Markets: Mechanism, Failure & Intervention (AQA A-Level Economics): Revision Notes
Competition Policy
The theoretical background to competition policy
Competition policy exists because perfectly competitive markets, while theoretically ideal, rarely exist in the real world. Understanding the difference between perfect competition and monopoly helps explain why governments need to intervene in markets.
Perfect competition is the ideal market structure because it delivers important benefits to society. When markets are perfectly competitive, two key principles operate. First, without economies of scale, perfect competition is more productively and allocatively efficient than monopoly. This means resources are used in the best possible way and goods are produced at the quantities consumers actually want. Second, in perfect competition, consumer sovereignty rules. This means consumers, not firms, have the power in the market. Consumers get what they want at fair prices.
In a perfectly competitive market, consumers are "sovereign" - they hold the power to determine what gets produced through their purchasing decisions. Firms must respond to consumer preferences or go out of business.
In contrast, monopoly leads to the opposite situation. Monopolies create producer sovereignty, where firms have the power to manipulate consumers. By restricting output and raising prices, monopolies harm consumer welfare. The result is a net welfare loss to society, plus a transfer of consumer surplus into producer surplus and monopoly profit. Essentially, consumers lose out while monopolists gain excessive profits.
Monopoly power creates three main harms:
- A net welfare loss to society (deadweight loss)
- Transfer of consumer surplus to producer surplus
- Excessive monopoly profits at the expense of consumers
This is why governments intervene with competition policy, even though perfect competition rarely exists in practice.
However, even though perfect competition is theoretically superior, it doesn't exist in most real-world markets. When firms operate in markets with high levels of competition but not perfect competition, economists believe that competition policy can help prevent the abuses that occur when firms possess significant monopoly power.
Competition policy refers to the part of government economic policy that tries to make imperfectly competitive and monopolistic markets more competitive. The aims of competition policy include:
- Preventing the exploitation of monopoly power
- Reducing costs of production
- Improving efficiency
- Eliminating excessive profit so that prices reflect costs of production
- Removing entry and exit barriers that separate markets
When monopoly might be preferable to competition
Competition policy recognises that monopoly isn't always bad. There are two main circumstances where monopoly may actually be preferable to having many small competitive firms:
Economies of scale: When the market size is limited but economies of scale are possible, monopolies can produce at a lower average cost than smaller, more competitive firms. This means the monopoly can potentially offer lower prices to consumers than would exist in a competitive market, as long as the monopoly doesn't abuse its power.
Innovation and dynamic efficiency: Under certain circumstances, firms with monopoly power may be more innovative than firms that aren't protected by entry barriers. When this is the case, monopoly may be more dynamically efficient than a more competitive market. The monopoly profits provide funds for research and development, and the protection from competition gives firms the security to invest in long-term innovation.
This cost-benefit perspective is crucial to UK competition policy. Rather than assuming all monopolies are bad, policy-makers assess each case individually. If a monopoly delivers significant benefits through economies of scale or innovation that outweigh the costs of reduced competition, it may be allowed to continue operating.
The three different parts of UK competition policy
UK competition policy comprises three main elements: policy towards monopoly, mergers, and restrictive trading practices. Each addresses different aspects of anti-competitive behaviour in markets.
Monopoly policy
Although the term "monopoly policy" is commonly used, it's actually somewhat misleading. In the UK, there are very few pure monopolies where a single firm controls 100% of the market. Instead, monopoly policy focuses on oligopolies and concentrated markets dominated by just a few firms. These markets share many characteristics with monopoly, even if they're not technically pure monopolies.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is the government agency responsible for advising on and implementing UK competition policy. The CMA was established through the merger of two older organisations: the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC). This merger took place in 2013, with the CMA beginning operations in 2014.
The CMA's responsibilities extend beyond investigating pure monopolies. It also examines mergers that might create a new monopoly or a highly concentrated market structure. A highly concentrated market is one where a single firm, or a small number of firms, controls a large share of the market.
