Automatism/Non-Insane Automatism (OCR A-Level Law): Revision Notes
Automatism/Non-Insane Automatism
What is automatism?
Automatism is a complete defence available when a defendant's consciousness becomes so impaired that they act in a state of physical involuntariness. Since the defendant cannot control their actions, they cannot form the necessary mens rea (mental element) for a crime, regardless of how serious the consequences may be.
The leading definition comes from Lord Denning in Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland (1963), who described automatism as:
an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleepwalking.
In practical terms, automatism applies when the defendant's muscles react without any control from the mind. This complete lack of mental control means there is no mens rea, and therefore no criminal liability.
The key to understanding automatism is recognizing that it addresses situations where the defendant's body acts independently of their conscious mind. This is fundamentally different from situations where someone consciously commits an act but lacks the intent (mens rea) to commit a crime - automatism means there is no conscious act at all.
Burden of proof
When automatism is raised as a defence, the burden of proof operates on two levels:
Evidential burden: The defence must provide sufficient evidence to raise the issue of automatism. This means presenting evidence that makes automatism a realistic possibility.
Legal burden: Once automatism is raised, the prosecution bears the legal burden of disproving it beyond reasonable doubt.
This was confirmed in Hill v Baxter (1958) and R v C (2007), which established that if automatism is successfully proven, the defendant receives a complete acquittal.
Understanding the Two-Level Burden:
The defence doesn't need to prove automatism occurred - they only need to raise it as a genuine possibility by providing some evidence. Once they've met this evidential burden, the burden shifts to the prosecution to disprove automatism beyond reasonable doubt. This is the legal burden, and if the prosecution cannot meet it, the defendant must be acquitted.
Essential requirements for automatism
External factor
For automatism to succeed, the loss of control must result from an external factor. This is the key distinction between automatism (non-insane) and insanity (which involves internal factors).
Examples of external factors that can give rise to automatism include:
- Being struck on the head by an object
- Slipping on ice
- Sudden illness
- Physical reactions such as hiccups or coughing fits
- Radical external events, such as being attacked by a swarm of bees (Kay v Butterworth (1945))
- Severe external stress or trauma
The external/internal distinction in practice
The distinction between external and internal factors can be seen in the contrasting cases involving diabetes. This distinction is crucial but can seem arbitrary in practice, as the following examples demonstrate:
Worked Example: External vs Internal Factors in Diabetes Cases
R v Quick (1973) - External Factor = Automatism
- Facts: Diabetic defendant attacked a patient after taking insulin but not eating enough food
- Analysis: The cause of the automatic state was the insulin injection (an external intervention)
- Result: Defence of automatism available
R v Hennessy (1989) - Internal Factor = Insanity
- Facts: Diabetic defendant failed to take insulin for three days before taking a car
- Analysis: The cause was the diabetes itself and its natural progression without treatment
- Result: Classified as insanity, not automatism
Key Distinction: The same medical condition (diabetes) can lead to either automatism or insanity depending on whether the cause is external treatment (Quick) or the internal disease process itself (Hennessy).
The Arbitrary Nature of the External/Internal Distinction:
The diabetes cases highlight a significant criticism of the automatism defence. In both Quick and Hennessy, the defendants suffered from the same condition and experienced similar states of impaired consciousness. The only difference was the immediate cause - yet this led to completely different legal outcomes: complete acquittal (Quick) versus a special verdict of insanity (Hennessy). This distinction has been criticized as arbitrary and potentially unfair.
External stress and PTSD
The courts have taken an inconsistent approach to whether severe psychological trauma can constitute an external factor:
R v T (1990): The defendant participated in a robbery three days after being raped, claiming she was in a dream-like state due to PTSD. The court accepted this could be automatism, ruling that external stress can give rise to automatism if sufficiently severe. The judge rejected the prosecution's argument that opening a pen-knife was a "controlled and positive action", finding the defendant was "acting as though in a dream".
However, this was contradicted in R v Narborough (2004): The defendant argued that childhood sexual abuse caused PTSD with flashbacks that led him to stab the victim. The Court of Appeal rejected this, stating that the defence psychiatrist had not shown that PTSD "affects a person's mental processes that his mind is no longer in control of his actions".
The PTSD Inconsistency Problem:
The treatment of PTSD as a potential basis for automatism reveals a troubling inconsistency in the law. R v T suggested that severe external trauma (rape) could cause an automatic state, while R v Narborough rejected a similar argument based on childhood abuse. The cases are difficult to reconcile and create uncertainty about when, if ever, PTSD can ground an automatism defence. This inconsistency leaves the law in an unclear state and makes it difficult for defendants and their advisers to predict outcomes.
Total loss of control
Automatism requires a complete and total loss of control. Any degree of impaired, reduced, or partial control will invalidate the defence.
A-G Ref. No. 2 of 1992 (1993) illustrates this requirement. The defendant drove in a trance-like state along the motorway's hard shoulder, killing two people. The Court of Appeal dismissed the automatism defence because there was evidence of some control being exercised, even if impaired.
