Gorbachev in 1990 (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes
Gorbachev in 1990
Constitutional reform
By 1990, Gorbachev faced a significant political dilemma. Democratisation had successfully weakened the Communist Party, but it had failed to create a strong government in its place. This created serious problems for Gorbachev, who desperately needed powerful central authority to push through his economic reforms and maintain order across the Soviet Union.
The process of democratisation had also raised fundamental questions about the role of the Communist Party in Soviet politics. Boris Yeltsin demanded a new constitution that would officially end the Communist Party's leading role in government. Gorbachev himself recognised the need for constitutional change, but for different reasons. He wanted constitutional reform that would grant him new powers to tackle the Soviet Union's deepening economic and political crises.
The Core Dilemma of Reform
Gorbachev had successfully dismantled old power structures, but had not created effective new ones to replace them. The weakening of the Communist Party left a power vacuum that threatened political stability.
The presidency
Creation of the presidency
In March 1990, Gorbachev was appointed as President of the Soviet Union. This appeared to be a victory in the short term, but it ultimately created enormous problems for Gorbachev in the longer term.
Reasons for creating the presidency
Gorbachev established the presidency for several interconnected reasons. Primarily, he wanted to increase his personal power. Democratisation had actually weakened his position rather than strengthening it. He had hoped that democratisation would provide him with a power base independent of the Communist Party. However, whilst democratisation had given the Supreme Soviet new authority, Gorbachev found himself unable to control this newly empowered institution.
As a result, Gorbachev decided to create a new position—President of the Soviet Union—which would be independent of both the Communist Party and the Supreme Soviet. This new office would give him the authority he needed to implement his reforms without relying on these increasingly difficult-to-control institutions.
The appointment vs election dilemma
Gorbachev faced a crucial decision: should he stand for election as President, or should he be appointed to the position? Standing for election was a significant gamble. Yeltsin's popularity had been steadily increasing since the 1989 elections, and there was a real possibility that Yeltsin, rather than Gorbachev, would win a presidential election.
To avoid this risk, Gorbachev decided that the President would be appointed by the Congress of People's Deputies, where he still had majority support. Whilst this strategy ensured Gorbachev's appointment as President, it had a serious consequence: Gorbachev lacked democratic legitimacy.
The Legitimacy Problem
Unlike his rivals—particularly Yeltsin, who had been directly elected to his position—Gorbachev had no mandate from the people. He had not been chosen by popular vote, which significantly undermined his authority and credibility, especially among those who supported democratic reforms.
Emergency powers and their consequences
Following his appointment, Gorbachev was granted emergency powers for 18 months. These special powers were intended to help him deal with the economic crisis and the growing unrest in the republics.
Gorbachev used these emergency powers in controversial ways. On various occasions, he:
- Censored the press
- Deployed Soviet troops to restore order, particularly in the non-Russian republics
Abandoning the Reform Agenda?
These actions drew sharp criticism from radicals who accused Gorbachev of abandoning his reform agenda and introducing a new form of dictatorship. The use of emergency powers seemed to contradict everything Gorbachev had claimed to stand for regarding openness and democracy.
Shevardnadze's resignation
The most dramatic consequence of Gorbachev's use of emergency powers came in December 1990, when Eduard Shevardnadze, a key supporter of Gorbachev throughout the 1980s, resigned from the government. Shevardnadze's resignation was highly significant because he publicly claimed that Gorbachev had abandoned the path to democracy.
This resignation demonstrated how Gorbachev's attempt to strengthen his position had actually alienated some of his most important allies and supporters.
Conclusion: Gorbachev in 1990
By 1990, it was becoming clear that Gorbachev's reform programme had produced outcomes very different from those he had intended. He had hoped that glasnost (openness) and democratisation would help revitalise both the Communist Party and the Soviet economy. However, the reform process failed to achieve either of these goals. Instead, it contributed significantly to the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The failure of glasnost and democratisation
Greater openness had destroyed the authority of the Communist Party. Simultaneously, glasnost allowed the anti-communist opposition to openly criticise the government, something that would have been impossible in earlier years. Democratisation had weakened the Communist Party further by bringing its democratic legitimacy into serious question. If the Party had never been elected by the people, why should it have the right to rule?
The destruction of Gorbachev's power base
By 1990, Gorbachev's own reforms had destroyed his power base. This created a paradox: whilst he desperately needed power to implement further reforms, his earlier reforms had stripped away the very sources of his authority. As a result, he found it increasingly difficult to push through his reform agenda.
The Paradox of Reform
Gorbachev needed power to implement reforms, but his reforms had destroyed the sources of his power. This circular problem left him unable to effectively govern or push through his agenda.
The refusal to stand for election
Significantly, although Gorbachev repeatedly stressed the importance of democracy, he refused to stand for election as President. This decision meant that he never gained a popular mandate for either his power or his reforms. This lack of democratic legitimacy became a critical weakness that undermined his authority throughout 1990 and beyond.
Misunderstanding the people's mood
Gorbachev consistently hoped and believed that the Soviet people would support his reform agenda. However, this belief proved to be fundamentally mistaken. Gorbachev had misunderstood the mood of the people. Ultimately, democratisation undermined the Soviet Union because the Soviet people had lost faith in both the Communist Party and the Union itself. They wanted more radical change than Gorbachev was prepared to offer, or they wanted independence for their republics rather than reform of the existing system.
Key Points to Remember:
-
March 1990: Gorbachev was appointed (not elected) as President of the Soviet Union, giving him a position independent of the Communist Party but lacking democratic legitimacy.
-
The appointment dilemma: Gorbachev chose appointment over election to avoid losing to the increasingly popular Yeltsin, but this decision left him without a popular mandate for his power or reforms.
-
Emergency powers backfired: The 18 months of emergency powers were used to censor the press and deploy troops, leading radicals to accuse Gorbachev of abandoning democracy and introducing dictatorship.
-
Shevardnadze's resignation (December 1990): A key ally resigned, claiming Gorbachev had abandoned the path to democracy—a damaging blow to Gorbachev's credibility.
-
By 1990, Gorbachev's reforms had destroyed his power base: Glasnost and democratisation had weakened the Communist Party and allowed opposition to flourish, whilst failing to create strong alternative structures or revive the economy. Gorbachev had misunderstood the Soviet people, who had lost faith in both the Party and the Union.