Historical Interpretation: Gorbachev’s Reforms (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes

Historical Interpretation: Gorbachev's Reforms

The context of economic reform

Understanding Gorbachev's reforms requires recognising an important starting point: in 1985, when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union faced long-term economic weaknesses but there was no immediate economic crisis. There was no indication that the Soviet Union was in danger of imminent collapse.

However, Gorbachev's economic reforms themselves created an economic crisis, which rapidly turned into a catastrophe. These failed reforms had devastating consequences:

• They undermined the authority of the Communist Government
• They weakened the government's economic power
• They contributed significantly to the fall of the Soviet Union (alongside political reforms and leadership decisions)

The historical debate: Why did Gorbachev's reforms fail?

Historians fundamentally disagree about why Gorbachev's economic reforms failed. This debate centres on a crucial question: Was effective reform of the Soviet economy actually possible?

There are two main schools of thought:

Interpretation 1: Archie Brown - Reform was possible but poorly executed

Archie Brown argues that effective reform of the Soviet economy was theoretically possible, but Gorbachev's policies were poorly conceived and executed.

Brown's key arguments:

The central problem - Tension between reform and replacement

There was a fundamental tension in Gorbachev's approach that undermined his entire reform programme. He tried to reform the existing command economy system to make it work better. At the same time, he was moving towards replacing it with a completely different system (market economy). These two aims had conflicting logics and could not be achieved simultaneously.

The evolution of perestroika

In the early years of perestroika (restructuring), Gorbachev focused on reforming the command economy. This approach achieved only very limited success. By 1990-1, there was broad support among specialists for abandoning the command economy entirely in favour of a market economy.

Gorbachev's awareness of the costs

Gorbachev understood better than Yeltsin that transitioning to a market economy would cause significant hardship. Freeing prices (price liberalisation) would have two effects:

• Positive: improve the supply of goods and services
• Negative: raise prices to levels that tens of millions of citizens could not afford for years to come

The state of limbo

Economic legislation during perestroika, such as the Law on Co-operatives, helped pave the way for marketisation (transition to market economy). However, by the end of the Gorbachev era, the Soviet economy was stuck in limbo. It was no longer a functioning command economy but not yet a market system. This halfway state proved disastrous.

Interpretation 2: Stephen Richards Graubard - Reform was inherently impossible

Stephen Richards Graubard takes a more critical position, arguing that reform of the command economy was inherently impossible. There was no viable middle way.

Graubard's key arguments:

The fundamental flaw - No middle way

Gorbachev's major failure was economic reform. While he was keenly aware of the need for reform, he never realised that no middle way existed. He should have made a clear choice: either stick with the command economy OR abandon it completely for a market economy. Attempting to reform the command economy - to make it work better - was impossible.

Falling between two stools

Gorbachev's economic policies "fell between two stools". This created a completely inconsistent economic system, utterly out of balance. The resulting hybrid system was far worse than either:

• An ordinary command economy, OR
• A bold transition to a complete market economy

Gorbachev's limitations

Initially (before 1990), Gorbachev was impeded by Communist conservatives who resisted change. However, from 1990 onwards, Graubard argues that Gorbachev showed he was unprepared to go very far himself. Even at the very end, Gorbachev insisted on slow, gradual change.

Failure to recognise the crisis

By the end of Gorbachev's leadership, disintegration and chaos had already been reached. The situation demanded speedy, decisive action. Gorbachev failed to grasp the severity of the crisis and the urgency required.

Comparing the two interpretations

Aspect	Archie Brown	Stephen Richards Graubard
Was reform possible?	Yes, but it needed to be done properly	No, reform was inherently impossible
What went wrong?	Poor conception and execution of policies	Trying to find a middle way that didn't exist
What should Gorbachev have done?	Either reform more effectively OR transition more decisively	Make a clear choice: full command economy OR full market economy
The hybrid system	Created a problematic limbo state	Created an inconsistent, unbalanced disaster
Gorbachev's awareness	Understood the costs better than Yeltsin	Failed to grasp the severity of crisis and need for speed
Timing of failure	Emerged gradually through tension between reform and replacement	Fundamental from the start due to impossibility of middle way

Key concepts explained

Exam focus: Using historical interpretations

When evaluating these interpretations in an exam, you need to critically assess the evidence and reasoning behind each historian's position. Here's how to approach each interpretation:

For Archie Brown's interpretation:

• Evidence supporting: The Soviet economy did end up in a dysfunctional limbo state, neither fully command nor market
• Evidence challenging: Some argue the command economy was so flawed that no reform could have saved it

For Stephen Richards Graubard's interpretation:

• Evidence supporting: The hybrid system did create serious economic problems and inconsistencies
• Evidence challenging: Other communist countries (like China) managed economic reforms more successfully, suggesting a middle way was possible