US Containment in Action in Asia (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

US Policy towards China and Taiwan

Introduction: Asia in the early Cold War

At the end of the Second World War, the USA maintained only limited interest in Asian affairs. American strategic priorities remained focused on Europe, and there was no immediate attempt to extend Cold War containment policies into Asia. However, events between 1949 and 1950 would fundamentally alter this position, transforming US engagement with China and Taiwan into a central component of American Cold War strategy.

With the end of Japanese occupation in 1945, a civil war erupted in China between the communist forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the nationalist forces of the Kuomintang (KMT). This conflict would prove decisive in reshaping US policy towards the region.

The Chinese Civil War and communist victory, 1949

By early 1949, a communist victory in the Chinese Civil War appeared inevitable. Mao Zedong's communist forces had gained the upper hand against Jiang Jieshi's nationalist KMT, raising urgent questions about American interests in the region.

Mao himself considered the possibility of US intervention in the civil war but reached the conclusion that this would not happen. He assessed that the USA remained far more interested in European affairs than Asian ones. However, Mao's real concern centred on the prospect of American support for an exiled Jiang Jieshi operating from Taiwan. Such support could undermine Mao's objective of establishing a united and intact communist China, potentially creating a rival government that claimed legitimacy over all Chinese territory.

In June 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced its allegiance to the USSR. This alignment raised alarm in Washington, as it suggested the potential for Soviet expansion of influence in Asia. The question facing American policymakers was how to respond to communist victory in China without driving the CCP further into Soviet arms.

Acheson's strategy: The White Paper and secret support

Dean G. Acheson, George Marshall's successor as Secretary of State, became the principal architect of US policy towards China in 1949. Acheson was committed to supporting the KMT in Taiwan, but he advocated a strategy of secret rather than overt assistance. His reasoning was clear: the USA must not appear to be an 'imperialist menace' to China, as such an appearance would only strengthen Sino-Soviet relations.

Sino refers to China, derived from Latin; Sino-Soviet therefore describes the relationship between China and the USSR.

Acheson's approach reflected a sophisticated understanding of Chinese communist motivations. Supporting the nationalists in Taiwan was conceived as a means to an end, namely undermining the CCP, rather than as an end in itself. The goal was to prevent the emergence of a powerful Sino-Soviet alliance rather than to restore nationalist rule over mainland China.

The White Paper, July 1949

In July 1949, Acheson published a government report known as the White Paper on China. This document attempted to justify the USA's withdrawal from direct military support for Jiang Jieshi. The White Paper argued that the outcome of the Chinese Civil War had been determined by internal Chinese forces beyond American control. Acheson contended that nothing the USA could have done within reasonable limits would have altered the result, and that the nationalist defeat was a product of internal Chinese dynamics rather than American failure.

This argument served multiple purposes. Domestically, it defended the Truman administration against charges that it had "lost" China. Internationally, it signalled that the USA did not intend to engage in direct military intervention to reverse communist victory. However, behind this public stance, the USA maintained covert support for the nationalist government in Taiwan.

The Chinese communists viewed American policy with deep suspicion. Mao articulated the communist perspective in an article written in August 1949, as the USA withdrew its diplomatic presence from China. He characterised the civil war as an attempt to turn China into an American colony, arguing that the USA had supplied money and weapons whilst Jiang Jieshi provided men to fight against the Chinese people. Mao presented China as the centre of gravity in Asia, a large nation of 475 million people whose seizure would give the USA control over the entire continent. This interpretation reflected communist fears of American imperialism and reinforced the CCP's commitment to Soviet alliance.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, February 1950

In February 1950, China and the USSR formalised their relationship through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. This alliance represented precisely what American policy had sought to prevent. The treaty committed the two communist powers to mutual support and cooperation, significantly altering the balance of power in Asia.

The formation of this alliance began to change American perceptions of the strategic situation. Initially, the Truman administration had taken the view that China would remain somewhat isolated from Soviet support and posed no real threat to US interests in the Far East. The assumption had been that the situations in Europe and Asia were distinct and unconnected. However, the Sino-Soviet alliance challenged this assumption, suggesting that Cold War dynamics were becoming truly global rather than confined to the European theatre.

