Development of the Conflict, 1643–46 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Development of the Conflict, 1643–46
Territorial control and early campaigns, 1642–43
In 1642, the King controlled the north and west of England, while Parliament held the south-east. The campaigns during 1642–43 centred on Royalist efforts to attack and capture London. At the close of 1643, the entry of the Scots on Parliament's side shifted control of the northern region towards Parliament. However, weaknesses within the Parliamentarian command structure allowed the Royalists to strengthen their position in the west, prompting the restructuring of Parliament's armies over the winter of 1644–45.
By 1645, following a decisive engagement at Naseby near Leicester, Royalist forces began to weaken. Parliament's New Model Army then eliminated remaining opposition in the war's final year.
Early Royalist advantages and the failure to exploit them
Initial strengths of the King's position
During the early stages of the war, advantage rested with the King. Although the gentry divided between the two sides, greater numbers joined the Royalist cause, bringing with them their tenants, horses and military expertise—at least in terms of riding and fighting ability. Many individuals quickly donated money and plate (silver items) to support the King. Charles could also call upon professional soldiers, mainly officers who had fought abroad during the Thirty Years War. Among his nephews, Rupert and Maurice of Nassau, he possessed two experienced and battle-hardened commanders.
The King's early military advantages stemmed from three key sources: the support of greater numbers of gentry (who brought their tenants and resources), the availability of professional military officers with combat experience from continental wars, and the leadership of experienced commanders like his nephews Rupert and Maurice.
The battle of Edgehill and the march on London, October–November 1642
These advantages became evident at the battle of Edgehill in October 1642, where Parliament's forces, led by the Earl of Essex, were driven back into London. The day ended in a stalemate that left the road to London open, and the King's forces found themselves prevented from reaching the capital only by the London Trained Bands—volunteers from the city commanded by Philip Skippon—and by the approach of winter. The determination with which these volunteers supported the remnants of Essex's forces at Turnham Green in November demonstrated their commitment to Parliament's cause.
The three-pronged Royalist attack, 1643
After spending the winter at Oxford, the Royalists planned a three-pronged attack for 1643:
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Northern army: The Earl of Newcastle extended control from a secure base in York. He succeeded in defeating Parliament's Yorkshire army at Adwalton Moor in June 1643.
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Southwestern army: Sir Ralph Hopton secured Cornwall and much of Devon, positioning himself to march east.
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Western advance: In July, Prince Rupert captured Bristol. Meanwhile, his brother Maurice defeated Parliamentarian forces at Roundway Down in Wiltshire and seized Dorchester to gain control of Dorset.
There appeared little to prevent the King's armies from approaching London from Newbury, Oxford and the north.
Why the strategy failed
With a Peace Party in Parliament demanding negotiation, the Royalists would probably not need to attack the city directly. They could rely on internal pressures to force Parliamentarian leaders to sue for peace. However, this strategic opportunity was not successfully exploited.
Critical Strategic Failure
Despite winning significant victories at Edgehill, Adwalton Moor, and Roundway Down in 1642-43, and having armies positioned to converge on London from three directions, the Royalists failed to capitalize on their early advantages. This failure to exploit their momentum when Parliament was internally divided proved to be a turning point in the war.
Parliament's defensive position and political divisions
Naval control and regional strongholds
Parliament was preserved from the Royalist advance through a combination of factors. Control of the navy enabled Parliamentarian strongholds at Hull, Gloucester and Plymouth to hold out, preventing the Royalists from concentrating their strength on London.
Hull provided a safe refuge for the remains of Parliament's Yorkshire army. The Earl of Newcastle refused to march south with hostile forces at his back.
Strategic Importance of Naval Control
Parliament's control of the navy proved decisive in maintaining defensive strongholds. These coastal and riverine positions could be supplied and reinforced by sea, making them nearly impossible for the Royalists to capture or bypass. This forced the Royalists to divide their forces rather than concentrate on London.
In East Anglia, the Eastern Association developed a strong force commanded by the Earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell. This force captured Gainsborough and could support Hull from the south.
In September, the Earl of Essex marched from London to relieve Gloucester and succeeded in defeating a Royalist force at Newbury on his return.
