to a major breakthrough in December 1972, when the two Germanies signed an agreement formally recognising each other. With this agreement, the Hallstein Doctrine was effectively dead. However, Kissinger recognised that the USA needed to develop détente with the Soviet Union to prevent West German détente from marginalising US influence in Europe. The USA's superpower influence could not be undermined by initiatives taken by West Germany.
The Basic Treaty
The label 'Basic Treaty' (in German, Grundlagenvertrag) referred to the 'Treaty concerning the basis of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic'. As the full title suggests, the treaty attempted, in some measure, to normalise relations between the two Germanies. The treaty was signed on 21 December 1972 in East Berlin.
The treaty's key articles established the framework for this new relationship:
Key Articles of the Basic Treaty
Article 1 committed both states to develop normal, good-neighbourly relations with each other on the basis of equal rights.
Article 2 stated that both republics would be guided by the aims and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, especially those of sovereign equality of all states, respect for their independence, autonomy and territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, the protection of human rights, and non-discrimination.
Article 3 established that, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, both states would settle any disputes between them exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force. This article also reaffirmed the inviolability of the frontier existing between them and committed both sides to respect each other's territorial integrity.
Embedded within these three articles was the commitment to potential economic relations, the recognition of the sovereignty of both the FRG and GDR, and territorial 'inviolability'. Further articles promised to seek peaceful methods of conflict resolution.
The Basic Treaty represented a critical moment in European détente. It settled relations, comparatively at least, between East and West Germany, but it also provided the route by which other European nations could establish relations with the GDR. Following the signing (although the treaty actually came into official effect in June 1973), various nations established diplomatic relations with the GDR, as shown in Table 1.
By the end of September 1973, both the FRG and the GDR were members of the United Nations. The groundwork had been laid for a furthering of European détente.
Table 1: Nations establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR
| Nation | Date diplomatic relations opened with GDR |
|---|---|
| Australia | December 1972 |
| United Kingdom | February 1973 |
| France | February 1973 |
| Netherlands | February 1973 |
| Federal Republic of Germany | February 1974 |
| United States of America | December 1974 |
Notice how quickly major Western nations moved to recognise East Germany once the Basic Treaty was signed, demonstrating the treaty's significance in breaking down Cold War diplomatic barriers.
The Helsinki Accords
European détente reached its high point with the convening of a European security conference involving all major Eastern and Western European countries and the USA. Although the final meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) took place in Helsinki in 1975, discussions about a variety of issues had begun in 1972. A total of 35 states participated, including the USA and Canada as well as the whole of Europe, except Albania. Each state had the power to veto proposals at its disposal.
The work of the conference lasted two years and reached its finale at a summit-level meeting between 30 July and 1 August 1975. The outcome was known as the Helsinki Accords or, more formally, the Helsinki Final Act. The main parts of the agreement were divided into what became referred to as 'baskets'. Each basket was linked to a specific package of agreements.
The baskets of the Helsinki Final Act
Basket I: Security in Europe
This basket led to a 'Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States', which consisted of ten principles that were to be applied to inter-state relations:
- Respect for sovereignty and equality among states
- The rejection of the threat or use of force
- The peaceful settlement of disputes
- Recognition of existing frontiers
- Territorial integrity to be recognised and acknowledged
- Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states
- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
- Cooperation among states
- The fulfilment of international obligations
Additionally, all signatories agreed to provide advanced notification of large military exercises and other similar plans, in order to reinforce mutual confidence.
Basket II: Cooperation in the field of economics, of science and technology and of the environment
This addressed trade and industrial cooperation, transportation, science and technology, the promotion of tourism, the environment, and issues concerning migrant labour.
Basket III: Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields
This focused on cultural and educational exchange and the wider issue of contacts among peoples. It sought to encourage the freer movement of people, information and ideas.
The Helsinki Final Act was not seen as the last step in European détente. Plans were laid to have follow-up meetings and the first was planned to take place in Belgrade in late 1977.
The Soviet position
The Soviets had three main interests in the CSCE:
- To expand Ostpolitik and develop wider acceptance of the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe
- To decrease barriers between states in order to increase economic activity and trade
- To further the process of East-West détente
The Soviets were less interested in the details of human rights issues. There was genuine concern about external interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and other communist states in Eastern Europe. This selective interest would later prove significant, as human rights provisions in the Helsinki Accords became tools for dissident movements in Eastern Europe.
There was some initial reluctance to accept the provisions on advanced notice of military exercises. However, it was the Soviet commitment to the wider aim of promoting East-West détente that led them to accept these conditions in the Helsinki Final Act.
The American position
The USA was not fully committed to accepting the political status quo in Eastern Europe, which the Helsinki Final Act seemed to recognise as a permanent reality. Americans feared that agreeing to the Helsinki Final Act meant accepting a divided Germany and an Eastern Europe subservient to the Soviet Union.
They also feared that as Western Europe came to feel more secure, there was the possibility that its support for military programmes within NATO member states would be reduced. Despite the reservations the superpowers had over the Helsinki Final Act, there was a common recognition that East-West confrontation in Europe was relaxing, and both sides welcomed this.
The American ambivalence toward the Helsinki Accords reflected a broader tension in détente policy: the desire to reduce tensions and avoid conflict while not appearing to legitimise Soviet control over Eastern Europe. This balancing act would continue to challenge US foreign policy throughout the 1970s.
The arms race
The Helsinki process took place against the backdrop of continuing strategic competition between the superpowers. In July 1974, Kissinger was convinced that if a SALT II agreement was not reached by 1977, when the interim agreement was due to expire, there would be an expansion of nuclear weapons technology and in the numbers of nuclear weapons. There was also the possibility that the USSR could be in a position to destroy American nuclear forces.
The Fragility of Détente
Despite diplomatic progress, the arms race continued unabated. This raised the possible necessity of the USA having to balance its strategic forces against those of the USSR. SALT was seen by Kissinger as the guarantee that a nuclear arms race would not revive and expand. The US Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger, urged that the USA must ensure that it had technical and strategic superiority over the USSR in nuclear weapons.
By the middle of 1978, President Carter was faced with the USSR's refusal to end the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe, or to reduce its stocks of heavy missiles. Carter accepted that the USA had to redress the growing strategic imbalance. He activated the deployment of new weapons programmes and the establishment of the new stealth bomber. In December 1979, Carter convinced the USA's NATO allies to increase their military expenditure by a further three per cent and to deploy 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles across alliance territory.
The USSR continued to deploy its SS-20 missile systems through its Warsaw Pact allies. This was seen by the USA and its European allies as a fundamental threat to the NATO defence strategy. It was the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that profoundly shifted the basis for East-West détente.
Key Points to Remember:
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Ostpolitik was Willy Brandt's policy of abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine and recognising East Germany, leading to improved East-West relations in Europe from 1969 onwards.
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The Basic Treaty of December 1972 formally established diplomatic relations between West and East Germany, representing a major breakthrough that allowed other nations to recognise the GDR.
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The Helsinki Accords (1975) represented the high point of European détente, with 35 states agreeing to three 'baskets' covering security, economic cooperation, and humanitarian issues.
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The Soviet Union used the Helsinki process to gain Western acceptance of post-war borders and the political status quo in Eastern Europe, while showing less interest in human rights provisions.
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Despite the diplomatic progress of the Helsinki Accords, the arms race continued to intensify, particularly with the deployment of SS-20 missiles and the American response with Pershing II missiles, demonstrating that détente remained fragile.