The cost-benefit approach to monopoly policy
UK competition policy has always been based on a pragmatic, case-by-case approach rather than blanket rules. Economists recognise that monopoly can be either beneficial or harmful depending on the circumstances. Therefore, each case must be judged on its individual merits.
The UK's Cost-Benefit Test:
The approach works like this: if the likely costs from a reduction of competition exceed the benefits, then monopoly should be prevented. However, if the likely benefits exceed the costs, then monopoly should be permitted. Ongoing regulation ensures that firms, particularly large ones, continue to act in the public interest even after being allowed to maintain their market position.
This pragmatic approach distinguishes UK policy from more rigid "automatic prohibition" approaches used in some other countries.
How the CMA investigates monopolies:
The CMA uses several tools to scan the UK economy systematically for evidence of monopoly abuse:
- Market structure indicators: Concentration ratios provide evidence of monopolistic market structures
- Market conduct indicators: Consumer and trade complaints allow the CMA to monitor anti-competitive business behaviour
- Performance indicators: These help identify markets where firms may be exploiting their position
When the CMA discovers evidence of monopoly behaviour that appears contrary to the public interest, it investigates further. The investigation focuses on whether specific features of the market (including structural features and conduct by firms or customers) prevent, restrict or distort competition.
Historically, investigations focused on whether particular trading practices were in the "public interest," which was vaguely defined. The 2002 Enterprise Act changed this approach by introducing competition-based tests to replace the public interest test. Now, the tests centre on whether any features of the market prevent, restrict or distort competition.
This shift made the investigative criteria more objective and less open to political influence.
Alternative approaches to the problem of monopoly
For over 70 years, the UK has adopted a regulatory and investigatory approach to monopoly. Relatively few firms and takeover bids are actually investigated. The rationale is that the possibility of a CMA investigation creates sufficient incentive for most large firms to behave well and resist the temptation to exploit monopoly power against the public interest.
However, the CMA's "watchdog" role is not the only possible way to deal with monopoly. Several alternative strategic approaches exist, though they have generally fallen out of favour in the UK:
Compulsory breaking up of monopolies (monopoly busting): Some free-market economists believe the advantages of competitive markets can only be achieved when the economy is as close as possible to perfect competition. They argue that monopoly is inherently bad and impossible to justify. Therefore, the government should adopt an automatic policy rule to break up monopolies whenever they're discovered. UK policy-makers have rarely adopted this approach, though the government does have legal powers to order the break-up of established monopolies. The term for this approach is "monopoly busting."
Price controls to restrict monopoly abuse: Although price controls have been used by UK governments at various times to restrict firms' freedom to set prices, this policy has only been used in a limited way in recent years. Under the influence of free-market economic theory, price controls have fallen out of favour as a general policy tool.
Taxing monopoly profits: As well as controlling prices directly, the government can tax monopoly profit to punish firms for exploiting their monopoly power and making excessive profit. Monopoly taxes have not generally been used in the UK, except on a few occasions. For example, landlords face a "windfall" tax on gains when land they own becomes available for property development. Similarly, banks have faced special taxes on windfall profits from high interest rates.
Rate of return regulation: In the USA, regulators have imposed maximum rates of return on capital that utility companies can earn. In principle, these act as price caps, since utilities face fines if they set prices too high and earn excessive returns. However, in practice, rate of return regulation often has unintended consequences instead of increasing productive efficiency. This type of intervention can encourage utility companies to raise costs so that raising prices doesn't lead to higher profits, allowing them to comply with the regulation. The higher costs, resulting from productively inefficient use of resources, may allow business managers to enjoy an easier life. Monopolies protected by high entry barriers are especially likely to allow costs to rise.
