The Extent of Moral Responsibility (AQA A-Level Religious Studies): Revision Notes
The extent of moral responsibility
Introduction
The fundamental question about moral responsibility centres on whether we have free will. Even when someone has a sufficient understanding of right and wrong and is mentally competent, we must still ask: are our choices genuinely free, or are they determined by forces beyond our control?
Epicurus and the problem of free will
Epicurus (341-270 BCE), a Greek philosopher, was the first to draw attention to this problem. He believed the world consisted entirely of atoms within a void, completely governed by physical laws. This would mean:
- We have no control over the forces of nature
- We cannot determine the situations in which we find ourselves
- We have no freedom of action but are entirely determined by forces beyond our control
However, this created a problem for Epicurus himself. He also believed people should seek to maximise happiness by living simply and peacefully. But if there is no free will, how can he recommend a particular way of life? This highlighted a fundamental tension: observation and science tend towards determinism, whilst personal and moral experience tend towards free will.
Understanding the debate
To grasp this debate, we need to understand two fundamentally different views and two ways they relate to each other:
The fundamental views:
- Hard Determinism: We are not free but are fully determined by antecedent physical causes
- Libertarianism: We are free
The two ways they relate:
- Incompatibilism: We are either determined or free, but cannot be both
- Compatibilism: Scientific determinism is compatible with our experience of freedom (sometimes called 'Soft Determinism')
Hard Determinism
What is Hard determinism?
Determinism is the view that all events and states of affairs, including all human decisions and actions, are the necessary consequence of antecedent (previous) states of affairs. Determinism is commonly identified with Causal Determinism because the laws of cause and effect in physics suggest a complete chain of antecedent causes going back to the Big Bang.
Hard Determinism is the view that because Determinism is true, no one has free will.
Key features of hard determinism
All forms of Hard Determinism are based on the concept of 'universal causation'. According to this approach:
- Every event in the universe has a cause
- This applies not just to physical events but to mental events
- Every thought we think and every decision we take is merely an event in a chain of causes and effects
- The network of causes and conditions at any moment determines everything that will happen in the future
Most science works on the assumption that the world operates in ways that are regular and theoretically predictable. We do not need to prove that we know every possible cause of an event; it is only necessary to show that, in general, all events have causes that are theoretically knowable.
Hard Determinism therefore governs ethical choices also. In effect, ethical choices do not exist: our moral decisions are as determined as anything else.
The illusion of freedom
We may think we are free to choose what to do, but such freedom is merely an illusion created by the very complex processes in the human brain. We think we are choosing, whereas in fact we are running through a very complex calculation, the outcome of which is already determined.
A Hard Determinist would argue that since freedom is an illusion, we are not logically justified in claiming responsibility for our actions, even if we feel that we have freely chosen to do them.
Reductionism
Determinism is sometimes backed up by Reductionism. This is the view that to understand a complex entity, one should analyse (or reduce) it to the smallest component parts of which it is made. With this approach:
- Human behaviour is reduced to biology
- Biology is reduced to chemistry
- Chemistry is reduced to physics
What starts out appearing to be a very complex action is simply the cumulative effect of many simple ones. On this basis, our thoughts may be seen as no more than electrical impulses in the brain, and our actions are simply the result of chemical and electrical activity.
The feeling of freedom as ignorance
Baruch Spinoza (1632-77), a Dutch rationalist philosopher, considered that everything in the world was totally determined by physical causes, and therefore there was no scope for human freedom. His approach has been followed by determinists, materialists and behaviourists.
Spinoza suggested that we merely consider ourselves to be free because we are ignorant of all the causes operating upon us. The experience of freedom is an illusion generated by our ignorance of the totality of causes acting upon us. If we could take into account everything that had ever happened to us, every experience that etched neural pathways into our brains, then we would understand that our choices are determined.
This is the point at which the determinist distinguishes between freedom itself and the apparent freedom of the will. Our experience of free will is factually incorrect (we are actually determined by physical forces), but the limited nature of human awareness of those causes means that we experience the process by which we assess and register the infinite number of influences acting upon us as free will.
Scientific Determinism
Scientific Determinism holds that all events, including human actions and choices, are determined by antecedent events and states of affairs, so there can be no freedom of the will.
