Nur ad-Din’s Growing Rift with Saladin (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes
Nur ad-Din's Growing Rift with Saladin
The growth of Nur ad-Din's power, 1154-69
By 1154, Nur ad-Din had successfully unified Muslim Syria and established himself as Zengi's rightful successor. His campaigns against the Franks in both Edessa and Antioch had strengthened his reputation as the leader of a jihad (holy war against the crusaders). However, this position now needed defending as Frankish power grew under King Baldwin III and King Amalric.
Nur ad-Din's position by 1154 was both powerful and precarious. While he had unified Muslim Syria and earned recognition as a jihad leader, he faced the constant challenge of defending his territories against increasingly confident Frankish forces. This dual pressure—maintaining his reputation as Islam's defender while securing his borders—would shape all his subsequent strategic decisions.
Military successes and diplomatic achievements
Nur ad-Din demonstrated his capability to contain the Frankish threat through several important actions:
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1156 - He negotiated a treaty to resolve the ongoing dispute over Harenc, which had been contested since the Battle of Inab. The agreement divided the revenues from Harenc between the Franks and Turks, showing his diplomatic skills.
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1157 - He successfully defended Shaizar against a Frankish attack, protecting Syrian territory.
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August 1164 - At the Battle of Harim, Nur ad-Din achieved a significant victory over Christian forces at Artah. Supported by the Artuqid Turks, he captured several important Frankish nobles, including Bohemond III of Antioch and Raymond III of Tripoli. This battle also secured complete Muslim control of Harenc.
These victories reinforced Nur ad-Din's image as the protector of Muslim lands and leader of jihad against the crusaders.
Limitations of Nur ad-Din's power
Despite these successes, Nur ad-Din's authority faced significant constraints. His power was not absolute, and he proved pragmatic when circumstances demanded:
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1159 - When the Byzantine emperor Manuel Comnenus threatened Aleppo with invasion, Nur ad-Din made a pragmatic decision. Rather than fight against overwhelming odds, he formed a truce with Manuel against Kilij Arslan, the sultan of Rum. This showed he was willing to ally with Christians when necessary for survival.
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1163 - The Franks defeated Nur ad-Din during an attack at al-Bugay'a, demonstrating that he did not win every battle.
These examples reveal that whilst Nur ad-Din's power had increased significantly, Muslim Syria still lacked sufficient resources to launch an all-out assault on the crusader states. This military reality would shape his strategic thinking about Egypt and drive his subsequent campaigns.
The issue of Egypt
Strategic importance of Egypt
One fundamental reason Nur ad-Din could not pursue an all-out jihad against the crusader states was that Muslim Syria simply lacked the necessary resources to defeat them. However, Egypt offered a potential solution to this problem:
- Immense wealth - Egypt was extraordinarily rich and could fund large-scale military campaigns.
- World-renowned port - Alexandria provided access to Mediterranean trade and naval power.
- Military manpower - Egypt could supply enough troops to enable Nur ad-Din to attack the crusader states from both the south and the east simultaneously.
The Fatimid problem
The major obstacle to incorporating Egypt into Nur ad-Din's empire was political and religious. Egypt remained under Fatimid control and did not fall within the authority of Nur ad-Din's Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. This meant any conquest of Egypt would involve overthrowing a rival Islamic caliphate.
The Frankish threat to Egypt
The temptation to invade Egypt intensified because of the serious threat it faced from the Christians. If Egypt fell to Baldwin III or Amalric, this would be catastrophic for Nur ad-Din because:
- The Franks could use Egypt's wealth and resources against him.
- They could attack Muslim Syria from multiple directions.
- The balance of power in the region would shift decisively against Muslim forces.
This threat was very real. The Franks launched five separate attempts to conquer Egypt during the 1160s, targeting key locations including Bilbeis, Alexandria, Cairo, and Damietta. The frequency of these invasions demonstrated that Egypt's strategic value was recognized by both Muslim and Christian leaders.
