The Battle of Hattin (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Battle of Hattin
Background: Saladin's preparation for war
By 1187, Saladin had completed a lengthy consolidation programme that had strengthened Muslim power across the Near East. Throughout the early 1180s, he had focused more on fighting fellow Muslims than the Frankish crusader states. This strategy, whilst unpopular with some Muslim leaders, proved highly effective in building the resources needed for a successful jihad (holy war) against the Christians.
Saladin's Strategic Truces
Saladin negotiated several truces with the Franks during this period to focus on consolidating Muslim territories:
- The 1180 truce gave him time to intervene in disputes between the Seljuks and the Artuqids
- The 1185 truce provided breathing space to attack Mosul and force Izz al-Din to support him
- He also made a truce with the Byzantine emperor to secure his borders
These truces were strategic decisions. Saladin recognised he needed to tackle one threat at a time.
By 1187, with his consolidation complete, he was finally ready to confront the crusader states.
Muslim unity and Saladin's challenges
Whilst Saladin is often portrayed as a powerful unifying figure in the Muslim world, the reality was more complex. He faced opposition from several Muslim leaders, including:
- The Abbasid caliph of Baghdad, al-Nasir, who distrusted him
- The Seljuks of Iran and Anatolia
- The Almohads in North Africa
This distrust developed because Saladin had spent most of his career fighting fellow Muslims rather than the Franks. Only in the final years of his life (1187-1193) did he focus exclusively on holy war. This lack of broader Muslim support from outside his territories would later prove significant, particularly in his struggle to achieve naval supremacy and his failure to capture Tyre after the Third Crusade.
The attack on Tiberias
In 1187, Saladin finally embraced the role of jihad leader that had been established by Zengi and Nur ad-Din before him. Until this point, he had faced fierce criticism for prioritising conflicts against fellow Muslims over Christians. However, his consolidation policy had been strategically sound, giving him time to build up the military resources needed to defeat the crusader states.
Saladin's military advantage
By 1187, Saladin commanded the combined forces of three countries (Egypt, Syria, and the Jazira), whilst the crusaders struggled to obtain any support from Western Europe. This gave him a crucial numerical superiority:
Muslim forces (May 1187):
- Total troops: approximately 30,000 men
- Cavalry: approximately 12,000
Frankish forces (June 1187):
- Total troops: approximately 20,000 men
- Mounted knights: approximately 1,200
Initial skirmishes
The invasion began with a small Muslim force of around 7,000 men led by Saladin's son, al-Afdal. Operating under a treaty with Raymond III of Tripoli, this force entered Galilee with plans to attack the coast.
A small Christian force of approximately 130 knights attempted to stop al-Afdal but were defeated and killed at Cresson. This was the first demonstration of the Franks' numerical inferiority, a factor that would prove decisive in the coming battle.
Saladin's strategic plan
Saladin's plan was carefully designed to force the Franks into open battle. His experience in 1183 had taught him that allowing the crusaders to remain in defensive positions led to lengthy, costly campaigns with low morale. The Franks would simply move between castles and fortified cities, avoiding large-scale confrontation.
Why Saladin Wanted Open Battle
Saladin wanted a major battle because only then would his superior numbers give him the decisive advantage needed for victory. To achieve this, he set a trap.
On 2 July 1187, a small Muslim force attacked and captured the town of Tiberias, though its citadel (fortified stronghold) continued to resist. The trap was now laid. Saladin hoped that King Guy of Jerusalem would unwisely commit his entire army to march down the treacherous, steep path into Tiberias.
Fortunately for the Muslims, this is exactly what Guy decided to do.
The march to disaster
3 July: The descent to Tiberias
On the night of 2-3 July, King Guy began his march to Tiberias. This decision would prove catastrophic. Guy's forces had to descend 1,500 feet towards the town, and during this descent, Muslim forces launched countless small attacks on the Frankish army.
These attacks weakened the Christians, but the most critical moment came at the village of Turan. This was the last point where Guy's army would have access to water. Despite this, Guy ordered his troops to march on.
