Investment in Agriculture, 1953–64 (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes

Investment in Agriculture, 1953–64

Introduction

When Khrushchev came to power in 1953, he made a bold admission that broke with Soviet tradition: agriculture under Stalin had been inefficient and actually less productive than it had been during Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). He recognised that meaningful reforms were essential to boost productivity and improve living standards for agricultural workers. Between 1953 and 1964, Stalin's successors introduced a series of agricultural reforms aimed at revitalising this crucial sector of the Soviet economy.

The politics of agriculture

Agricultural policy was deeply intertwined with Khrushchev's political career. His predecessor, Malenkov, had initially focused on agriculture, promising substantial production increases in 1953. When these promises failed to materialise in 1954, Malenkov lost political influence to Khrushchev.

Khrushchev similarly staked his reputation on agricultural success. Between 1954 and 1958, he delivered impressive harvest increases that were crucial in consolidating his power as Soviet leader. However, his 1956 promise to outproduce the United States by 1960 ended in embarrassing failure. Some of his initiatives, particularly the maize cultivation campaign, proved extremely ineffective, earning him a reputation for launching hare-brained schemes rather than sensible policies. The slow growth of agricultural output between 1960 and 1964 convinced many Party members that Khrushchev's reforms were unnecessary and even harmful, contributing to his eventual replacement by a more cautious leader.

Main agricultural policies

Improved incentives

In 1954, Khrushchev fundamentally changed how collective farms related to the government, aiming to encourage higher production. Under Stalin's system, each farm had been required to meet a quota of goods, which the state purchased at extremely low prices. Khrushchev's reform reduced these mandatory quotas and introduced substantially higher prices for any produce delivered beyond the quota requirement.

This change had an immediate and dramatic impact: farm incomes rose by 250 per cent between 1952 and 1956. By making it financially worthwhile for farms to increase production, Khrushchev created a powerful incentive for agricultural workers to work harder and more efficiently.

Investment in resources

Khrushchev backed up his policy reforms with substantial investment in agricultural equipment and materials. In 1954, he announced the construction of new fertiliser factories and an increase in tractor production. The results came quickly:

• By 1955, the number of available tractors had increased by 30 per cent
• Fertiliser production rose by 40 per cent in the same period

This investment aimed to modernise Soviet farming and provide the tools necessary for increased productivity.

Virgin Lands Scheme

The Virgin Lands Scheme represented Khrushchev's most ambitious agricultural initiative. Launched in September 1953, the scheme aimed to dramatically increase Soviet agricultural production by converting vast areas of previously unfarmed land in the northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and western Siberia into productive farms.

This policy required enormous investment. Agricultural spending grew from under 3 per cent annually to 12.8 per cent of the entire Soviet budget between 1954 and 1959. The scale of expansion was remarkable:

Year	1953	1956	1964
Total area sown (million hectares)	18.2	35.3	97.4
Total labour employed (million workers)	2.6	2.9	8.6

Between 1953 and 1964, the scheme led to a massive increase in the amount of farmed land in the Soviet Union, with the total sown area expanding more than fivefold.

The Corn Campaign

From September 1958, Khrushchev introduced the Corn Campaign, encouraging Ukrainian farmers to grow maize. His plan involved shifting wheat production to the newly created Virgin Lands farms while traditional Ukrainian farms would produce maize. The maize would serve as animal feed, theoretically increasing the amount of meat available to Soviet consumers.

However, the Corn Campaign failed spectacularly. Khrushchev had based his initiative on the success of American farms, but Soviet farms could only produce 50 per cent of the corn per hectare that US farms achieved. This was due to differences in climate, lower labour productivity, and the inferiority of Soviet tractors and fertilisers. Moreover, growing more corn meant producing less hay, so the total amount of animal feed actually dropped by 30 per cent between 1958 and 1964 – the opposite of what Khrushchev had intended.

Agricultural successes, 1954–58

Initially, particularly the Virgin Lands Scheme, proved extremely successful. Between 1953 and 1958, grain harvests, meat production, and milk production all rose significantly:

Product	1953	1958
Grain harvest (million tons)	82.5	134.7
Meat (million tons)	5.8	7.7
Milk (million tons)	36.5	58.9

Overall, agricultural production increased by approximately 35.3 per cent during this period. These impressive gains had several positive effects:

• Greater availability of food in Soviet shops, improving the standard of living for ordinary citizens
• A 400 per cent rise in the income of farm workers
• Political consolidation for Khrushchev, allowing him to propose even more ambitious schemes

The success emboldened Khrushchev to announce in 1956 a new commitment to produce more food than the United States by 1960, which would have required a staggering 300 per cent increase in production in just four years.

Problems in agriculture, 1954–64

Despite the early successes, Soviet agriculture remained deeply troubled, both during and after the golden age of 1954–58.

Persistent inefficiency

Even during the successful period, Soviet agriculture was extraordinarily inefficient. The Virgin Lands Scheme proved expensive to maintain – Kazakhstan's naturally dry climate required sophisticated irrigation systems that were costly to operate. More fundamentally, Soviet agriculture was extremely labour-intensive. During the 1950s and 1960s, between 54 and 44 per cent of the Soviet population worked on farms, compared to only 5 per cent of the American population. Yet American farms produced more than twice as much food, highlighting the deep inefficiency of Soviet agriculture.

Declining growth after 1958

After the initial success, the Virgin Lands Scheme failed to generate further growth. Harvests in 1959 and 1960 fell slightly below 1958 levels. Between 1960 and 1964, production increased slowly, so that overall agricultural production was only about 15 per cent higher in 1964 than in 1958. While these figures were historically high, they fell far short of the ambitious targets Khrushchev had set in 1956, leading to his policy being judged a failure.

Multiple systemic problems

Several specific problems contributed to the slower growth rates between 1958 and 1964:

• Abolition of Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS): This reform made it harder for farm workers to obtain modern farming equipment, undermining efficiency.

• Inappropriate central planning: Centrally directed campaigns were ineffective because they ignored local conditions. For example, Khrushchev's advocacy of maize production was unsuitable for the climate of many Soviet farms, wasting labour, fertilisers, and farmland.

• Poor logistics: Soviet planners did not always deliver the correct fertiliser to farms or deliver it when needed, reducing its effectiveness.

• Administrative confusion: Khrushchev repeatedly reformed the ministries responsible for agriculture. These contradictory reorganisations created administrative chaos rather than efficiency.

• Inadequate infrastructure: Soviet farms often lacked proper storage facilities, meaning some of the food produced simply went to waste.

• Low pay: Although wages for agricultural workers increased, they remained inadequate to attract and retain skilled workers.

• Reduced investment: Khrushchev dramatically cut agricultural investment from 12.8 per cent annually (1954–59) to just 2 per cent in 1960, undermining the progress that had been made.

• Failure to address underlying inefficiency: Khrushchev's reforms did not tackle the fundamental inefficiencies in the system, meaning long-term problems of waste and low productivity continued.

Overall assessment

Khrushchev's agricultural reforms achieved significant improvements in Soviet agriculture, particularly between 1954 and 1958. However, further progress was blocked by systemic problems. Central direction of agriculture meant that local conditions were not properly considered, making truly effective farming impossible. The reforms failed to address fundamental inefficiencies in the system. Administrative reorganisations created additional problems rather than solutions. Ultimately, Soviet agriculture remained too inefficient to meet Khrushchev's ambitious targets, contributing to his political downfall in 1964.