The Military Struggle, 1643–46 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Victory of Parliament
Introduction: addressing Parliament's military failures
By 1644, Parliament faced serious military problems. Despite initial advantages, Parliamentarian forces had failed to secure decisive victories against the King's armies. Poor coordination between different commanders, personal rivalries, and the reluctance of some members of the House of Lords to prosecute the war vigorously all contributed to military stagnation. The solution adopted to address these failures became a turning point in the conflict and ultimately secured Parliament's victory by 1646.
The military failures of 1644 exposed deep divisions within Parliament's forces. These included poor coordination between commanders, personal rivalries among generals, and political tensions between those seeking outright victory and those preferring negotiation. These problems threatened to paralyse Parliament's entire war effort.
The Self-Denying Ordinance
Self-Denying Ordinance refers to an agreement passed in 1645 that separated military and political functions, requiring members of Parliament who held military commands to relinquish one of these roles. The measure allowed failed commanders who were members of the House of Lords to be removed without losing face, whilst simultaneously creating the foundation for more effective military organisation.
Zouch Tate, a member of the War Party, proposed the Ordinance, with Oliver Cromwell providing support. The military setbacks of late 1644 had prompted recriminations among Parliament's generals, exposing political and religious divisions. Cromwell accused the Earl of Manchester and the Earl of Essex of preferring negotiations to outright victory, whilst Manchester and the Scots in turn accused Cromwell of favouring political and religious radicals. These tensions threatened to paralyse Parliament's war effort.
The Self-Denying Ordinance resolved these disputes by permitting a complete reorganisation of Parliament's forces. It enabled the creation of a single, mobile and professional army of 22,000 men—the New Model Army—rather than multiple regional forces with divided loyalties. The commander was to be Sir Thomas Fairfax, a man recognised for his military ability rather than political manoeuvring. His focus would be achieving military success whilst leaving political decisions to others.
An unexpected advantage emerged from this arrangement. Parliament found itself unable to secure a permanent replacement for the position of commander of cavalry immediately. Cromwell was therefore appointed to fulfil the role temporarily on a series of short-term commissions that extended until the war ended. This arrangement allowed Parliament to retain one of its most capable military commanders whilst technically adhering to the principles of the Ordinance.
The New Model Army: composition and character
The New Model Army was officially formed on 4 April 1645, with Sir Thomas Fairfax of Nun Appleton, near Tadcaster, appointed as Lord General to command the entire force. The army consisted of:
- Twelve regiments of Foot, totalling 14,000 men, under Major-General Philip Skippon, who had previously commanded the London Trained Bands and served with the Earl of Essex
- Eleven regiments of Horse, comprising 6,600 men, under Lieutenant-General Oliver Cromwell, formerly Lieutenant-General to the Earl of Manchester in the army from the Eastern Association
- One regiment of dragoons, numbering 1,000 men, armed with muskets
This reorganisation represented more than a simple restructuring. The New Model Army brought together experienced soldiers from various Parliamentary forces, creating a unified command structure that could respond quickly to strategic needs across the country.
The historiographical debate: religious fervour or professional discipline?
The character and effectiveness of the New Model Army has generated considerable historical debate. Understanding different interpretations helps explain both contemporary reactions and the army's actual success.
Historians such as Sir Charles Firth, writing in his 1904 study of Cromwell's Army, explored the religious commitment of many soldiers. Firth argued that the religious separatists recruited by officers like Cromwell, and protected from critics such as the Presbyterian minister Thomas Edwards, created an army dominated by religious radicalism. Richard Baxter, serving as an army chaplain, described in Reliquae Baxterianae (1696) how many soldiers among Cromwell's forces displayed intense religious conviction. Baxter observed: "When I came to the Army among Cromwell's soldiers I heard a new face of things, which I never dreamt of: I heard plotting heads hot upon that which intimated their intention to subvert both Church and State ... I found that many of the honest men of weak judgements and little acquaintance with such matters, had been seduced into a disputing vein, and made it too much of their religion to talk for this opinion and for that; sometimes for State democracy, and sometimes for Church democracy." Baxter's account reveals the genuine religious enthusiasm present within sections of the army, whilst also expressing concern about its political implications.
More recent scholarship has challenged the view that religious fervour alone explained the army's effectiveness. Historians now argue that thorough training, regular pay, and professional discipline mattered more than religious motivation. The New Model Army was not composed entirely of religiously motivated volunteers; many soldiers joined for practical reasons, particularly cavalrymen from gentry backgrounds.
However, enough religiously committed soldiers existed, especially in cavalry regiments, to create a culture of restraint and discipline. These men set standards of behaviour that enforced egalitarian policies more effectively across the force. The promotion system based on merit rather than social status further contributed to maintaining high standards and encouraged dedication to the cause.
The likelihood is that both religious commitment and professional factors worked together. Regular pay meant soldiers did not need to plunder, whilst effective training and a tradition of victory built confidence and mutual respect between officers and men. Many officers, including Cromwell himself, shared their soldiers' religious attitudes to some degree, which encouraged the sense of fighting for a cause. The combination created a formidable fighting force that also had potential to become a political actor in its own right.
Military campaigns and Parliament's victory, 1645-46
The creation of the New Model Army in early 1645 constituted a military revolution, though its full effects took time to materialise. Training the force, establishing unity, and developing a coherent identity required several months. Nevertheless, the army played a decisive role in securing Parliament's ultimate victory.
The Battle of Naseby, June 1645
The Battle of Naseby: A Decisive Victory
The New Model Army's first major test came at Naseby in June 1645. The battle unfolded as follows:
Initial Phase: Rivalries and miscalculations among Royalist commanders initially helped Parliament, but the battle demonstrated the New Model Army's superior discipline and fighting capability.