Why the UK Favors Its Current Approach:
The UK has generally avoided these more interventionist approaches in favor of its case-by-case investigatory model. This reflects a belief that:
- Not all monopolies are harmful (some deliver economies of scale)
- Automatic rules may prevent beneficial monopolies
- The threat of investigation is often sufficient deterrent
- Markets and technologies change too rapidly for rigid rules
State ownership of monopoly: In the past, UK Labour governments sometimes viewed monopoly problems as resulting solely from private ownership and the pursuit of private profit. At its most simplistic, this view suggests that monopoly problems disappear when firms are nationalised or taken into public ownership. In public ownership, monopolies are assumed to act solely in the public interest.
Privatising monopolies: Conservative governments opposed state ownership, arguing it produces particular forms of abuse that wouldn't occur if industries were privately owned. According to the Conservative view, inefficiency and resistance to change stem from workers and management in state-run monopolies believing they'll always be bailed out by government if losses occur. It's also alleged that interference by governments for social and political reasons makes it difficult for nationalised industries to operate efficiently. Conservatives believe that privatising state-owned monopolies improves efficiency and commercial performance. Privatisation exposes industries to the threat of takeover and the discipline of the free market. In some cases, privatisation has also subjected previously state-owned monopolies to competition.
Deregulation and removal of barriers to entry: Most economists believe that privatisation alone cannot eliminate monopoly abuse; it merely changes the nature of the problem to private monopoly and commercial exploitation of a monopoly position. When the telecommunication, gas and electricity monopolies were privatised, regulatory bodies were established: Ofcom and Ofgem, operating alongside the CMA. One method of exposing monopolies (including privatised utility industries) to increased competition is using deregulatory policies to remove artificial barriers to entry.
Contestable market theory and competition policy
In recent years, contestable market theory has had a major impact on UK monopoly policy. The theory suggests that, provided there is adequate potential for competition, a conventional regulatory policy is unnecessary. The government's main role should be to discover which industries and markets are potentially contestable.
The growing influence of contestable market theory has been accompanied by the introduction of deregulatory policies designed to develop conditions with reduced barriers to entry and exit, or a complete absence of such barriers.
Understanding Contestable Markets:
For a market to be perfectly contestable, barriers to entry must disappear and there must be no sunk costs. Sunk costs are costs incurred when entering a market that cannot be recovered if the firm decides to leave.
The key insight: the threat of potential competition, rather than actual competition, disciplines firms and prevents monopoly abuse. Even a monopolist will behave competitively if new firms can enter quickly and contest the market.
Merger policy
Whereas a government's monopoly policy deals with established monopoly or markets already dominated by large firms, merger policy is concerned with takeovers and mergers that might create a new monopoly. Strictly speaking, a merger involves the voluntary coming together of two or more firms, whereas a takeover is usually involuntary (at least for the victim being acquired through a hostile takeover). However, the term "merger policy" covers all types of acquisition, whether friendly or hostile, willing or unwilling.
Until quite recently, the government itself decided whether to refer merging companies to the competition authorities for investigation. This approach left governments open to criticism that when deciding against a merger reference, they were bending to the lobbying power of big business and engaging in political opportunism.
Now, the CMA makes virtually all merger references. The CMA keeps itself informed of all merger situations that might be eligible for investigation on public interest grounds. Currently, a takeover or merger is eligible for investigation if it is expected to lead to a substantial lessening of competition (SLC).
The shift in decision-making power from government ministers to the CMA represents an important change. By removing political discretion from merger decisions, this reform:
- Reduces the risk of political interference
- Makes the process more transparent and objective
- Protects the competition authority from accusations of favoritism
- Ensures consistent application of competition principles
Restrictive trading practices policy
Restrictive trading practices undertaken by firms in imperfect product markets can be divided into two categories:
- Practices undertaken independently by a single firm
- Collective restrictive practices involving either a written or an implied agreement among two or more firms
Independently undertaken restrictive practices include:
- Decisions to charge discriminatory prices
- Refusal to supply a particular resale outlet
- Full-line forcing, whereby a supplier forces a distributor that wishes to sell one of its products to stock its full range of products
Collective restrictive practices:
The most common example of a collective restrictive trading practice is a cartel agreement, in which firms come together to fix or rig the price of a good. By agreeing to restrict output and raise prices collectively, cartel members can enjoy the benefits of monopoly without actually merging into a single firm.
