The Fall of Jerusalem to Saladin, 1187 (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Fall of Jerusalem to Saladin, 1187
Context: After the Battle of Hattin
Following Saladin's decisive victory at the Battle of Hattin on 4 July 1187, the Frankish kingdom of Jerusalem was left dangerously vulnerable. Most city garrisons had sent their soldiers to support King Guy in the battle, leaving towns and cities across the kingdom desperately short of defenders. This weakness, combined with widespread fear of Saladin's advancing forces, created perfect conditions for rapid Muslim conquest.
The outcome of Hattin was catastrophic for the Franks. With most fighting men either dead or captured in a single battle, entire cities were left virtually defenceless. This unprecedented vulnerability allowed Saladin to achieve in months what might normally have taken years of campaigning.
Saladin employed a lightning strike approach to his campaign. Rather than wasting time and resources on lengthy sieges, he moved swiftly from one target to the next. If any city showed signs of strong resistance that might slow his momentum—such as Tyre—he simply bypassed it and continued his advance. This strategy proved devastatingly effective, allowing him to capture most of the kingdom in just a few months.
Saladin's conquest of Outremer: Timeline of key events
July 1187: The coastal conquests begin
5 July: Tiberias became the first city to surrender to Saladin's forces, capitulating immediately after the Battle of Hattin. The citadel, which was under the control of Eschiva (wife of Raymond III of Tripoli), held out slightly longer but surrendered on 9 July.
9 July: The important coastal town of Acre capitulated. This was a significant loss for the Franks, as Acre was a major port and trading centre.
19 July: Another coastal settlement, Sidon, fell to Saladin without significant resistance.
August-September 1187: Completing the coastal campaign
6 August: Further north along the coast, Beirut surrendered to Saladin's advancing forces.
5 September: To complete his coastal conquests, Saladin captured Ascalon. After this rapid series of victories, only the city of Tyre survived Saladin's coastal invasion force, having successfully resisted his attacks.
Results of the lightning campaign
By the end of 1187, the transformation of the political landscape was dramatic. Only a handful of Frankish strongholds remained under Christian control, including:
- A few cities such as Tortosa and Antioch
- Several major castles including Krak des Chevaliers and Beaufort
The speed of Saladin's campaign was extraordinary. In just five months, he captured the vast majority of the Frankish kingdom. This rapid conquest demonstrated both his military skill and the fundamental weakness of the Frankish kingdom after Hattin—a kingdom that had taken the First Crusade decades to establish was largely dismantled in a matter of months.
The fall of Jerusalem: 2 October 1187
The desperate defence
Jerusalem itself was defended by Balian of Nablus, but the situation was dire from the outset. The city's defences were desperately undermanned, with most of the kingdom's fighting men either dead or captured at Hattin.
In an attempt to create an effective defensive force, Balian took the extraordinary step of knighting any nobleman over the age of 16, regardless of their military experience or training. This desperate measure—turning inexperienced teenagers into knights—demonstrates just how catastrophic the losses at Hattin had been for the Frankish military capability.
However, these emergency measures could not compensate for the lack of a proper army in the field or a fully manned garrison. Without adequate military resources, Balian stood little realistic chance of success against Saladin's forces.
The siege and surrender
The city fell after only a short siege on 2 October 1187. This marked the end of nearly a century of Frankish control over Christianity's most holy city—Jerusalem had been in Christian hands since the First Crusade captured it in 1099.
Saladin's merciful terms
In a demonstration of mercy that significantly improved Saladin's reputation throughout the medieval world, he allowed the citizens of Jerusalem to ransom themselves rather than face enslavement or death. The ransom terms were structured as follows:
- 7,000 of the poor were granted their freedom for a collective payment of 30,000 bezants (a bezant was a gold coin used as currency in the region)
- Individual ransoms were set for others based on their wealth and status
Very few Christians were permitted to remain behind as free citizens. The vast majority of the Frankish population left the city that they had controlled for almost a century, marking a profound shift in the balance of power in the Holy Land.
Consolidation: Saladin's strategy after Jerusalem, 1188-1190
After capturing Jerusalem and most of the coastal cities, Saladin had achieved remarkable success. However, the landscape of Outremer still contained numerous castles and some cities that remained under Frankish control. Saladin now had to shift his strategy from rapid conquest to careful consolidation—slowing down to commit his forces to a series of sieges that would secure his gains.
Consolidation was essential to Saladin's long-term strategy. Without capturing the remaining Frankish strongholds, isolated pockets of Christian resistance could serve as bases for counter-attacks or rallying points for future crusader armies. By systematically eliminating these positions, Saladin aimed to make Muslim control of Jerusalem permanent and irreversible.
This consolidation programme occupied Saladin for the next three years and involved several key campaigns:
The southern approach to Antioch (July 1188)
Saladin captured Jabala and Latakia in July 1188. These conquests helped secure the approaches to Antioch from the south, preventing the Franks from using these positions to threaten Muslim-held territory.