The cosmic microwave background (CMB) is the oldest light in the universe, dating from about 378,000 years after the Big Bang. When we look at this, we are seeing the universe as it was 13.77 billion years ago. There is a complete sequence of cause and effect, beginning with the Big Bang and culminating in the present, and from the present back to the Big Bang.
The equations in physics are deterministic; physics governs everything; therefore every event in the universe, physical and mental, is determined by physics. This means that the future is also determined.
The brain itself can be analysed as a physical system, and thoughts appear to be electrical impulses in the brain. All of what we call a human being can be analysed by sciences such as anthropology, sociology, physiology and psychology. There seems, therefore, to be no escape from the conclusion that we do not have free will.
Laplace's demon
The first full expression of Determinism came from Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827), a French physicist and mathematician. He argued that if an intelligence could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of all beings, it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom. For such an intelligence, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.
When we look at physical nature, we see a chain of causality that spreads outwards and backwards from any one physical event. Everything appears to arise in dependence upon other things, and there appear to be no 'gaps' in that chain of causation into which a 'mental' input could be inserted.
Can we avoid scientific determinism?
There are two ways in which it might be possible to avoid Scientific Determinism:
1. If the laws of nature are probabilistic
Science operates by gathering experimental evidence and observed facts, then seeking the best available interpretation. Various hypotheses are tested experimentally, and theories are framed to account for what has been observed.
We must recognise that it is almost certain that our scientific theories are wrong. History shows that newer theories replace older ones as our knowledge increases. Hence scientific laws cannot claim absolute truth, but only a degree of probability, proportional to the evidence upon which they are based.
2. If the quantum world is indeterminate
If it can be shown that there are entities not completely governed by the laws of nature, then we might have reason to reject Scientific Determinism.
Matter at the quantum scale appears to be different from its appearance at the 'macro' scale we experience. The 'Copenhagen Interpretation' (devised between 1925 and 1927 by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg) suggests that the laws governing the quantum world are indeterministic and probabilistic.
How this affects events at the macro scale is not clear, but if there is indeterminism somewhere in matter, then Determinism seems to be false. However, the Copenhagen Interpretation is not the only interpretation of the quantum world. The 'Many Worlds Interpretation', for example, is deterministic.
Most philosophers who reject Determinism locate indeterminacy in the mind, where indeterminacy at the quantum level might somehow allow for free will. There are many speculative ideas about how this might work.
In answer to the question 'Can Scientific Determinism be avoided?' - many people think so, but the simple fact is that we do not know.
Psychological Determinism
Psychological Determinism is closely associated with B.F. Skinner (1904-1990), an American psychologist and behaviourist. His variation is known as Psychological Behaviourism. According to this theory:
- All behaviour is a product of genetic and environmental conditions
- All human actions depend on the consequences of previous actions
- If an action has good consequences, the brain becomes disposed to repeat it
- If the consequences are otherwise, the disposition becomes one of avoidance
Behavioural psychology is a theory of learning that all behaviours, human and animal, are acquired through conditioning - by interaction with the environment. In Skinner's view, the good and bad consequences of previous actions dispose the brain to repeat or avoid such actions.
One classic experiment in behavioural psychology was carried out by Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) in experiments known as 'Pavlov's Dogs', culminating in the idea of 'classical conditioning'. Skinner's ideas on conditioning were derived from experiments based on animals.
Skinner's approach is sometimes termed 'Radical Behaviourism' because it involves all aspects of mental activity. In 1971, in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner denied the existence of internal psychological states such as intentions and purposes, and denied the existence of free will. According to Skinner, Determinism is 'complete'.
Evaluating Skinner's radical behaviourism
The American philosopher and cognitive scientist Noam Chomsky (b. 1928) dismissed Skinner's proposals as futile behaviourist speculation and assumption.
One particular criticism is that Skinner's application of the principles of animal behaviour to the much more complex human behaviour is unsound.
Another obvious response is that if human behaviour in its entirety is merely a set of conditioned responses determined by genetics and the environment, then Skinner's own behavioural thesis is merely an example of a conditioned response. Why should we bother to listen to it?
Theological Determinism
Theological Determinism is a view of Hard Determinism rooted in the Christian idea that God is omniscient (all-knowing).
In its earliest form, Theological Determinism led figures like St Augustine and Calvin to the doctrine of Predestination. An omniscient God must know the entire past, present and future of the universe and of humanity. Calvin concluded that God's omniscience means that 'some are eternally ordained to glory, through the sheer will of God, and the rest are ordained to eternal torment' - a view which receives far less support now than it did then.
