Eisenhower and Kennedy (AQA GCSE History): Revision Notes
Eisenhower and Kennedy: escalation of conflict in Vietnam
Introduction
Both Presidents Eisenhower (1953-1961) and Kennedy (1961-1963) shared a common goal regarding Vietnam - they wanted to keep America's role limited to providing funding and military advice rather than direct combat involvement. However, as the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, both presidents found themselves gradually increasing US commitment to prevent a communist victory.
This escalation pattern - where presidents intend limited involvement but find themselves drawn deeper into conflict - would become a recurring theme throughout the Vietnam War, ultimately leading to full-scale American military intervention under President Johnson.
US intervention under Eisenhower (1953-1961)
The domino theory approach
President Eisenhower strongly believed in the Domino Theory - the idea that if one country fell to communism, neighbouring countries would follow like falling dominoes. This belief shaped his approach to Vietnam, where he wanted to prevent communist expansion without getting America directly involved in another major war so soon after Korea.
The Domino Theory became the fundamental justification for American involvement in Vietnam. Understanding this concept is essential for grasping why both Eisenhower and Kennedy felt compelled to support South Vietnam despite the risks of escalation.
Key developments during Eisenhower's presidency
Eisenhower's strategy focused on supporting the South Vietnamese government financially and through military advice. In 1954, he helped establish the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which brought together eight countries committed to defending Asia from communist expansion.
The US provided crucial support for Ngo Dinh Diem's rise to power in South Vietnam. In 1955, a US-supervised referendum saw Diem claim victory with an implausible 98.2% of votes, clearly indicating American manipulation of the political process. When 1956 arrived and nationwide elections were supposed to be held according to the Geneva Accords, Diem refused to allow them, knowing he would likely lose to the popular Ho Chi Minh.
Diem's refusal to hold the 1956 elections was a crucial turning point. By supporting this decision, the US effectively abandoned the democratic process outlined in the Geneva Accords, undermining the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government from the outset.
By 1957, opposition to Diem's authoritarian rule was growing among the South Vietnamese people, but the US continued its support despite these concerning developments. Eisenhower did attempt to encourage reform - in 1960, he urged Diem to implement land redistribution to increase his popularity with peasants, but Diem largely ignored this advice.
Limited but significant involvement
Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower sent approximately 700 military advisers to help the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat the growing Vietcong insurgency. By the end of 1960, about half of South Vietnam was under government control, showing the limited effectiveness of this approach.
Despite being called "limited" involvement, Eisenhower's commitment of military advisers represented a significant departure from traditional American foreign policy. These advisers would become the foundation for much larger military commitments under subsequent presidents.
US intervention under Kennedy (1961-1963)
Facing a deteriorating situation
When Kennedy took office, he inherited a worsening situation in Vietnam. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy wanted to avoid direct American combat involvement, but it was becoming clear that the ARVN was losing the civil war against the Vietcong's effective guerrilla tactics.
Increased military support
Kennedy significantly escalated American involvement while maintaining the fiction of "advisory" support. The ARVN had been trying to fight conventional battles against the Vietcong but were consistently outmanoeuvred by guerrilla warfare. Kennedy responded by sending thousands more military advisers to work alongside ARVN troops and train them in new counter-insurgency tactics.
The scale of this increase was dramatic. Kennedy provided $136 million in economic aid, $65 million in military equipment, and $40 million specifically for ARVN training in 1961 alone. He also sent 300 US helicopters and pilots to transport ARVN troops, technically maintaining that Americans weren't in direct combat roles.
By 1963, the number of US military advisers in Vietnam had grown to 16,000 - a massive increase from Eisenhower's 700.
Kennedy's dramatic increase in military advisers - from 700 to 16,000 - represented a 23-fold escalation in American commitment. This massive expansion occurred while maintaining the official policy of "advisory support only," showing how easily limited involvement can escalate.
The strategic hamlets programme (1962)
Hearts and minds strategy
One of Kennedy's most significant initiatives was supporting Diem's "Agrovilles" programme, which evolved into the Strategic Hamlets programme. This represented a "hearts and minds" approach - the idea was to win peasant support for Diem's government by relocating them to new, well-defended villages with modern facilities.
Strategic Hamlet Implementation Process:
Step 1: Identify rural areas with Vietcong influence Step 2: Relocate peasant families to new, fortified villages Step 3: Provide modern amenities (schools, medical facilities) Step 4: Surround villages with defensive barriers and ARVN guards Step 5: Attempt to win peasant loyalty through improved living conditions
Implementation and problems
The programme involved creating large new villages equipped with schools and other amenities, surrounded by defensive barriers like spiked bamboo fences and guarded by ARVN forces. 800 US advisers helped establish 5,000 new strategic hamlets across South Vietnam.
However, the programme faced serious problems. Many peasants were forced to abandon their traditional villages, including ancestral graves that held deep spiritual significance in Vietnamese culture. This forced relocation created enormous resentment rather than winning hearts and minds.
In Vietnamese culture, ancestral graves and traditional village locations hold profound spiritual importance. The forced relocation separated families from generations of ancestors, creating deep cultural trauma that the programme's planners failed to understand.
Limited effectiveness
The Vietcong proved adept at attacking these strategic hamlets, often easily overcoming ARVN defences. Rather than reducing opposition to Diem, the programme actually increased opposition by 300% as peasants became increasingly frustrated with forced relocation and government control over their lives.
The Strategic Hamlets programme's failure demonstrates a critical lesson: military solutions without genuine popular support often backfire. The 300% increase in opposition shows how well-intentioned policies can dramatically worsen the very problems they aim to solve.
Kennedy and Diem's overthrow (1963)
The November coup
By November 1963, it was clear that Diem had lost the support of many within his own military. A group of ARVN generals plotted to overthrow him, and when US officials learned of the plan, they made a crucial decision not to intervene to save Diem.
Kennedy was reportedly very upset when he learned that Diem and his brother had been murdered during the coup, but the US had effectively given the green light for the regime change by not opposing it.
Diem's overthrow marked a critical turning point. By allowing their key ally to be removed, the US lost control over South Vietnamese politics and created a power vacuum that would lead to years of political instability and ultimately require greater American military involvement.
Timeline of key events
- 1954: SEATO established; Diem comes to power with US support
- 1955: US-supervised referendum gives Diem 98.2% victory
- 1956: Diem refuses to hold nationwide elections
- 1957: Opposition to Diem grows; US maintains support
- 1960: Eisenhower urges land reform; Diem ignores advice
- 1961: Kennedy dramatically increases aid and military advisers
- 1962: Strategic Hamlets programme implemented
- 1963: US military advisers reach 16,000; Diem overthrown and killed
Key Points to Remember:
-
Both presidents wanted limited involvement - Neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy wanted direct US combat troops in Vietnam, but both gradually increased American commitment
-
The Domino Theory drove policy - Fear of communist expansion in Asia motivated continued US support for South Vietnam despite Diem's unpopular rule
-
Military advisers grew dramatically - From 700 under Eisenhower to 16,000 under Kennedy, showing how "limited" involvement steadily escalated
-
Strategic Hamlets backfired - Kennedy's hearts and minds approach through forced village relocation actually increased opposition to Diem by 300%
-
Diem's overthrow marked a turning point - The November 1963 coup, which the US allowed to happen, removed America's key ally and created greater instability in South Vietnam