The night at Meskenah
As night fell, the Frankish army, slowed by continuous Muslim harassment, had not reached Tiberias. Guy ordered his exhausted troops to camp at Meskenah for the night.
Saladin, demonstrating superior logistics, had arranged for water to be transported to his troops via camels from Lake Tiberias. He then prepared for the final battle whilst his forces raided Guy's camp repeatedly throughout the night.
The Franks' Three Critical Problems
The Franks faced three critical problems at Meskenah:
- No water - they were desperately thirsty in the summer heat
- No sleep - constant Muslim raids prevented rest
- No hope - they were trapped between the enemy and their destination
The next day would prove very difficult for the exhausted, dehydrated Frankish army.
The Battle of Hattin: 4 July 1187
Desperate for water
On 4 July, Guy changed his strategy because his troops were now desperate for water. They began heading towards the springs at Hattin, but Saladin's army blocked their way. With no other practical option, Guy gathered his forces on the hills at the Horns of Hattin, among the remains of an ancient fortification. From this position, the Franks made their final attempt to defeat Saladin.
The final confrontation
The battle lasted well into the day. A small force under Raymond III of Tripoli managed to escape, but Guy's main army was trapped and exhausted. In his final move, Guy launched two cavalry charges against Saladin's forces, but these had little effect against the superior Muslim numbers.
The outcome
The battle ended in complete defeat for the Franks:
- King Guy and many important nobles, including Reynald of Châtillon, were taken prisoner
- The True Cross, originally captured during the First Crusade, was taken by Muslim forces
- The Frankish army, exhausted and desperate for water, had been decisively defeated
This was exactly the type of decisive victory Saladin had planned for. The defeat of the main Frankish army in open battle would now allow him to conquer the crusader states rapidly.
The effects of the Battle of Hattin
The execution of Reynald of Châtillon
After the battle, Saladin settled an old score with Reynald. Both Reynald and King Guy were brought before Saladin, and Guy was offered water. This was a traditional ritual signalling that Guy would be allowed to live. When Guy tried to pass the water to Reynald, Saladin reprimanded him.
The Ritual of Water and Mercy
The two prisoners were sent away, and only Reynald was called back. Saladin, angry about Reynald's earlier attack on a Muslim caravan, offered him the chance to convert to Islam. When Reynald rejected this offer, Saladin personally beheaded him.
The message was clear: Saladin would show mercy to those who cooperated, but little mercy to those who had wronged him.
Guy's fate
King Guy was spared according to the ritual of offering water. However, Saladin's generosity would later work against him. Guy was eventually released after promising never to fight against Saladin again. Yet Guy, claiming the promise had been made under duress, was released from it and later led the assault that resulted in the Franks retaking Acre. This demonstrated that Saladin's mercy, whilst enhancing his reputation, sometimes undermined his military goals.
Rapid conquests across Outremer
Why cities fell so quickly
Two factors explain the rapid collapse of Frankish territories:
Key Factors in Rapid Conquest
- Fear of Saladin following his decisive victory
- Lack of defenders - most city garrisons (defending forces) had sent their troops to help Guy, leaving cities virtually undefended
Saladin employed a lightning strike approach. If any city offered significant resistance and threatened to slow him down with a lengthy siege (such as Tyre), he simply bypassed it and moved on to easier targets.
Timeline of conquests
- 5 July 1187: Tiberias capitulates (the citadel, defended by Raymond III's wife Eschiva, surrenders)
- 9 July: The important coastal town of Acre capitulates
- 19 July: Sidon is taken
- 6 August: Beirut surrenders
- 5 September: Ascalon is captured, completing most coastal conquests (only Tyre survives)
By the end of 1187, only a few cities such as Tortosa and Antioch, and a handful of castles including Krak des Chevaliers and Beaufort, remained under Frankish control.
