Johnson’s Policy and Escalation in Vietnam (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Johnson's policy and escalation in Vietnam
Johnson inherits Vietnam
When Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency in November 1963 following Kennedy's assassination, he inherited a deteriorating situation in Vietnam. As historian Fredrik Logevall observes, Johnson "viewed all Vietnam options through the lens of the 1964 election" in the early months of his presidency. Johnson's personal political priorities centred on his domestic reform agenda, yet he recognised the need to achieve a swift outcome in Vietnam to secure these ambitions without committing the USA to substantial escalation.
Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-73) was Kennedy's vice president who became president upon Kennedy's assassination. A committed anti-communist, Johnson faced the tension between pursuing his domestic policy objectives and managing Kennedy's Vietnam legacy. His presidency would become defined by the escalation of the conflict, forcing him to reassess the USA's entire Cold War strategy based on containment.
Johnson's initial approach, 1963-1964
Political constraints and objectives
Johnson faced a distinct conflict in his thinking during 1964: win the war, but prevent it from becoming Americanised - a situation in which the USA would assume direct control of the war's conduct, reducing the South Vietnamese government and its armed forces to mere functionaries for US policies and strategies.
Johnson sought a quick victory that would allow him to focus on his primary domestic policy agenda. However, he remained constrained by Kennedy's Vietnam legacy and was not committed to a negotiated resolution. He anticipated that the conflict might expand into North Vietnam. Despite this, he did continue with Kennedy's approach by increasing the number of military advisers from 16,300 to 23,300, adhering to the counterinsurgency strategy - an approach that relied on small-scale military operations, intelligence gathering, and winning local support rather than conventional warfare.
OPLAN 34A
In January 1964, Johnson approved the implementation of OPLAN 34A. This strategy involved covert action through progressively escalating pressure designed to inflict increasing punishment upon North Vietnam and compel Hanoi to abandon its aggressive policies. The plan represented Johnson's attempt to apply military pressure without committing to full-scale American military intervention.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident and resolution, August 1964
The incident
On 2 August 1964, three North Vietnamese patrol boats fired torpedoes at USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin - the body of water off the coast of North Vietnam. The attack failed, and the Maddox called for air support from the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga. In the engagement that followed, one North Vietnamese torpedo boat was sunk and two more were badly damaged.
On 4 August, President Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnamese naval bases. Speaking on US television, he declared that "repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met with a positive reply".
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
News of the attack reached Washington and provoked an immediate response. Congress agreed upon a resolution in August 1964 that presented Johnson with sweeping powers to take whatever action he felt necessary to resist any armed attacks on US forces in Vietnam and to prevent any further aggression.
In effect, this gave Johnson absolute freedom to conduct whatever policy he wanted in Vietnam without consulting Congress. Johnson himself later commented that the resolution was "like grandma's nightshirt. It covered everything". Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed it worked to "open the flood gates".
The resolution proved to be a watershed for Johnson's policies in Vietnam. It provided him with the congressional mandate he deemed necessary to escalate US involvement, though he would face growing criticism as the war intensified.
Deterioration by the end of 1964
By the end of 1964, the situation in Vietnam was deteriorating rapidly for the USA:
- China agreed to provide military supplies to North Vietnam
- The USSR established firm diplomatic links with the National Liberation Front (NLF) - the political organisation representing communist forces in South Vietnam - and set up a permanent mission in Moscow. Military equipment was also sent to help North Vietnam
- The first North Vietnamese military forces, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), moved down the Ho Chi Minh Trail - the supply route running from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam
- The Vietcong had strengthened their positions in many parts of South Vietnam, particularly in the Mekong Delta region near Saigon
- The bombing response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident had failed to bolster South Vietnam's government. Anti-American feelings grew among much of the population, both rural and urban
- The South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) was in a state of low morale due to poor leadership, inadequate training and low pay
The USA's Western European allies remained unconvinced of Johnson's approach, and support from the international community began to diminish. France's leader, General Charles de Gaulle, warned Johnson that increased involvement could lead to a repeat of France's failed experience in Indochina.
