Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
Background to SALT negotiations
Détente refers to the policy of reducing tensions between the superpowers during the Cold War, particularly through diplomatic engagement and arms control.
Efforts to limit nuclear weapons had begun during the 1960s. The 1963 Moscow Test Ban Treaty and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty represented early attempts to manage nuclear arsenals. However, the Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia in 1968 stalled progress. Arms limitation talks resumed in 1969, leading to some degree of agreement by May 1972.
The USA and USSR shared an interest in controlling the nuclear arms race. Both sides recognised the dangers of unlimited weapons development. President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev saw political advantages in agreements that promoted stability and international peace.
American and Soviet perspectives on détente
Henry Kissinger, who served as Nixon's National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State, explained the American view of détente in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974. He argued that détente offered a means of controlling the Soviet Union by giving Moscow a stake in relationships with the West. Kissinger believed the Soviets would become more conscious of what they might lose by returning to confrontation, and would develop a self-interest in fostering relaxation of tensions.
Brezhnev, speaking in June 1975, presented a Soviet perspective. He noted that a new correlation of forces had been established in the world arena, where leaders of major powers could no longer seriously expect to resolve the historic conflict between capitalism and socialism by force of arms. With both sides possessing weapons of immense destructive power, the dangers of furthering tension had become increasingly obvious.
SALT I agreements (1972)
SALT I comprised two separate but related agreements signed in May 1972: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 26 May 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs) are defensive weapons designed to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles.
The ABM Treaty limited both the Soviet Union and the USA to constructing two fields of ABMs, each with no more than 100 missiles. One field could be positioned around a capital city, while the other was designated to protect Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) sites. This arrangement restricted the strategic value of ABMs, meaning there would be no competition to develop further ABM defence technology. More importantly, it made the race to develop offensive strategic nuclear weapons less pressing.
The treaty demonstrated that both superpowers recognised each other's destructive power and that each side had an interest in preventing a mutually destructive conflict. The agreement was regarded by both the USA and USSR as a major contribution to preventing nuclear war.
The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 26 May 1972
This agreement linked strategic offensive and defensive arms arrangements, complementing the ABM Treaty by establishing a freeze on strategic missiles. The specific allocations were:
- 1054 ICBMs for the USA and 1618 for the Soviet Union
- 656 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) for the USA and 740 for the Soviet Union
- 450 strategic bombers for the USA and 140 for the Soviet Union
The agreement was to remain valid for five years, expiring in 1977. However, it made no provision for limitations on newly developing technology, particularly Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Similarly, there were no defined limits on cruise missile systems (guided missiles launched from air, land or sea with land-based targets). Because the agreement was only interim, it was due to expire in 1977.
Political significance of SALT I
The SALT talks were politically beneficial to both Nixon and Brezhnev, reinforcing the political advantages to be gained by national leaders who backed policies creating greater stability and prospects for international peace.
Nixon, in his announcement to Congress in June 1972, emphasised that three-fifths of people alive had spent their whole lives under the shadow of nuclear war. He presented the Moscow agreements as the first step toward a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear nations, claiming this would enhance the security of both nations and reduce the level of fear worldwide.
SALT I produced more than merely an arms limitation agreement. It laid the foundation for a political achievement that made détente possible. By accepting these agreements, the USA accepted nuclear parity between itself and the Soviet Union. American nuclear dominance had faded, and the two major nuclear superpowers now enjoyed equal status. This represented a fundamental step in international relations because it meant both sides had something to gain from détente. A balance of power had been acknowledged, necessitating the construction of a new non-confrontational relationship. That relationship was to be détente.
The Moscow Summit, May 1972
The summit finalised the SALT agreements and established guidelines for American-Soviet relations through the 'Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics', which acted as a code of behaviour for the two powers.
Twelve principles were agreed, with three being most substantial:
First Basic Principle: The USA and Soviet Union committed to proceeding on the basis that in the nuclear age there was no alternative to conducting mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. They pledged to develop normal relations based on sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.
Second Basic Principle: Both sides agreed to avoid situations that could damage their commitment to peaceful coexistence, including avoiding military confrontations and preventing nuclear war. They would always exercise restraint in mutual relations and be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Each power rejected the idea it should be free to gain at the expense of the other. Peaceful relations were to be based on recognition of the right of each state to protect its security interests without using force.
Third Basic Principle: There was acceptance of a special responsibility to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations would not arise which would increase international tensions, and to promote conditions in which all countries would live in peace and security without outside interference in their internal affairs.
Limitations of the Basic Principles
The Basic Principles had no legal status. Everything depended upon each side abiding by the guidelines. From the American perspective, the Basic Principles represented aspirations rather than a solid basis for future détente. The Soviet Union considered them to be of greater importance.
SALT and the Basic Principles agreement recognised parity between the USA and Soviet Union, providing the foundation of détente as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.
While SALT I produced an interim agreement, both the USA and USSR desired to reach a more wide-ranging and lasting agreement, referred to as SALT II. Negotiations for this would continue over the following years.
The Vladivostok Summit, November 1974
Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon as US president after the Watergate scandal in August 1974, but retained Kissinger as the US chief negotiator with the Soviet Union. At the Vladivostok Summit in November 1974, Kissinger talked with Brezhnev about numbers of strategic missile launchers and MIRVs, with some movement in positions held by both sides.