The defensive perimeter strategy, January 1950

In early 1950, Acheson conducted a review of US policies towards the Far East. His thinking focused on the military security of the Pacific and the policy measures necessary to ensure American strategic interests. This review resulted in the articulation of what became known as the defensive perimeter strategy.

In a speech to the National Press Club in Washington DC on 12 January 1950, Acheson defined America's defensive commitments in the Pacific. The defensive perimeter, as Acheson described it, ran along the Aleutian Islands to Japan, then to the Ryukyu Islands, which were described as essential parts that must and would be held. The perimeter then extended from the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippine Islands. Acheson made clear that as far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific was concerned, no guarantee against military attack could be provided.

This definition of America's defensive perimeter was significant for what it included and what it excluded. Japan featured prominently, reflecting the growing importance of Japan as a Cold War ally in the Far East. Taiwan was not explicitly mentioned, leaving its status ambiguous. Most controversially, Korea was excluded from the defensive cordon, though the USA remained committed to protecting South Korea from communist expansion, as became evident in June 1950.

The defensive perimeter strategy represented an attempt to define clear limits to American military commitments in Asia whilst avoiding the appearance of abandoning friendly nations. However, its very specificity created potential vulnerabilities, as it signalled to potential adversaries where the USA considered its interests less directly engaged.

NSC-68 and the globalisation of containment, 1950

Two developments in 1949 triggered a fundamental review of American strategic objectives and priorities. In September 1949, the USSR successfully tested its own atomic bomb, ending the US nuclear monopoly. This technological shift was compounded by what American policymakers termed the "loss of China" – the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

These twin shocks prompted the Truman administration to commission a comprehensive review of US Cold War strategy. The result emerged as National Security Council Resolution 68 (NSC-68), issued in April 1950 and finally approved in September of that year.

The content and implications of NSC-68

NSC-68 called for substantially increased American military strength across all domains: general air, ground and sea forces, atomic capabilities, and civilian defences. The document argued that the USA must develop and maintain a level of military readiness sufficient to deter Soviet aggression, encourage nations resisting Soviet political pressure, and provide an adequate basis for immediate military commitments if war became unavoidable.

Moreover, NSC-68 advocated strengthening the orientation of non-Soviet nations towards the USA. It proposed helping those nations willing and able to contribute to US security to increase their economic and political stability as well as their military capability. This represented a significant expansion of the containment concept beyond its original European focus.

The document stressed the urgency of building America's political, economic and military power. It reflected a shift towards the globalisation of the Cold War, treating communist expansion anywhere as a threat to US interests. There was a powerful military emphasis throughout NSC-68, transforming containment from a primarily political and economic strategy into one with substantial military dimensions.

Events in the Far East served to reinforce 1950 as a turning point in the Cold War. It was in June 1950 that communist North Korea invaded non-communist South Korea, triggering direct US military intervention under United Nations auspices. The Korean War demonstrated that the Cold War had indeed become global and that Asia now featured as prominently in US strategic thinking as Europe.

By 1951, the USA's approach to China and Taiwan had been fundamentally transformed. What had begun in 1945 as limited interest in Asian affairs had evolved into a comprehensive strategy treating Asia as equivalent in importance to Europe. Japan had been consolidated as a US Cold War ally, whilst Taiwan received support as a means of limiting communist Chinese power. The recognition that containment alone was insufficient to address the communist threat had led to the militarisation of US Cold War strategy embodied in NSC-68.

Key figure: Jiang Jieshi (1887-1975)

Jiang Jieshi was China's nationalist, anti-communist leader, sometimes referred to by the Wade-Giles romanisation Chiang Kai-shek. He led the Kuomintang (KMT) during the Chinese Civil War against Mao Zedong's communist forces. After his defeat in 1949, Jiang was effectively exiled to Taiwan, where he established the Republic of China. From this base, he continued to claim legitimate authority over all of China, a position supported by the USA throughout the 1950s. Jiang's government on Taiwan became a focal point of US policy in Asia, representing both a potential tool to undermine the Chinese Communist Party and a symbol of resistance to communist expansion.

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