Uncertainty existed about the capacity, and determination, of South Vietnam to conduct a war. This was particularly evident due to consideration of neutralism - a scheme proposed by France that called for a negotiated settlement that would end all South Vietnam's military links with external states, thus leaving it exposed to North Vietnam. The lack of international support strengthened Johnson's inclination to delay any substantial escalation of the USA's role in the war by mid-1964.
The decision to escalate, 1965
Presidential election victory and freedom to act
Johnson's victory in the presidential election and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution confirmed his freedom to escalate the USA's role in Vietnam. His initial post-election thinking was based on armed reconnaissance strikes and a graduated military response against the North.
There remained no inclination to move towards a diplomatic settlement. Johnson was convinced that, faced with the economic and military might of the USA, North Vietnam would back down. He also possessed a mandate from Congress to take whatever action he deemed appropriate to protect US interests. Offers to arrange talks by the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, were rejected by the USA, as were efforts made by the Canadians. Hanoi also sent out subtle indications that it was willing to negotiate, but these overtures were not pursued.
The Pleiku incident and Operation Rolling Thunder
Another turning point emerged in February 1965. Following a Vietcong attack on an army barracks and a US helicopter base in Pleiku, along with further attacks, Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder - a sustained bombing campaign that progressed between 1965 and 1968. This operation marked the start of both the Americanisation of the war and its escalation in terms of US involvement.
On 7 April 1965, Johnson delivered a keynote speech at John Hopkins University in Baltimore. The New York Times praised Johnson for presenting "an American policy ... in which the country can take pride". In this address, Johnson justified the US presence in Vietnam:
Johnson's Justification Speech (7 April 1965):
"Why are we in South Vietnam? Over many years, we have made a pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence. I intend to keep our promise... To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war... We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."
Johnson presented the US commitment as essential to maintaining global order and preventing communist expansion throughout Southeast Asia.
Deployment of ground troops
In addition to Operation Rolling Thunder, the first US combat troops arrived near Danang in March 1965. The day after Johnson's speech, North Vietnam offered a four-point proposal based on the Geneva agreements:
- US troops must withdraw from South Vietnam, in accordance with the Geneva agreements
- Neither North nor South Vietnam may enter into any military alliance with a foreign power during the temporary division of Vietnam, in accordance with the Geneva agreements
- South Vietnam's internal affairs must be settled by the people of South Vietnam, in accordance with the program of the NLF and without external interference
- The peaceful reunification of Vietnam must be settled only by the people of both zones
Johnson rejected these proposals outright, believing that acceptance may have led to a unified and communist Vietnamese state. Instead, he ordered two marine battalions, an air squadron and 20,000 troops to be deployed in Vietnam. He publically announced his decision to escalate the USA's military role on 28 July 1965.
The scale of escalation
The escalation of US involvement was substantial and rapid:
| Year | Bomb tonnage | Ground troops |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 63,000 tons | 184,310 |
| 1966 | 136,000 tons | 385,300 |
| 1967 | 226,000 tons | 485,600 |
| 1968 | - | 536,000 |
By July 1965, the USA had deployed 75,000 ground troops in Vietnam. North Vietnamese leaders saw this as a clear indication that the USA was not merely preparing for the defence of South Vietnam. The escalation that Johnson initiated strengthened the resolve of the North Vietnamese leaders to continue the revolution in the South.
In his address to the nation on 28 July 1965, Johnson explained the escalation:
"What are our goals in that war-stained land? First, we intend to convince the communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their attacks and the number of incidents. I have asked the Commanding General, General [William] Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs. I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces, which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent."
General William Westmoreland (1914-2005) served as the commander of US forces in Vietnam from 1964 until 1968. He failed to properly address the tactics used by the North Vietnamese forces, instead pinning his faith in the USA's military superiority and a commitment to deploying increasing numbers of ground troops in order to overwhelm the enemy through sheer force.