In military terms, the year ended in a stalemate similar to that with which it began, but in political terms significant changes had occurred.
Parliamentary political divisions
Peace Party describes one of three groups within Parliament with clear but conflicting war aims. About half of the MPs who continued to support Parliament were essentially backbenchers. The remaining ninety or so members coalesced into three groups, characterized by historian Derek Hirst as 'loose clusters of friends and allies associated for limited political ends':
The Three Parliamentary Factions
Parliament's internal divisions created significant strategic challenges and reflected fundamental disagreements about war aims:
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War Party: Led by Henry Marten, Sir Arthur Haselrig and Sir Henry Vane, this group held the opinion that Charles must be defeated utterly to secure safety for their lives and liberties.
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Peace Party: Led by Denzil Holles in the Commons and closely associated with most of the minority of Lords who remained at Westminster, this faction sought to conduct a defensive war. They hoped that a demonstration of force or a stalemate would persuade the King to negotiate.
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Middle Party: Led by John Pym with support from John Hampden and Oliver St John in the Commons, and aided by the Earl of Warwick and Lord Saye and Sele, this group straddled the two extremes. The Middle Party also included the relatively obscure MP for Cambridge, Oliver Cromwell, a cousin of Hampden.
These divisions reflected deeper disagreements about war aims and created considerable internal tensions within the Parliamentarian leadership.
Explaining Parliament's victory
Historians have put forward various reasons to explain Parliament's ultimate victory. These include criticisms of the King's leadership, the indiscipline of Royalist troops, and the weakness of Royalist administration. Recent studies suggest that the two sides operated in remarkably similar ways, particularly in their methods and approach until late 1644. Both relied initially on locally-based forces run by county committees. Both experienced difficulty in persuading these committees to release forces for duty elsewhere. Both sides experienced internal divisions and rivalries among their leaders. The King's advisers disagreed over war aims, and considerable rivalry existed among his military commanders. Parliament was divided between a 'peace' party who wanted a negotiated settlement and a 'war' party who sought outright victory first.
Similarities Between the Two Sides
Research has revealed that both Royalist and Parliamentarian forces operated in remarkably similar ways until late 1644. Both struggled with the same challenges: relying on locally-based forces run by county committees, difficulty in mobilizing forces across regions, internal political divisions, and rivalries among military commanders. This similarity makes Parliament's eventual victory even more significant—it resulted from specific strategic advantages rather than inherently superior organization.
The Parliamentarian victory rested on three main factors: the failure of the Royalists to exploit their early advantage, the superior resources enjoyed by Parliament, and the military and political restructuring in 1644–45 that enabled those resources to be effectively employed.
Prince Rupert of the Rhine (1619–82)
Biographical Profile: Prince Rupert
Prince Rupert, one of the leading Royalist generals, was the son of Charles's sister Elizabeth and the Elector Palatine. Already experienced through service in the Thirty Years War, he and his brother Maurice joined Charles at Nottingham in 1642. Both served as military commanders.
Rupert was justly famed for his skill and courage as a leader of cavalry, but his abrasive personality led to quarrels with other Royalist generals and a bitter feud with Lord Digby. This contributed to the decision to attack at Naseby.
Later, in 1645, Rupert was forced to surrender Bristol, for which the King never forgave him. In 1646 he left England but returned under Charles II and served with distinction in the navy, becoming First Lord of the Admiralty (1673–79).
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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In 1642–43, the King controlled the north and west while Parliament held the south-east; Royalist campaigns focused on capturing London.
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The Royalists failed to exploit their early advantages after victories at Edgehill, Adwalton Moor and Roundway Down, missing the opportunity to threaten London effectively in 1643.
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Parliament's control of the navy and strongholds at Hull, Gloucester and Plymouth prevented the Royalists from concentrating forces; the Eastern Association provided strong regional defence.
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Parliament was internally divided between a War Party (favouring outright victory), a Peace Party (seeking negotiated settlement) and a Middle Party (seeking middle ground).
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Parliament's ultimate victory resulted from Royalist failure to capitalize on early success, Parliament's superior resources, and effective military and political restructuring in 1644–45.