The Problems of Political Reform (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Problems of Political Reform
Introduction
Political reform in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was fraught with danger. The Communist Party was not just a political party - it was the glue holding the entire Soviet Union together. Any attempt to reform the political system risked unravelling the whole structure. Understanding these problems is essential to grasp why Gorbachev's reforms ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR.
The fundamental nature of Soviet politics
The Soviet political system was built on foundations laid by Lenin and Stalin. Together, they created a distinctive political structure with three key characteristics:
A centralised party: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union controlled the state across the entire Soviet Union. Power flowed from the centre outwards, with Moscow dictating policy to all regions.
Regional parties: Each Soviet republic had its own Communist Party organisation, but these regional parties were subordinate to the central Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They followed orders rather than making independent decisions.
Party discipline: The entire Party structure operated under strict discipline, following the direction of the Politburo (the political bureau or executive committee at the top of the Communist Party).
The Politburo was the supreme decision-making body of the Communist Party, consisting of a small group of senior Party members who controlled all major policies and decisions across the Soviet Union.
The Communist Party had essentially become the government itself. It controlled every aspect of Soviet life: the economy, the army, the police force, and all media outlets.
Any policy which weakened the authority or discipline of the Party risked weakening the Soviet Union itself, because the Communist Party was what held the Union together. This fundamental reality made political reform extremely dangerous.
The tension between ideology and reality
Despite exercising total control, the Communist Party remained ideologically committed to creating a genuine democracy based on the will of the working people. This created a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the Soviet system.
Communist ideology promised true democracy and worker control. The reality was an authoritarian one-party state controlled by a small elite. This gap between the Party's official goals and the actual reality of Soviet life created ongoing discussion within the Party, which occasionally led to pressure for reform.
Growing cynicism among the Soviet people
Over time, this contradiction had serious consequences. The Soviet people became increasingly cynical about the system. They grew more aware of the corruption among Party officials and the gap between Communist promises and reality. The people knew the system was flawed.
However, most Soviet citizens tolerated the government because the Party was delivering tangible improvements. Living standards were rising year on year, which gave the government legitimacy despite the cynicism. People were willing to overlook corruption and broken promises as long as their material conditions improved.
The role of idealists in the Party
The widespread cynicism troubled idealists within the Communist Party. These were committed Communists who genuinely believed in the ideology and hoped to realise its promises. They believed that reforming the Party and introducing some form of democratisation (giving power to the people through democratic processes) would inspire the new generation to embrace Communism and complete the revolutionary journey that Lenin had started in 1917.
The dangers of reform
Political reform was extremely dangerous for the Soviet system. True democracy could lead to the fall of Communism - if people were given real choices, they might choose to reject Communist rule altogether.
Historical warning: Khrushchev's reforms
History provided a clear warning. Khrushchev's reforms in the 1950s had threatened Soviet control of Eastern Europe. Hungary and Poland had experienced uprisings that challenged Soviet dominance in 1956. This demonstrated that reform could quickly spiral out of control and threaten the entire Soviet bloc.
The uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1956 showed how political liberalisation could quickly lead to challenges against Communist rule. In Hungary, Soviet tanks had to violently suppress the uprising, demonstrating the fragility of Communist control when reforms were introduced.
Brezhnev's response: suppressing reform
Under Brezhnev (leader from 1964-1982), there was little meaningful reform and no serious attempts to democratise the government. Brezhnev prioritised stability over change. His policy focused on suppressing political dissent - silencing critics and preventing any challenges to Party authority. This period became known as the era of stagnation, when the Soviet Union stood still rather than moving forward.
Andropov's limited opening
Andropov (leader from 1982-1984) essentially continued Brezhnev's policy of suppressing political dissent. However, he made one important change: he allowed greater freedom within the Party leadership to discuss the Soviet Union's social and economic problems.
Andropov was concerned about long-term issues such as economic decline and corruption. His desire to tackle these problems led him to promote Communists who were willing to question the system to senior positions. Significantly, Gorbachev owed his position on the Politburo to Andropov. Without Andropov's support, Gorbachev would not have been in a position to become General Secretary in 1985.
Gorbachev's objectives
When Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary in 1985, his primary political aim was to revitalise the Soviet Union. He wanted to end the stagnation of the Brezhnev period and tackle specific problems:
- End the corruption of senior Party members
- End the cynicism and apathy (lack of interest or enthusiasm) among the Soviet people
- Return to Lenin's original vision
Gorbachev argued that the Soviet Union needed to return to the model Lenin had outlined in 1917, where people played a genuine role in politics through participation in local soviets (councils). However, Gorbachev did not have a clear strategy for achieving these goals when he took power.
