The Attack on Tiberias (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Attack on Tiberias
Background: Saladin's position in 1187
By 1187, Saladin had completed his consolidation programme across Egypt, Syria and parts of Mesopotamia. This meant he finally had the resources needed to launch a serious campaign against the crusader states. Until this point, Saladin had faced criticism from fellow Muslims for spending more time fighting other Muslim leaders than confronting the Franks. However, this approach had been strategically sound, allowing him to build up overwhelming military strength.
The crusader states, by contrast, received virtually no support from Western Europe. This created a crucial strategic imbalance that Saladin could exploit. By 1187, Saladin commanded the combined forces of three territories, whilst the Franks stood largely alone.
Saladin's call to jihad
In 1187, Saladin adopted the role of jihad (holy war) leader that had been established by Zengi and Nur ad-Din before him. He sent messages across his territories calling Muslims to arms for the holy war against the Franks.
Historical Source: Ibn al-Athir's Account
The historian Ibn al-Athir described how Saladin "wrote to all the provinces to call them to arms in the Holy War. He wrote to Mosul in the Jazira, to Arbela and other eastern states, to Egypt and to the Syrian domains."
This demonstrates the wide geographical reach of Saladin's authority by this stage and shows how he mobilized forces from across his territories.
Saladin gave command of one army to his son, al-Malik al-Afdal Ali, whilst he himself led another contingent. The purpose was partly to protect pilgrims (including some of Saladin's own relations) from attacks by Reynald of Châtillon (referred to as Arnat of al-Karak in the source).
The military balance
The key factor that would determine the 1187 campaign was numerical superiority. Saladin had spent years building up forces that far outnumbered what the crusader states could assemble.
The Decisive Numbers Advantage
Saladin's forces (May 1187):
- Approximately 30,000 men in total
- Including around 12,000 cavalry
King Guy's forces (June 1187):
- Approximately 20,000 men in total
- Including around 1,200 mounted knights
This meant Saladin had a advantage in overall numbers, but crucially a advantage in cavalry. This numerical superiority would prove decisive, but only if Saladin could force the Franks into open battle.
The defeat at Cresson
The invasion of the kingdom of Jerusalem began with a smaller Muslim force of around 7,000 men led by Saladin's son, al-Afdal. This force entered Galilee under the terms of a treaty that had been negotiated with Raymond III of Tripoli and planned to attack coastal areas.
A Christian force of approximately 130 knights decided to intercept and stop al-Afdal's raiders. This proved to be a catastrophic mistake. The Christian knights were heavily outnumbered and were defeated and killed at Cresson.
Significance of Cresson
This small battle demonstrated the first example of Frankish numerical inferiority. It showed what would happen when Christian forces faced Muslim armies in open combat without adequate numbers. This numerical disadvantage would become the central factor in Saladin's subsequent successes.
Saladin's strategic thinking
Saladin had learned important lessons from his earlier campaign in 1183. He understood that if he allowed the Franks to remain in defensive positions, the campaign would become lengthy, costly and demoralising. The crusaders would simply move from one castle or fortified city to another, avoiding a major confrontation.
Saladin's Key Strategic Insight
Saladin's strategy for 1187 was to draw the Franks into battle. He wanted a large-scale confrontation because only in open battle would his superior numbers give him the decisive advantage he needed. This required setting a trap that would be too tempting for the Frankish leadership to resist.
The attack on Tiberias (2 July 1187)
In July 1187, the invasion began in earnest. On 2 July, a smaller contingent from Saladin's forces attacked and captured the town of Tiberias. However, the citadel (the fortified stronghold within the town) held out and remained in Frankish hands.
The trap: This was deliberate. Saladin had now laid his trap and hoped that King Guy of Jerusalem would make the unwise decision to march his entire army down the treacherous, steep path that descended into Tiberias to confront him.
Why was this a trap?
The Tiberias Trap Explained
The route to Tiberias presented several problems for an army:
- It involved a difficult descent down steep paths
- The journey would be exhausting for the troops
- It would take the Frankish army away from defensive positions
- It would allow Saladin to choose the ground for battle
Despite these dangers, King Guy made exactly the decision Saladin had hoped for. On the night of 2-3 July, Guy began the march to Tiberias. This was recognised as a huge mistake, possibly because Guy believed Saladin had only a relatively small force at Tiberias.
Significance: The decision to march set the scene for the battle that Saladin had been planning. The Franks were now committed to moving through difficult terrain towards a position where Saladin's superior numbers could be brought to bear effectively.
Strategic significance
The attack on Tiberias was not primarily about capturing the town itself. Instead, it served several strategic purposes:
Testing Frankish decision-making: The attack revealed whether the Frankish leadership would fall into the trap of abandoning defensive positions.
Exploiting numerical advantage: By forcing the Franks to march in difficult conditions, Saladin created circumstances where his larger army could surround and overwhelm the crusaders.
Building momentum: The success at Cresson followed by the capture of Tiberias town created psychological pressure on the Frankish leadership to respond.
Setting up a decisive battle: Rather than a prolonged siege warfare campaign, Saladin created conditions for the major confrontation that became the Battle of Hattin.
The road to Hattin
King Guy's poor decision to march became increasingly apparent during the journey down to Tiberias. The Frankish army was now committed to a course of action that played directly into Saladin's strategic plan. The stage was set for the Battle of Hattin, which would prove to be one of the most decisive encounters of the entire crusading period.
The attack on Tiberias represents a masterclass in strategic planning. Saladin had:
- Built up overwhelming military resources through years of consolidation
- Learned from previous campaigns that he needed to force open battle
- Created a situation that tempted the Frankish leadership into abandoning their defensive advantages
- Set the conditions for a decisive confrontation where his numerical superiority would be decisive
Key Points to Remember:
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Numerical superiority was key: Saladin had 30,000 troops to Guy's 20,000 troops, with a 10:1 advantage in cavalry. This only mattered if he could force open battle.
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The defeat at Cresson demonstrated Frankish numerical inferiority for the first time, showing what would happen when Christian forces met Muslim armies in open combat.
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The attack on Tiberias was a deliberate trap: Saladin captured the town but allowed the citadel to hold out, creating a situation that would tempt King Guy to march his army into unfavourable terrain.
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Strategic thinking: Saladin had learned from 1183 that allowing the Franks to stay defensive led to stalemate. He needed to draw them into battle where his superior numbers would be decisive.
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King Guy's decision to march on 2-3 July 1187 was the crucial mistake that led directly to the disaster at Hattin, arguably changing the course of crusading history.