The fall of Jerusalem: 2 October 1187
A desperate defence
Jerusalem was defended by Balian of Nablus, but the city's defence was desperately undermanned. In an attempt to create an effective fighting force, Balian knighted any nobleman over the age of 16. However, without an army in the field or a fully manned garrison, Balian had little chance of success.
Saladin's mercy
The city fell after a short siege on 2 October 1187. In a demonstration of mercy that significantly improved his reputation, Saladin allowed the citizens of Jerusalem to ransom themselves (pay for their freedom).
Saladin's Merciful Treatment
For example:
- 7,000 of the poor were granted freedom for a payment of 30,000 bezants (a form of currency)
- Few were allowed to remain as free men
- The Franks left the city they had held for almost a century
This merciful treatment contrasted sharply with the Frankish massacre of Muslims when Jerusalem was first captured in 1099, and it enhanced Saladin's status as a pious and honourable leader of the jihad.
Consolidation: 1188-1190
Slowing down to secure gains
After capturing Jerusalem, Saladin had taken most of the coast and the most important inland city. However, numerous castles and some cities remained in Frankish hands. Muslim forces now had to slow down and commit to a series of sieges to consolidate (strengthen and secure) their position.
Saladin's Consolidation Timeline
Saladin's consolidation movements included:
- July 1188: Capturing Jabala and Latakia on the southern approach to Antioch
- September 1188: Taking the fortress at Baghras and Darbsak, north of Antioch
- 1188-1190: Long sieges of isolated castles (for example, Kerak fell in November 1188, but Beaufort did not surrender until April 1190)
Repeating a successful strategy
Saladin's consolidation programme after Jerusalem mirrored his earlier policies in Egypt, Syria, and the Jazira. He dedicated time to thoroughly securing each territory rather than rushing ahead. This methodical approach helped ensure that Jerusalem would remain in Muslim hands rather than fall to the participants of the Third Crusade.
Exam focus
Significance of the Battle of Hattin
The Battle of Hattin was the most decisive crusader defeat in the entire crusading period because:
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Destruction of military power: The capture of King Guy and most Frankish nobles, along with the death or capture of most knights, left the crusader states virtually defenceless
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Psychological impact: The capture of the True Cross was a devastating symbolic blow to Christian morale
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Strategic consequences: Without an army in the field, cities and castles could not resist Saladin effectively, leading to rapid conquests
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Loss of Jerusalem: The ultimate consequence was the fall of Jerusalem itself after nearly 90 years of Christian rule
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Triggered the Third Crusade: The disaster prompted a major response from Western Europe, though even this could not fully restore Frankish power
Guy's critical mistakes
When analysing the battle, identify Guy's key errors:
Critical Errors by King Guy
- Poor timing: Beginning the march at night in summer heat
- Ignoring water supplies: Passing Turan, the last water source
- Predictability: Falling into Saladin's trap exactly as planned
- Underestimating numbers: Possibly believing Saladin had a smaller force than reality
- Refusing to retreat: Camping at Meskenah rather than withdrawing to a defensible position
Saladin's strengths
Consider what this battle reveals about Saladin's leadership:
- Strategic planning: Setting an effective trap at Tiberias
- Logistics: Ensuring water supply for his troops via camel transport
- Patience: Waiting years for the right moment after consolidating power
- Tactical awareness: Using numerical superiority through open battle rather than sieges
- Psychological warfare: Night raids to exhaust and demoralise the enemy
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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Saladin's consolidation before 1187 gave him crucial numerical superiority (30,000 vs 20,000 troops), making victory possible
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Guy's fatal mistake was marching to Tiberias in the heat without securing water supplies, leaving his army exhausted and dehydrated
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The Battle of Hattin on 4 July 1187 resulted in the capture of King Guy, Reynald of Châtillon, and the True Cross, destroying Frankish military power
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Rapid conquests followed because city garrisons were undermanned, having sent troops to support Guy - most cities fell within weeks
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Jerusalem fell on 2 October 1187 after a short siege, but Saladin showed mercy by allowing inhabitants to ransom themselves rather than face massacre