Leadership of the Crusades, 1095–1192 (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes

Reasons for Richard's Decision Not to Attack Jerusalem

Context and background

The primary goal of the Third Crusade was to recapture the holy city of Jerusalem from Saladin's Muslim forces. However, despite reaching within 12 miles of the city on two separate occasions, King Richard I of England chose not to launch a direct assault. This decision resulted from a combination of military, political and logistical challenges that emerged between October 1191 and July 1792.

The first march to Jerusalem (October 1191 - January 1192)

Richard's concerns before the campaign

Even before setting out towards Jerusalem, Richard I harboured serious doubts about the crusade's prospects. In a letter to the Abbot of Clairvaux on 1 October 1191, the king revealed the desperate circumstances facing the crusader forces. This source provides crucial insight into Richard's thinking before the march began.

Furthermore, the Duke of Burgundy, the French forces and Count Henry had all spent their wealth and would return home unless fresh crusaders arrived to reinforce them.

This evidence reveals that before the march even commenced, Richard understood a fundamental problem: the crusade lacked the resources and manpower needed for sustained operations. He desperately appealed for more European princes and nobles to join the effort and help defend any territory they might recover. The tone of the letter – describing how they threw themselves at the Abbot's feet "with profuse tears" – suggests Richard recognised how precarious their position had become.

The cautious advance

In late October 1191, Richard's army began moving towards Jerusalem. However, the approach was deliberately slow and methodical rather than a rapid advance. Richard wanted to secure castles along the route to maintain a reliable supply line back to the crusader-controlled coast. This strategic caution demonstrated Richard's understanding that simply reaching Jerusalem would be meaningless without the logistics to support a siege and occupation.

By 3 January 1192, the crusader army had reached Beit Nuba, positioned just 12 miles from Jerusalem. The holy city was tantalizingly close – close enough that the crusaders might have pushed forward and attempted an assault. After months of marching and hardship, many crusaders were desperate to achieve their ultimate goal.

The decisive council meeting

On 6 January 1192, Richard convened an army council to determine the next course of action. This meeting proved to be the turning point of the first march. The Templars and Hospitallers – military religious orders with extensive experience fighting in Outremer (the crusader states in the Holy Land) – offered crucial advice that fundamentally changed Richard's calculations.

Their assessment was brutally realistic and based on decades of warfare in the region. They acknowledged that the crusader army might succeed in capturing Jerusalem through a direct assault. However, they insisted that Saladin's forces would inevitably retake the city after the crusaders withdrew or weakened. The crusaders simply lacked sufficient numbers to garrison and permanently hold Jerusalem against the Muslim armies that Saladin could bring to bear.

This advice carried enormous weight because these military orders possessed local knowledge that recently arrived European crusaders lacked. They understood the military realities of the region, the distances involved, the climate, and the nature of warfare against Saladin's forces. Their assessment was difficult to dispute.

The retreat to Ascalon

Acting on this advice, Richard made the painful decision to abandon the march. On 13 January 1192, instead of pressing forward to Jerusalem, the army turned around and headed back to the coastal city of Ascalon. This abandoned city needed to be refortified to strengthen crusader control over the coastline and protect their vital supply routes.

The succession dispute (February - May 1192)

The crisis over the kingship

Between the first and second marches, military operations largely ceased whilst the crusaders dealt with a destructive internal political crisis. This succession dispute not only caused months of critical delay but also fundamentally weakened Richard's commitment to the entire crusade.

The problem centred on who should rule the Kingdom of Jerusalem. After the siege of Acre in 1191, Guy of Lusignan had been made king. However, Conrad of Montferrat enjoyed powerful backing from both the French crusaders and the local lords who actually lived in Outremer and would remain after the visiting crusaders returned home. In February 1192, Conrad's supporters grew impatient and attempted to seize control of the key city of Acre for their candidate. This aggressive move threatened to plunge the kingdom into civil war precisely when unity was most essential.

Richard's forced compromise

The barons of Jerusalem and the French crusaders pressured Richard to reverse his earlier decision, despite the king's clear preference for Guy. Faced with the prospect of civil war amongst the very people he was trying to help, Richard reluctantly agreed to a new arrangement. Conrad would replace Guy as king of Jerusalem, whilst Guy would be given the island of Cyprus to rule instead (Cyprus had been conquered by Richard during his journey to the crusade).