Why Cartels Are Harmful:
Cartel agreements are particularly damaging to competition because they allow firms to:
- Artificially raise prices above competitive levels
- Restrict output and limit consumer choice
- Share out monopoly profits among members
- Avoid the efficiency pressures of genuine competition
Unlike a single monopoly firm, cartel members coordinate their behavior while maintaining separate operations, making detection more difficult.
Both independently undertaken and collective restrictive trading practices are now dealt with by the Competition and Markets Authority. The CMA usually asks the firm or firms involved to drop the practice voluntarily on the grounds that it is anti-competitive. A cartel agreement is usually banned unless the firms involved can persuade the CMA that the agreement is in the public interest. For example, firms might argue the cartel protects the public from injury or provides other benefits.
Case study: European Competition Commissioner fines Google €4.3 billion
Real-World Application: Google and EU Competition Policy
In July 2018, the European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager fined Google €4.3 billion for abusing its market dominance with the Android operating system, which powers most of the world's mobile phones.

The case centred on three types of restrictions that Google imposed on Android device manufacturers and network operators to ensure that traffic on Android devices went to the Google search engine. By using Android as a vehicle to cement the dominance of its search engine, Google denied rivals the chance to innovate and compete.
What Google did:
Google implemented several anti-competitive practices:
- Required manufacturers to pre-install the Google Search app and browser app (Chrome) as a condition for licensing Google's app store (the Play Store)
- Made payments to certain large manufacturers and mobile network operators on condition that they exclusively pre-installed the Google Search app on their devices
- Prevented manufacturers wishing to pre-install Google apps from selling even a single smart mobile device running on alternative versions of Android that were not approved by Google
Google's defence:
Google contested the EU's decision to fine the company but lost the appeal in 2021. Google's argument was based on the claim that Google couldn't possibly be a harmful monopoly. Instead of charging a price for Android, Google gives most of the operating system away. For Google's business to work, it must become as easy as possible for advertisers to reach smartphone users.
According to Google, this is the purpose of all the software Google gives away, from the Android operating system through to YouTube, Google search on phones and the Chrome browser. This might look like a cross-subsidy, but it's actually the heart of Google's business model. The software that Google gives away is designed to draw phone users into Google's advertising ecosystem.
The competition policy perspective:
The European Commission took a different view. Competition authorities argued that by preventing competition in the Android market, Google was able to maintain and strengthen its dominance in the search engine market, which is where it generates most of its advertising revenue. The restrictions prevented other companies from competing fairly, harmed consumer choice, and stifled innovation in the mobile technology sector.
This case demonstrates how competition policy has evolved to address challenges in digital markets, where traditional concepts of monopoly and competition work differently. Tech companies often provide "free" services to consumers while generating revenue through advertising and data collection, making it more difficult to assess whether they're harming consumer welfare.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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Competition policy aims to make imperfectly competitive markets work more like competitive markets by preventing monopoly abuse, reducing barriers to entry, and promoting efficiency.
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The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) investigates monopolies, mergers and restrictive trading practices using a cost-benefit approach rather than automatically banning all monopolies.
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UK competition policy comprises three main parts: monopoly policy, merger policy, and restrictive trading practices policy, each addressing different types of anti-competitive behaviour.
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Several alternative approaches to monopoly exist including monopoly busting, price controls, taxation, rate of return regulation, state ownership, privatisation, and deregulation, though the UK mainly uses a case-by-case investigatory approach.
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Modern competition policy increasingly focuses on contestable markets where the threat of potential competition disciplines firms, even when actual competition is limited. Real-world cases like the Google fine show how competition policy applies to digital economy monopolies.