The term "soviets" refers to councils - local democratic bodies that Lenin envisioned as the foundation of genuine worker democracy. In theory, these councils would allow ordinary people to participate directly in governing their communities.
Gorbachev's initial reform plans
Initially, Gorbachev believed it was possible to reform the Soviet system while retaining Communist control. His original plans for reform were quite limited:
- Open up debate within the Party: Allow more discussion and criticism within Party structures
- Allow intellectuals more freedom of expression: Give writers, artists, and thinkers more freedom to express their views
- Allow the public more access to information: Make government more transparent and share more information with citizens
These reforms had consequences that Gorbachev did not foresee. Once reform began, it created pressure for greater change. As you will see in later sections, Gorbachev's limited reforms eventually spiralled into radical transformation.
Historical interpretations: was the Soviet Union's fall inevitable?
Historians disagree about whether the collapse of the USSR was inevitable or whether it could have survived if Gorbachev had not introduced radical reforms. This debate is crucial for understanding the problems of political reform.
Interpretation 1: Jeremy Smith - the fall was inevitable
Historian Jeremy Smith argues that the Soviet Union's collapse was ultimately inevitable, even if the exact timing was not predetermined. He identifies several fundamental weaknesses:
Systemic weaknesses: The Soviet system had built-in flaws that would eventually cause its downfall. The centralised command economy, for example, became increasingly inefficient.
A redundant ideology: Communist ideology had become outdated and no longer provided meaningful guidance for governing a modern industrial society.
Internal contradictions: The gap between Communist promises (democracy, equality) and reality (authoritarian rule, privilege for Party elite) created unsustainable tensions.
Lack of flexibility: The Soviet system could not adapt to changing circumstances and new challenges. It was too rigid to evolve.
Smith's Key Argument
According to this view, while the Soviet system had successfully transformed the Russian Empire into a powerful industrial state, it contained "the seeds of its own destruction." Even if collapse did not occur exactly in 1991, it would have happened eventually.
Interpretation 2: Archie Brown - survival was possible
Historian Archie Brown takes a different approach. He argues that in 1985, the Soviet Union was still strong enough to survive into the twenty-first century. While acknowledging problems, he emphasises the strength of Soviet control mechanisms.
Problems existed but were not critical: Brown acknowledges:
- Several decades of accumulated problems
- Declining economic growth rates
- Rising infant mortality and alcoholism
- Increasing popular cynicism
- The costly and unpopular war in Afghanistan
- Technological lag behind the West
However, he argues these problems were not severe enough to cause collapse on their own.
No strong pressure for change: In 1985, there was no significant pressure from below demanding change. The dissident movement (groups opposing the Soviet system) had been crushed. The atmosphere was one of political apathy and fatalism (belief that nothing could be changed) rather than revolutionary fervour.
Strong control mechanisms: All the mechanisms of political control remained firmly in place - the Communist Party, the KGB (secret police), the military, and propaganda systems.
Brown's Key Argument
"It was not so much a case of crisis forcing radical reform as of radical reform generating crisis." In other words, Gorbachev's reforms created the crisis that destroyed the Soviet Union, rather than responding to an existing crisis. The system could have continued without reform, but reform shook its foundations and led to collapse.
Evaluating the interpretations
Both interpretations have merit:
Smith's view highlights genuine long-term weaknesses in the Soviet system. The economic problems, ideological contradictions, and lack of flexibility were real and serious. However, as Brown points out, these weaknesses had existed for decades without causing collapse.
Brown's view emphasises the strength of Soviet control in 1985 and the role of Gorbachev's choices in triggering collapse. However, this perhaps underestimates how severe the problems were becoming. Could a system with such fundamental contradictions and declining economic performance really have survived indefinitely?
Finding the Middle Ground
The truth may lie somewhere between these positions. The Soviet Union had serious structural problems that needed addressing, but Gorbachev's particular approach to reform - which you will study in later sections - may have accelerated the collapse rather than preventing it.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
- The Soviet political system was built by Lenin and Stalin around a centralised, disciplined Communist Party that controlled all aspects of government
- The Communist Party was what held the Soviet Union together - weakening the Party meant risking the collapse of the entire Union
- There was a fundamental contradiction between Communist ideology (promising democracy) and reality (authoritarian one-party rule)
- Reform was dangerous because true democracy could lead to the rejection of Communist rule, as Khrushchev's reforms had shown in the 1950s
- Gorbachev aimed to revitalise the Soviet Union and return to Lenin's original vision, but he did not have a clear strategy for achieving this
- Historians debate whether the USSR's collapse was inevitable (Smith) or whether it could have survived without Gorbachev's radical reforms (Brown)