However, this compromise failed to resolve the situation. Conrad, even after being recognised as the rightful king, refused to help the crusaders with their military campaign. The impasse was only broken by Conrad's assassination on 28 April 1192. His replacement, Count Henry of Champagne, proved acceptable to all parties because he was related to both Richard and Philip of France. Only then could the crusade finally resume its military operations.

The impact on the crusade

The second march to Jerusalem (May - July 1192)

Strategic success at Darun

In May 1192, after the succession issue was finally resolved, the English and French forces set out on a new campaign. Rather than marching directly towards Jerusalem, they first targeted the coastal town of Darun. This operation demonstrated sound strategic thinking.

Capturing Darun would extend the crusader-controlled coastline further south. More importantly, it would block Saladin's communication link with Egypt, his main power base and source of reinforcements. By cutting this vital connection, the crusaders could isolate Saladin's forces in the region and prevent him from receiving fresh troops and supplies from Egypt.

Return to Beit Nuba

Following the capture of Darun, the crusaders resumed their journey towards Jerusalem. They reached Beit Nuba for the second time on 7 June 1192, returning to the exact location where they had turned back six months earlier. However, the army was not yet at full strength. They began a prolonged wait for Henry of Champagne's forces to arrive and bolster their numbers before making any final decisions.

During this extended pause at Beit Nuba, the fragile unity that had been restored after Conrad's death began to unravel. The crusaders had time to argue about strategy, and the fundamental divisions between different factions re-emerged with devastating consequences.

The committee's recommendation

In mid-June 1192, a committee of 20 leaders gathered to decide the crusade's next move. This represented an attempt to make decisions collectively rather than relying solely on Richard's judgement. The committee faced a crucial strategic choice: should they attack Jerusalem directly, or pursue a different objective?

The committee reached a recommendation that had Richard's full support and made excellent strategic sense. They proposed that instead of attacking Jerusalem, the combined crusader forces should launch an Egyptian campaign. By striking at the heart of Saladin's territory in Egypt, they could fundamentally weaken his power base and his ability to threaten any crusader conquests. This addressed the core problem identified during the first march – the need to neutralise Saladin's forces before attempting to take and hold Jerusalem.

French refusal and final breakdown

However, the committee's recommendation collapsed due to the renewed divisions among the crusaders. The French refused to support the Egyptian campaign. They insisted on attacking Jerusalem immediately, driven by religious fervour and the emotional pull of the holy city. Strategic considerations about long-term sustainability meant nothing to them compared to the symbolic importance of Jerusalem.

Richard's decision to withdraw

Confronted with this impossible situation, Richard faced multiple pressures that made continuing the crusade untenable:

• Military impossibility: Richard recognised that the fundamental problem remained unchanged from the first march. They could not hold Jerusalem even if they captured it. The Templars and Hospitallers had been right in January, and nothing had changed by June. The crusaders still lacked the resources and manpower to garrison the city permanently against Saladin's forces.

• Atmosphere of disunity: Operating in an environment where French and English forces could not agree on basic strategy made any complex military operation extremely dangerous. A divided crusader army attempting to besiege and hold Jerusalem against Saladin would be courting disaster.

• Problems in England: Richard received troubling news about the situation at home. His brother John was threatening his throne, and political instability was growing during the king's prolonged absence. Richard had responsibilities beyond the crusade, and he could not ignore threats to his own kingdom.

• French intransigence: The French refusal to accept sound military strategy showed they were driven by emotion and religious zeal rather than practical military considerations. Richard could not rely on them as partners in a rational campaign.

• Knowledge of failure: Richard's own assessment, based on months of campaigning and the advice of experienced military orders, told him they "could not hold Jerusalem". Attacking the city under these circumstances would waste lives achieving nothing permanent.

Given these impossible circumstances, Richard made the painful but necessary decision to recommend withdrawal. The retreat began on 4 July 1192, ending the crusade's final attempt to reach Jerusalem. For the second time, Richard had stood at Beit Nuba within striking distance of the holy city and chosen to turn back rather than pursue an unachievable goal.