The alliance between Shawar and the Franks
Nur ad-Din's strategic situation became even more dangerous when the Egyptian vizier Shawar formed an alliance with the Franks. In 1167, Shawar offered the Franks the enormous sum of 400,000 dinars if they would remain in Egypt until Nur ad-Din's forces had been defeated.
This alliance made it clear that immediate action was required to prevent Egypt from falling into Frankish hands, which would have surrounded Muslim Syria with hostile forces.
The Egyptian campaign: the rise of Saladin
Saladin's early military career
Saladin began his rise to prominence during Nur ad-Din's Egyptian campaign. The commander of Nur ad-Din's invasion force was Shirkuh, with his nephew Saladin serving as second in command.
Campaign Analysis: Alexandria 1167
Saladin's first recorded military action occurred in 1167. Shirkuh's forces attacked and captured Alexandria, after which Shirkuh divided his army. He took part of his forces out of the city to avoid having all his troops trapped in a lengthy siege. Saladin remained behind and took charge of defending Alexandria.
This decision demonstrated Shirkuh's tactical awareness—by not concentrating all forces in one location, he maintained operational flexibility. For Saladin, this was his first independent command, where he had to manage a defensive siege without his uncle's direct oversight.
The campaign reached a stalemate and was resolved through negotiation. Shirkuh and Amalric agreed that both armies would withdraw from Alexandria, which they did in August 1167.
1168-69 - The final campaign:
However, this withdrawal proved to be only a temporary pause. In November 1168, the Franks seized the initiative:
- They attacked Bilbeis and massacred its inhabitants.
- Their former ally Shawar became so alarmed that he turned to Nur ad-Din for help.
- Shirkuh, accompanied by Saladin, marched to Cairo where his army established camp to defend the capital from the Franks.
Amalric, rather than entering into another costly siege, decided to cut his losses and withdrew on 2 January 1169. Unfortunately for Shawar, Shirkuh and Saladin remained encamped outside Cairo.
Saladin becomes vizier
By 8 January 1169, Shirkuh had entered Cairo and began positioning himself to replace Shawar as vizier (the actual ruler who acted on behalf of the caliph). On 18 January, Shawar was murdered, probably by a supporter of Shirkuh or perhaps even at his request. Regardless of the truth about who ordered the killing, the caliph installed Shirkuh as the new vizier.
However, Shirkuh's rule proved brief. On 13 March 1169, Shirkuh himself died. Although there were rumours of poison, it most likely resulted from poor diet and illness. His replacement, invested on 26 March 1169, was none other than Saladin.
At first glance, Saladin's appointment appeared to be a tremendous victory for Nur ad-Din. His power now extended across Abbasid Syria and Fatimid Egypt. He should have been in a position to finally launch a decisive assault on the Franks. However, Saladin's subsequent actions made it clear that he had different plans.
The rift between Nur ad-Din and Saladin
Saladin's consolidation of power
Rather than simply serving as Nur ad-Din's subordinate and exploiting Egypt for his master's benefit, Saladin moved quickly to build his own independent power base. He consolidated his position through three key strategies:
1. Placing family in key government positions:
Saladin ensured loyalty by appointing his relatives to crucial roles within the Egyptian government:
- His brother, Turan-Shah, joined him almost immediately on 7 July 1169.
- His father, Ayyub, arrived soon after and was appointed Egypt's treasurer.
- The rest of his brothers and nephews quickly followed.
With his family surrounding him, Saladin could feel more secure against rival claims to his leadership and minimise the risk of rebellion within his government.
2. Creating a loyal military force:
Saladin strengthened his position further through the creation of the Salhiyya, a military corps directly responsible to him alone. This gave him military power independent of Nur ad-Din's forces.
3. Prioritising Egypt's needs:
When a force of Franks and Byzantines renewed their offensive in Egypt in October 1169, Saladin was prepared and defeated them, further cementing his authority.
Three instances of defiance
Despite Saladin's theoretical subordination to Nur ad-Din, the rift between them became evident through at least three instances before Nur ad-Din's death in May 1174 when Saladin failed to act according to his master's wishes:
1. September 1171 - The Shaubak retreat:
Saladin and Nur ad-Din planned a joint offensive against the Franks. The strategy was:
- Saladin would attack Shaubak (a Frankish fortress).