Defences further north (September 1188)
In September 1188, Saladin took the fortress at Baghras and Darbsak. These strongholds lay to the north of Antioch, further tightening Muslim control over the region and limiting the Franks' ability to manoeuvre.
Long sieges of isolated castles (1188-1190)
Saladin targeted a number of castles that remained in Frankish hands between 1188 and 1190. These sieges were often lengthy and costly:
- Kerak fell in November 1188 after a determined siege
- Beaufort did not surrender until April 1190, requiring an 18-month campaign to capture
Strategic purpose of consolidation
Saladin's consolidation programme mirrored his earlier policies in Egypt, Syria, and the Jazira. By dedicating time and resources to capturing these remaining strongholds, he ensured that Jerusalem would remain securely in Muslim hands. This careful consolidation proved crucial, as it meant the participants of the Third Crusade (which began arriving in 1189) would find it extremely difficult to recapture the holy city.
Saladin's reputation for humanity and generosity
Saladin's treatment of defeated enemies became legendary and helped establish his status as a pious leader of the jihad (holy war). Numerous contemporary accounts describe his generosity and mercy, which stood in stark contrast to the behaviour of many medieval military leaders.
Examples of Saladin's mercy
The Women of Jerusalem
After the capture of Jerusalem, a group of female Franks approached Saladin seeking help to find their husbands and fathers. Saladin agreed to their request and began an investigation.
When their male relatives were found among the prisoners captured at the Battle of Hattin, Saladin released them without ransom. If the men were discovered to have been killed in battle, Saladin gave the women presents as compensation for their loss.
This act of compassion demonstrated Saladin's commitment to mercy even when dealing with the families of his enemies.
The Old Pilgrim at Acre
When Saladin captured Acre, an elderly Christian pilgrim was taken prisoner. The old man had travelled to Outremer specifically to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.
After the pilgrim appealed directly to Saladin, the Muslim leader allowed him to go free so he could travel on to Jerusalem and fulfil his religious vow—despite the fact that Jerusalem was now under Muslim control and the pilgrim was technically an enemy.
When mercy backfired: The case of King Guy
Saladin's generosity sometimes worked against his own interests. After the Battle of Hattin, he eventually released King Guy of Jerusalem after Guy promised never to fight against Saladin's interests again. However, Guy argued that this promise had been made under duress (as a prisoner) and therefore was not binding. Released from his oath, Guy went on to lead the vigorous assault that resulted in the Franks retaking Acre.
This episode reveals a crucial weakness in Saladin's approach: his mercy and honour sometimes prevented him from making the most strategically advantageous decisions. A more ruthless commander might have kept Guy imprisoned or executed him, thereby preventing the strong Frankish resistance that would later develop at Acre.
The significance of Saladin's humanity
Saladin's kindness served several purposes:
- It bolstered his status in the eyes of fellow Muslims, who saw him as embodying the ideals of Islamic leadership
- It made the truce that ended the Third Crusade more acceptable to the Franks, who had come to respect him
- It contrasted favourably with some of the brutality shown by Christian crusaders
However, as the case of King Guy demonstrates, Saladin's merciful approach did not always serve his military objectives. His reputation for humanity was genuine, but it occasionally allowed his enemies to regroup and fight another day.
Saladin's position after 1187: New challenges emerge
Despite the extraordinary accomplishments of 1187 and the relative success of the consolidation programme that followed, Saladin began to face serious problems that would ultimately help the Third Crusade achieve some significant victories, particularly at Acre.
Three Critical Problems Emerged:
After his stunning victories in 1187, Saladin faced mounting challenges that would weaken his position and create opportunities for the Third Crusade. Understanding these problems is essential to explaining why the Muslim position deteriorated between 1187 and 1191.
Loss of troops
After the lightning pace of the 1187 campaigns, military operations began to slow considerably in 1188. Many of Saladin's allies wanted to return home with their forces. This fragmentation of his army significantly weakened Saladin's position:
- Taqi al-Din returned to Mosul, taking troops from the surrounding region with him
- Al-Adil went back to Egypt with his forces
- Al-Zahir departed for Aleppo
The departure of these key allies and their armies left Saladin with fewer troops to prosecute his campaigns and defend his gains.
Funding difficulties
Maintaining armies in the field was enormously expensive. The prolonged nature of the campaigns after 1187 placed severe financial strain on Saladin and his supporters. Imad al-Din, one of Saladin's emirs, complained in early 1189 that he faced serious financial difficulties. The cost of keeping troops supplied, fed, and paid while besieging stubborn Frankish strongholds was draining Muslim resources at an alarming rate.
Frankish resistance
While Jerusalem had capitulated relatively quickly, other Christian possessions continued to fight with determination, forcing Saladin to abandon certain objectives or divert resources. A notable example occurred in 1188, when a Sicilian fleet arrived and prevented Saladin from capturing Tripoli. This demonstrated that the Franks could still receive naval support from Christian Europe, complicating Saladin's efforts to complete his conquests.