Command and Execution: Fairfax commanded the Parliamentarian forces effectively, and Cromwell led the cavalry with characteristic aggression and tactical awareness.
Outcome: The Royalists suffered a comprehensive defeat that destroyed the main field army supporting the King.
Beyond the immediate military victory, Naseby provided Parliament with a substantial political advantage. During the battle, Parliamentary forces captured the King's baggage-train, which contained his personal correspondence. When this correspondence was published, it revealed Charles's determination to secure victory on his own terms, the lack of good faith with which he had approached peace negotiations since 1642, and his willingness to seek help from sources including Irish Catholics and the Pope. This disclosure damaged the King's credibility and weakened support for the Royalist cause among those who might otherwise have sought compromise.
The captured correspondence proved as valuable as the military victory itself. It exposed the King's duplicity in negotiations and his willingness to seek Catholic support, undermining his political credibility among moderate supporters who might otherwise have sought compromise.
Subsequent victories and the King's surrender
Following Naseby, Fairfax demonstrated the New Model Army's advantage in mobility and coordination. In June, he defeated Goring's army in Somerset. By September, Rupert had been forced to surrender Bristol. By the end of 1645, Royalist forces had been driven back into Wales and the south-west. The speed with which Fairfax could move his unified force around the country enabled him to eliminate remaining Royalist armies systematically.
In early 1646, the New Model Army took control of Devon and Cornwall. In May, the King accepted defeat, surrendering to the Scots at Southwell in Nottinghamshire on 5 May. From there, he was taken to Newcastle before being handed over (with considerable financial compensation) to the Scots' Parliamentary allies as they withdrew across the border. The war had effectively ended with Parliament's complete military victory.
The weakening of Royalist support
Military success alone does not fully explain Parliament's victory; the erosion of Royalist support played an equally important role. Royalist territories faced increasing demands for taxes, men, and provisions as the war continued. Resentment at the impact of civil war grew steadily among local populations. Many counties experienced outbreaks of Clubmen risings, where local forces and residents combined to oppose all military activity in attempts to defend what remained of their property and livelihoods.
Although this resurgence of neutralism was not confined to Royalist areas, the Clubmen organisations concentrated in the west and west Midlands where Royalist armies had been based. In Somerset, Clubmen joined with Fairfax to drive out Goring's army, which had become notorious for its lack of discipline and brutal treatment of civilians. However, most Clubmen groups remained strictly neutral, seeking protection from all armed forces.
The Clubmen movement represented a significant form of popular resistance to the war's continuation. These local organisations sought to protect their communities from all armies, regardless of allegiance. Their emergence demonstrated growing war-weariness and resentment at the demands placed on civilian populations.
The effect on the Royalist war effort proved greater than on Parliament's forces. The King's armies depended more heavily on provisions seized from local populations, and their crumbling effectiveness and declining morale made them more vulnerable to external pressures. The combination of military defeat, loss of resources, and popular opposition undermined any remaining prospect of Royalist recovery.
Changed attitudes and expectations by 1646
By 1646, Parliament had secured the military victory that MPs hoped would force the King to accept a settlement on their terms. The Nineteen Propositions of 1642 were quickly revived and presented to Charles with some amendments whilst he remained with the Scots' army in Newcastle. However, the situation facing MPs seeking peace had changed dramatically from 1642.
The process of war and the measures taken to secure victory had altered attitudes and expectations in ways that could not have been foreseen at the outbreak of conflict. On one hand, an overwhelming desire for peace existed, influenced by the taxation levels that dwarfed Charles's demands before 1640, the dislocation of trade, and the physical damage and personal suffering the war had caused. This desire translated into renewed support for the Peace Party amongst those wanting a return to pre-war normality.
On the other hand, the war effort and the propaganda required to maintain it had encouraged the development of new ideas and new expectations among those who had fought enthusiastically for Parliament. The emergence of radical thinking—concerning politics, religion, and social organisation—caused immediate concern to those now involved in seeking peace. They worried, probably correctly, that whatever changes had occurred as a result of war, these changes did not extend to the aims, beliefs, and character of Charles I. The King showed no inclination to accept limitations on his authority that went beyond temporary expedients he might later overturn.
Key dates: Parliament's victory
- 1642 – Battle of Edgehill, followed by victory of the London Militia at Turnham Green, prevented the King from entering London
- 1643 – Sieges of Hull and Gloucester prevented Royalist march on London; Scottish alliance with Parliament
- 1644 – Battle of Marston Moor secured the north for Parliament
- 1644-45 – The Self-Denying Ordinance and establishment of the New Model Army transformed Parliament's military organisation
- 1645 – Battle of Naseby destroyed the King's main army
- 1646 – Charles surrendered to the Scots
Key Points to Remember:
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The Self-Denying Ordinance (1645) resolved political divisions by separating military and political commands, enabling creation of the New Model Army as a unified professional force of 22,000 men under Fairfax and Cromwell.
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The New Model Army's effectiveness resulted from both professional factors (regular pay, thorough training, merit-based promotion) and religious commitment among sections of the force, creating discipline and dedication that previous Parliamentary armies had lacked.
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The Battle of Naseby (June 1645) proved decisive militarily, but the capture of the King's correspondence provided equally important political advantage by revealing his duplicity in peace negotiations and willingness to seek Catholic support.
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Royalist support weakened progressively due to excessive demands for resources, brutal treatment of civilians by armies like Goring's, and emergence of Clubmen movements opposing all military activity to protect local communities.
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By 1646, Parliament's complete military victory coincided with changed political expectations—whilst many desired peace and a return to normality, the war had generated radical ideas and new political consciousness that complicated prospects for settlement with an unchanged Charles I.