Agreement was reached on a framework for a ten-year plan, seen as the preliminary move towards a future SALT II treaty. The Soviets agreed to equal levels of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers.
Framework agreement details
Ford's statement to Congress on 2 December 1974 outlined the achievements. Prospects were favourable for substantial negotiations on limiting strategic arms. The general framework agreed for a new agreement would last through 1985:
- A ceiling of 2400 each on the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers
- A limit on missiles that could be armed with MIRVs
- Equal limits on the strategic forces of each side
These ceilings were set well below the force levels that would otherwise have been expected over the next ten years, creating a solid basis from which future arms reductions could be negotiated.
Opposition and challenges
Despite internal opposition in the USA linked to high weapons levels being retained and apparent Soviet gains, Congress passed resolutions supporting the Vladivostok SALT agreement by February 1975.
However, a smooth transition from Vladivostok to SALT II did not materialise. One problem was that the USA argued the limit on air-to-surface missiles applied only to ballistic missiles, while the Soviet Union argued it also included cruise missiles. Similar clarification issues emerged in Geneva. Although there had been some progress, the two sides remained far from a finalised agreement that could be ratified through SALT II.
Carter's approach and renewed difficulties (1977-1979)
Carter's more ambitious proposals
Jimmy Carter replaced Ford as US president in January 1977. The Carter administration began by attempting to establish a far more ambitious arms reduction programme for the SALT II agreement than had been outlined in the Vladivostok agreement. Carter faced pressure from public opinion and his own advisers, most notably Zbigniew Brzezinski.
By March 1977, Carter was considering substantially reduced levels of heavy ICBMs, new limits on testing, and a ban on new types of ICBMs. Carter was not interested in simply completing Kissinger's unfinished business from Vladivostok. The details of new proposals were unveiled to the Soviets on 28 March 1977, including:
- Reducing strategic systems from the 2400 level agreed at Vladivostok to between 1800 and 2000
- Reducing the number of launchers for missiles with MIRVs from 1320 to 1100
- Reducing modern ICBMs to 150 and the number of launchers for ICBMs with MIRVs to 550
- A ban on the development, testing and deployment of new ICBMs
- A ban on all types of cruise missiles with a range above 2500 kilometres
- Only heavy bombers could have air-launched cruise missiles with a range of 600-2500 kilometres
Soviet rejection and strain on détente
Brezhnev regarded the Vladivostok agreement as binding and thought Carter was acting in a unilateral manner. The proposals demanded a disproportionate reduction in Soviet forces compared to those of the USA. Brezhnev rejected them outright.
An increasingly strong feeling developed within the USSR that the Carter administration was beginning to move away from détente and the cooperation on nuclear weapons it necessitated.
A report from Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to his Moscow superiors on 11 July 1978 characterised Soviet-American relations during the Carter administration as marked by instability and major swings. Dobrynin noted that Carter, on the initiative of Brzezinski, had conducted a meeting of cabinet members and closest advisers in mid-April where the decision was made to initiate a harsher course towards the Soviet Union. The administration's own selective conception of détente appeared to deny supporting a return to the Cold War, but it feared a decline in relations to a level where the threat of serious conflict would be interpreted as real.
When Kissinger returned from Vladivostok, he faced opposition from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown, and many others. New proposals were forced onto Kissinger and backed by Ford. Brezhnev rejected the new approach, making clear that a further SALT agreement would not be achieved in 1976, particularly as this was a presidential election year and Ford was the nominated Republican candidate.
The Vienna Summit, June 1979
Despite delays, both the Soviet Union and USA wanted the SALT II agreement to proceed. The agreement was finally announced on 9 May 1979, signed and finalised at the Vienna Summit in June 1979.
The agreement's main provisions
The SALT II agreement (18 June 1979) included:
Article III: Each party undertook to limit ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to an aggregate number not to exceed 2400. From January 1981, strategic offensive arms would be limited to an aggregate number not to exceed 2250, with reductions initiated of arms in excess of this aggregate number.
Article V: Each party undertook to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles. Each party further undertook to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1200.
Significance and limitations
The signing was the main achievement of the Vienna Summit, representing the fact that a summit could take place at all, meaning the Soviet and American leadership could talk and communicate directly rather than through intermediaries.
At the meeting, the two leaders demonstrated warmth and respect for one another. Each publicly recognised the responsibility held by the other to control the arms race, avoid nuclear war, and sustain détente.
However, the Vienna Summit ended with Brezhnev appearing frail at the meeting with Carter. The discussion was largely scripted beforehand and neither Brezhnev nor Carter deviated much from opinions established by their associated diplomats over the previous two years.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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SALT I (1972) comprised two agreements: the ABM Treaty limiting defensive missiles to 100 each, and the Interim Agreement freezing offensive strategic missiles with specific allocations for ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.
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The Moscow Summit (May 1972) established the Basic Principles of Relations, committing both sides to peaceful coexistence, avoiding military confrontation, and settling differences by peaceful means.
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SALT represented acceptance of nuclear parity between the USA and USSR, marking the end of American nuclear dominance and creating the foundation for détente.
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The Vladivostok Summit (November 1974) established a framework for SALT II with a ceiling of 2400 launchers and limits on MIRVs, but disagreements over cruise missiles delayed finalisation.
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Carter's more ambitious proposals in 1977 demanded disproportionate Soviet reductions and were rejected by Brezhnev, straining détente and causing Soviet concerns about American commitment to cooperation.