Analysis of the key factors

Strategic reality vs religious emotion

The fundamental tension throughout both marches was between strategic military reality and powerful religious emotion. Jerusalem held enormous symbolic and spiritual significance for the crusaders. Many had travelled thousands of miles, endured terrible hardships, and lost comrades specifically to reach the holy city. The emotional pull of Jerusalem was immense.

However, Richard and his experienced military advisers understood that symbolic conquest was worthless if it could not be sustained. The Templars and Hospitallers, with their decades of experience fighting in Outremer, grasped what many newly arrived crusaders did not: temporary victories that were quickly reversed actually harmed the crusader cause by wasting precious resources and demoralising the faithful.

The resource problem

Richard's letter from October 1191 laid bare a critical challenge: the crusaders had exhausted their financial resources, their physical strength, and their supplies. This was not a temporary shortage that could be resolved with a few weeks' rest. The fundamental problem was that crusading was extraordinarily expensive, and the costs mounted relentlessly.

Maintaining an army in a hostile climate thousands of miles from home required constant expenditure on food, equipment, wages, and logistics. A prolonged siege of Jerusalem would demand even more resources. The crusaders simply did not possess the wealth needed to both capture Jerusalem and then garrison it for the months or years needed to make the conquest permanent. Without fresh reinforcements and money from Europe – which Richard's desperate appeals failed to secure in sufficient quantity – the crusade was living on borrowed time.

The manpower shortage

Even more critical than money was the shortage of manpower. Many crusaders had taken vows to serve for a limited period, often one to three years. As these periods expired, men returned home, steadily reducing the crusader army's strength. The forces Richard commanded were insufficient to both take Jerusalem by storm and then provide a large enough garrison to hold it against Saladin's counterattacks.

Political division and the succession dispute

The succession crisis over the Kingdom of Jerusalem revealed a deeper problem: the crusaders were not a unified movement but rather a collection of competing factions pursuing different interests. The local lords of Outremer, who would remain in the region after visiting crusaders returned home, had different priorities from those who saw the crusade as a temporary military expedition. The French and English had their own national rivalries. Guy and Conrad each had their supporters who placed factional loyalty above the common cause.

This political division directly weakened the crusade in multiple ways. The months spent arguing about the succession were months when no military progress occurred. Richard's willingness to fight for the kingdom diminished when he saw that its inhabitants seemed more interested in internal power struggles than in defending against Saladin. Most critically, the divisions made unified command and coordinated strategy impossible.

The breakdown of French-English cooperation

During the second march, the cooperation between French and English forces that had existed earlier in the crusade completely collapsed. The French refusal to accept the committee's recommendation to attack Egypt instead of Jerusalem showed they were no longer willing to accept strategic logic or work within a unified command structure.

Logistical challenges

Jerusalem's inland location created severe logistical problems. The crusaders controlled the coast, where their ships could bring supplies from Europe and Cyprus. However, Jerusalem was miles inland, across difficult terrain that Saladin's forces could easily interdict. Maintaining supply lines to a garrison in Jerusalem whilst under constant attack would have been extremely difficult.

The crusaders had learned from bitter experience how important secure supply lines were. During the siege of Acre, they had nearly starved before finally establishing secure communications with their fleet. A garrison in Jerusalem would face similar or worse difficulties, isolated in hostile territory with tenuous connections to their coastal bases.

Time pressures and domestic concerns

Richard faced increasing pressure to return to England. His brother John was actively working to undermine Richard's rule during the king's absence. The longer Richard remained on crusade, the greater the threat to his throne became. Unlike some crusaders who had few responsibilities pulling them home, Richard was a king with a realm to govern and protect.

This time pressure made the long-term commitment needed to hold Jerusalem impossible for Richard personally. Even if the crusaders somehow captured and initially held the city, Richard would need to return home soon, leaving the defence to others. This raised an obvious question: if Richard himself could not stay to defend Jerusalem, why should he commit his forces to capturing it?

Realistic assessment and strategic wisdom

Perhaps the most important factor in Richard's decision was his capacity for realistic assessment of military situations. Unlike crusaders driven purely by religious zeal who believed God would provide victory regardless of military logic, Richard maintained a pragmatic understanding of what was militarily achievable.

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