The siege of Acre begins: August 1189
Strategic importance of Acre
Acre was a crucial port city that Saladin had captured in 1187. Its importance to both sides could hardly be overstated—whoever controlled Acre possessed a vital naval base that could supply and reinforce campaigns throughout the kingdom of Jerusalem. For the Franks, recapturing Acre was essential if they hoped to mount a successful campaign to regain their lost territories.
Control of Acre meant control of the sea routes to the Holy Land. Without a major port, the crusaders could not effectively land reinforcements, supplies, or siege equipment from Europe. This is why both sides were willing to commit massive resources to the struggle for this single city.
King Guy's bold move
In August 1189, King Guy made a daring decision. With the troops that had either survived or avoided the disaster at Hattin, he marched to Acre and began to besiege it. Guy's forces camped outside the city walls and settled in for what would become one of the longest and most significant sieges of the crusading period.
Saladin's response
Saladin initially prevaricated, worried that the siege might be a deliberate trick or diversion designed to draw him into a trap while the Franks attacked elsewhere. However, he eventually recognised the genuine threat to Acre and came to the city's rescue in September 1189.
On 15 September 1189, Muslim forces launched a major attack on Guy's camp, attempting to destroy the besieging force. However, the assault failed to break the Frankish siege. The crusaders responded in kind on 4 October 1189, attacking Saladin's positions, but they too made no significant progress.
Stalemate develops
By 23 October 1189, both sides found themselves entrenched in their positions with neither able to dislodge the other. Saladin was camped outside Guy's siege lines, effectively besieging the besiegers, while Guy continued to blockade Acre itself. Recognising that he needed reinforcements to break this deadlock, Saladin requested help from his allies in northern Syria and Iraq.
However, these reinforcements did not arrive until early summer 1190, and Saladin chose to delay further major action until they appeared. This decision would prove costly, as it gave the Franks time to consolidate their position and receive reinforcements of their own.
Why did the 1190 campaign to relieve Acre fail?
By November 1190, after another full year of campaigning, Saladin found himself in essentially the same situation as in October 1189. Both sides remained trapped in a frustrating stalemate, with neither able to achieve a decisive breakthrough.
The Coordination Failure
The main reason for the lack of progress was Saladin's failure to effectively co-ordinate his Muslim allied forces. Unlike his brilliantly executed lightning campaign of 1187, the Acre campaign suffered from poor timing, miscommunication, and conflicting priorities among his allies.
The failure to co-ordinate Muslim forces
Several crucial timing problems undermined Saladin's campaign:
Zangi of Sinjar: This ally arrived too early in 1190, before Saladin was ready to make use of his troops. As a result, Zangi's forces were sent back home without contributing to the campaign, wasting a valuable opportunity.
Kilij Arslan: This important ally did not arrive until October 1190, far too late to participate in the planned summer offensive. His delay was caused by the need to redirect his troops northwards to deal with the threat from Frederick Barbarossa's German crusaders, who were approaching through Anatolia.
Saladin's own priorities: Even Saladin himself slowed down progress through his decision to focus on the conquest of Beaufort Castle first. This siege kept him out of the Acre campaign until the castle finally surrendered on 2 April 1190, wasting precious months.
The financial and military consequences
The delays had two major negative effects on Saladin's position:
Enormous financial costs: Keeping troops in the field for such an extended period was extraordinarily expensive. In a letter to an ally, Saladin estimated that his expenditure was running at around 20,000 dinars per day. This massive drain on resources could not be sustained indefinitely, putting severe pressure on Saladin's ability to maintain his forces.
To put this figure in perspective, 20,000 dinars per day meant Saladin was spending approximately 7.3 million dinars per year just to maintain the siege at Acre. This level of expenditure was unsustainable even for a wealthy ruler, explaining why financial pressures became one of the critical factors in the eventual Muslim defeat at Acre.
Opportunity for Frankish reinforcement: The stalemate at Acre gave the Third Crusade time to organise and send reinforcements. European crusaders, including the forces of King Richard I of England and King Philip II of France, were en route to the Holy Land. When they arrived, they would dramatically shift the balance of power in favour of the Franks, ultimately leading to the fall of Acre to the crusaders in 1191.
Key Points to Remember:
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After the Battle of Hattin (4 July 1187), Saladin used a lightning strike strategy to rapidly capture most Frankish cities, which were left undermanned and fearful.
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Jerusalem fell to Saladin on 2 October 1187 after a short siege. Saladin showed remarkable mercy by allowing citizens to ransom themselves, which greatly enhanced his reputation throughout the medieval world.
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Saladin spent 1188-1190 consolidating his gains through careful sieges of remaining Frankish strongholds, including Kerak (fell November 1188) and Beaufort (fell April 1190).
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Despite his successes, Saladin faced three major problems after 1187: loss of troops as allies returned home, funding difficulties (costing 20,000 dinars per day at Acre), and continuing Frankish resistance.
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The Siege of Acre (beginning August 1189) ended in stalemate because Saladin failed to co-ordinate his allied forces effectively. Poor timing meant reinforcements arrived either too early or too late to be useful, while the enormous financial costs weakened his position and allowed the Third Crusade time to arrive and eventually recapture the city.