- Nur ad-Din would attack Kerak (another Frankish stronghold).
- The two armies would then meet in the middle.
However, Saladin took Shaubak but then retreated before Nur ad-Din reached him. He may have feared that if they met face to face, Nur ad-Din would order him back to Syria, effectively ending his independence in Egypt.
2. 1173 - The Montreal and Kerak campaign:
Saladin launched an attack on the castles at Montreal and Kerak. Nur ad-Din planned to join him, but once again Saladin chose to leave before his arrival. Instead of waiting for his supposed master, Saladin decided to consolidate the territories around Egypt. Nur ad-Din was thus denied another opportunity to confront his supposed servant face to face.
3. 1173 - The financial audit dispute:
Nur ad-Din wanted to use Egypt as a financial resource to fund his campaigns further north in Syria. However, Saladin understood that if Egyptian resources were heavily extracted from the country's population, his own strength and perhaps even his position would be threatened.
When Nur ad-Din ordered a financial audit of Egypt in 1173, Saladin responded cleverly but defiantly. Rather than promising an annual tribute that would drain Egyptian resources, he sent extravagant gifts to Nur ad-Din. This satisfied the immediate demand whilst avoiding any commitment to regular financial support.
The deepening conflict
A contemporary source by Ibn al-Athir reveals the seriousness of the rift:
When Nur al-Din heard what Saladin had done [attacked Shaubak], he left Damascus, also making for Frankish territory to enter it from another direction. Saladin was told: If Nur al-Din enters the lands of the Franks while they are in this situation, you on one side and Nur al-Din on another, he will conquer them and when the Franks are cleared from his route and their king taken, with Nur al-Din there will be no place left in Egypt. If Nur al-Din comes to you here, you will have to meet him and then he will exercise his authority over you as he wishes.
This source shows that Saladin's advisers believed that if he met Nur ad-Din face to face, he would have to submit to his authority. Therefore, avoiding direct confrontation was essential to maintaining his independence.
The source continues:
Saladin then withdrew from Shawbak to return to Egypt, without taking it from the Franks... He made his excuses at length but Nur al-Din did not accept them. His attitude towards him changed and he resolved to enter Egypt and expel him.
This reveals that by the early 1170s, Nur ad-Din had recognised Saladin's defiance and was planning to invade Egypt to remove him from power. Only Nur ad-Din's death in May 1174 prevented this confrontation.
Symbolic gestures of jihad
Despite the growing rift, Nur ad-Din continued to emphasise his role as leader of jihad. In 1168-69, he commissioned a minbar (a platform from which a sermon is delivered by an imam or religious leader). His intention was to place this in the Aqsa Mosque once he had conquered Jerusalem. This powerful symbol demonstrated his commitment to the ultimate goal of recapturing the holy city.
Ironically, it would be Saladin, not Nur ad-Din, who would eventually complete this task. When Jerusalem was captured in 1187, Saladin placed Nur ad-Din's minbar in the Aqsa Mosque, fulfilling his former master's ambition.
Key Points to Remember:
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Nur ad-Din's power had significant limitations - Despite military successes between 1154-69, Muslim Syria lacked the resources for an all-out assault on the crusader states, making Egypt strategically essential.
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Egypt was the key to defeating the Franks - Egypt offered wealth, the port of Alexandria, and military manpower that could enable attacks on crusader states from multiple directions.
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Saladin built an independent power base - Through placing family in key positions, creating the loyal Salhiyya military corps, and prioritising Egypt's needs, Saladin established himself as an independent ruler rather than Nur ad-Din's subordinate.
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Saladin defied Nur ad-Din three times - He retreated from Shaubak in 1171, withdrew from Kerak in 1173, and refused to provide regular financial tribute in 1173, avoiding face-to-face meetings that would force his submission.
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Only Nur ad-Din's death prevented civil war - By the early 1170s, Nur ad-Din had resolved to invade Egypt and expel Saladin, but his death in May 1174 prevented this confrontation and left Saladin free to build his own empire.