The Strictness of the Total Loss Requirement:
The requirement for total loss of control is exceptionally strict. Even if a defendant's consciousness is severely impaired, if they retain any degree of control over their actions, automatism will fail. This means:
- Reduced awareness ≠ automatism
- Diminished control ≠ automatism
- Impaired judgment ≠ automatism
- Only complete absence of voluntary control = automatism
In A-G Ref. No. 2 of 1992, the fact that the defendant was able to steer the vehicle, even in a trance-like state, showed some control and defeated the defence entirely.
Self-induced automatism
Automatism will not succeed as a defence if the defendant knowingly brought about the automatic state through their own actions. The most common example is voluntary intoxication.
General rule
When automatism is self-induced, the availability of the defence depends on whether the crime charged requires specific or basic intent:
The Specific Intent vs Basic Intent Distinction:
- The defendant will usually have a defence to specific intent crimes (such as murder, robbery, or s.18 GBH)
- The defendant will not have a defence to basic intent crimes (such as manslaughter, assault, or s.20 GBH) if it was their fault that they voluntarily placed themselves in the automatic state
This distinction reflects the principle that a defendant who voluntarily induces an automatic state through their own recklessness should not escape liability for crimes of basic intent, where recklessness itself can satisfy the mens rea.
R v Coley (2013) demonstrates this principle. The defendant pleaded automatism against charges of ABH and s.18 after drinking himself into an involuntary state. The defence was rejected because, even if he was in an involuntary state, this resulted from his own voluntary fault.
Exception: non-reckless self-induced automatism
There is an important exception established in R v Hardy (1984):
The Non-Reckless Exception:
If the defendant does not realise that their self-induced actions would cause automatism, and they were not reckless in bringing about that state, automatism may still be available.
This means that if a defendant unknowingly and non-recklessly brings about an automatic state (for example, by taking medication without realizing it would cause such a reaction), they may still rely on automatism even though it was technically "self-induced".
The rules for self-induced automatism were further developed in R v Bailey (1983), which set out three rules for determining when self-induced automatism can succeed (particularly relevant in cases involving failure to eat after taking medication for conditions like diabetes).
Key cases summary
The following table provides a quick reference to the key cases that have shaped the law on automatism:
| Case | Facts | Legal principle |
|---|---|---|
| Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland (1963) | D strangled his girlfriend during a 'blackout' | Lord Denning established the legal definition of automatism |
| Hill v Baxter (1958) | D hit a car at a junction, claiming to remember nothing | Confirmed the evidential burden of proof is on the defence |
| R v Quick (1973) | Diabetic D attacked a patient after taking insulin but not eating | External factor (insulin) = automatism, not insanity |
| R v Hennessy (1989) | Diabetic D failed to take insulin for three days then took a car | Internal factor (diabetes itself) = insanity, not automatism |
| R v T (1990) | D committed robbery three days after being raped, claiming PTSD | External stress can give rise to automatism if severe enough |
| R v Narborough (2004) | D stabbed V, claiming childhood abuse caused PTSD flashbacks | Court rejected PTSD automatism defence, contradicting R v T |
| A-G Ref. No. 2 of 1992 (1993) | D drove in trance-like state on hard shoulder, killing two people | There must be total loss of control; partial control invalidates the defence |
| R v Coley (2013) | D pleaded automatism after drinking himself into an involuntary state | Self-induced automatism rejected; voluntary intoxication was his fault |
| Kay v Butterworth (1945) | Referenced as example of external factor | Being attacked by a swarm of bees can constitute an external factor |
Exam tips
Problem Question Approach:
When analysing automatism, always address these three key questions in order:
- Is there an external factor? (identify it specifically and explain why it's external rather than internal)
- Is there total loss of control? (remember: any control = no automatism; be strict in your analysis)
- Is it self-induced? (if yes, apply the specific/basic intent distinction and consider the non-reckless exception)
Essay Question Focus Areas:
Be prepared to evaluate and critically discuss:
- The inconsistency in the external/internal distinction (compare Quick and Hennessy - why should the immediate cause matter so much?)
- The problematic approach to PTSD (compare R v T and R v Narborough - which approach is correct?)
- Whether the total loss of control requirement is too strict (should impaired control be sufficient?)
- The relationship between automatism and insanity (why does the external/internal distinction lead to such different outcomes?)
Understanding Command Words:
- "Analyse" = examine the legal requirements and how they apply to the facts
- "Evaluate" = assess strengths and weaknesses, including academic and judicial criticisms
- "Discuss" = present different perspectives and reach a reasoned conclusion
- "Apply" = use the legal principles to solve a problem scenario, showing your working
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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Automatism requires physical involuntariness due to an external factor with total loss of control
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If successful, automatism results in a complete acquittal (unlike insanity, which leads to special verdict)
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The key distinction from insanity is external vs internal causation (compare R v Quick - external insulin = automatism; R v Hennessy - internal diabetes = insanity)
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Self-induced automatism generally fails as a defence to basic intent crimes, but may succeed for specific intent crimes
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The total loss of control must be complete; any partial control invalidates the defence (A-G Ref. No. 2 of 1992)
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Evidential burden on defence, legal burden on prosecution to disprove beyond reasonable doubt