North Vietnamese response
From a resolution issued by the Central Committee of the Vietnam Worker's Party in December 1963 - a month after President Kennedy's assassination - North Vietnamese confidence was evident:
North Vietnamese Confidence (December 1963):
"As for us, we became more confident in the victory of our armed forces ... to create a basic change in the balance of forces between the enemy and us is within our grasp. In the days ahead, our force will be increasingly developed, whereas the enemy will certainly encounter a great deal of difficulties and he will be demoralised. If the US imperialists send more troops to Vietnam to save the situation ... the struggle will become stronger and harder but it will certainly succeed in attaining the final victory."
In a speech to a North Vietnamese Conference of Communist Party members held between 6 and 8 July 1965, Le Duan assessed the USA's capacity to achieve victory in Vietnam:
Le Duan's Strategic Assessment (July 1965):
"The US rear area is very far away, and American soldiers are 'soldiers in chains', who cannot stand the weather conditions, and don't know the battlefield. The Southern revolution can fight a protracted war, while the US can't, because American military, economic and political resources must be distributed throughout the world. If they reach a stage of desperation, would the US use the atomic bomb? Our camp also has the atomic bomb. The Soviet Union has sufficient atomic strength to oppose any imperialists who wish to use the atomic bomb in order to attack a socialist country, and threaten mankind... The best way to cope is to fight even more strongly and more accurately in the South and quickly create the opportune moment to advance to complete defeat of US imperialism and its lackeys in the South."
This speech demonstrated North Vietnamese resolve and their confidence that they could outlast American commitment to the war.
Tactics and relative strengths of the two sides
In November 1965, the first substantial engagement between US forces and the forces of North Vietnam took place in the Ia Drang Valley in the Central Highlands. This was a conventional battle and it served to influence the tactics that became the hallmark of the war, particularly for the North Vietnamese.
The USA suffered approximately 300 dead whilst the North had between 2,000 and 3,000 fatalities. Both sides viewed the battle as a victory: the USA because of the high enemy casualty figure, and the North Vietnamese because they held their position. However, General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the North Vietnamese forces, recognised that he needed an alternative strategy in order to combat the military superiority of the US forces in terms of numbers and particularly equipment.
Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses:
The USA enjoyed overwhelming advantages in conventional military power, technology, air superiority, and economic resources. However, American soldiers often struggled with the unfamiliar terrain, climate, and guerrilla warfare tactics employed by their opponents. US forces were also constrained by the need to maintain support at home and to justify the war's continuation.
North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces benefited from intimate knowledge of the terrain, strong ideological commitment, support from China and the USSR, and the ability to conduct a protracted guerrilla campaign. They were willing to accept substantial casualties in pursuit of their objectives. However, they faced significant disadvantages in terms of conventional military power, equipment quality, and vulnerability to aerial bombardment.
The Battle of Ia Drang Valley demonstrated that neither side could achieve a swift, decisive victory. It foreshadowed the attritional nature of the conflict that would characterise the war over the following years.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
- Johnson inherited Vietnam from Kennedy in November 1963 and initially sought a quick victory without full Americanisation, implementing OPLAN 34A as a covert escalation strategy.
- The Gulf of Tonkin incident (August 1964) and subsequent Congressional resolution gave Johnson sweeping powers to conduct whatever policy he wanted in Vietnam without consulting Congress.
- By the end of 1964, the situation deteriorated as China and the USSR increased support for North Vietnam, PAVN forces moved south, and the South Vietnamese government and army weakened.
- The Pleiku incident (February 1965) triggered Operation Rolling Thunder and the deployment of the first US combat troops, marking the start of full Americanisation and escalation.
- US troop numbers rose dramatically from 75,000 in July 1965 to 536,000 by 1968, accompanied by massive increases in bombing tonnage, whilst Johnson rejected all diplomatic initiatives.
- The Battle of Ia Drang Valley (November 1965) revealed that neither side could achieve swift victory, with the USA relying on superior firepower and North Vietnam adapting to guerrilla tactics to combat American military superiority.