Leaving aside predestination, the problem remains that an omniscient God's foreknowledge must be causal. If God knows that you will do 'x' at a specific point in the future, you cannot avoid doing 'x'. If this is the case, then free will must be an illusion, and all events in the universe, both physical and mental, are determined by God's omniscience.
Evaluating theological determinism
If there is no God, then Theological Determinism does not even get off the ground. But if there is a God, then there is a case to answer. The issue seems to hinge on God's relationship to time:
A timeless God: Aquinas' view is that God does not exist in time but exists timelessly. For God, there is no today, tomorrow or yesterday. A timeless God sees all times, rather like an unrolled scroll, so sees the entire history of the universe timelessly. Following this idea, some argue that God sees the results of our future free choices but does not cause them. On this view, God has the power to intervene and control, but does not - he permits human free choices.
A temporal God: The alternative view is that God exists in time. If that is the case, then God cannot know the future, so Theological Determinism is false. Christian Process theologians see God and the physical universe as two aspects of one reality. In the physical universe, the future has not yet happened - a temporal God would not know the future, and so would not be a threat to human free will.
It seems, therefore, that Theological Determinism is false. The issue is very complicated, however, depending on your theological starting point, so Theological Determinism cannot be rejected out of hand.
Conclusions concerning hard determinism
There is no conclusive evidence, as yet, to show that Hard Determinism as a general theory is either true or false. For the non-religious, Theological Determinism is a non-starter. For some, there is cumulative evidence in favour of Determinism, and recent studies in cognitive psychology are often seen to point in that direction, for example those of Benjamin Libet.
Benjamin Libet (1916-2007), an American neuroscientist, conducted experiments in the 1980s to show that unconscious electrical processes in the brain (the brain's 'readiness potential') precede the brain's conscious decision to perform volitional acts (acts of the will).
Libet's experiments seemed to show that the brain prepares to act well before we are conscious of the urge to move. The implication is that the will is not under an individual's conscious control but is the result of determined electrical brain processes. If that is the case, then free will is denied and mental activity is determined.
This produced approval from determinist philosophers and scientists who assumed that Libet had proved their case. However, the deterministic interpretation of the data was denied by Libet himself, who argued that the brain has the ability to veto pre-conscious intentions, and that the veto appears to be freely chosen, without any neurophysiological evidence for neurophysiological Determinism.
We still do not have enough evidence to decide whether any form of Hard Determinism is true or false.
Libertarianism
Libertarianism is the view that, despite restraints from genetics and the environment, human beings are free moral agents.
Key features of libertarianism
1. Libertarianism is the view that:
- All forms of Determinism are false
- In issues of right and wrong we act as free moral agents
2. Most libertarians are mind-body dualists
This follows the view of Descartes, that the mind is a separate substance from the physical body and brain, and is able to act freely in the physical world.
3. Other libertarians claim that causality has nothing to do with free will
This view asserts that there are two types of events: those that are caused and those that are free, and these are ontologically distinct. This might well be true, but it cannot be shown to be true.
4. A 'moderate' libertarian:
- Would not deny that the external world is deterministic
- Would accept that deterministic processes affect living beings
- Would accept that personality is largely governed by heredity, social situation and environment
- Would accept that such influences incline us to act in certain ways rather than others
Nevertheless, a libertarian insists that human behaviour is not determined by external causes. For example, a kleptomaniac whose physiological, psychological and genetic disposition may dispose him to steal might or might not steal when left unobserved in a shop.
All our experience of decision-making and following moral principles, and even our sense of guilt when something goes wrong, suggests that we are actually free: that we can choose what to do, and that we must therefore take responsibility for our actions.
Limitations on freedom
However, it is clear that nobody is totally free. Human behaviour is constrained by certain limitations:
Physical limitations: There are some things we are physically incapable of doing. We cannot run a mile in two minutes. Physical limitations of this sort have little ethical significance.
Psychological limitations: If we have a strong psychological motivation for one particular choice rather than another, this will have some bearing on what we choose, depending on the degree of motivation.
Social limitations: We are all limited by the financial, social and political structures under which we live. The way we understand life and the choices we make are profoundly influenced by our circumstances. We can rebel against the norms of our society, affirming our freedom to do so, but it takes more effort and conviction to do so rather than simply to conform to expectations.
For a libertarian, limitations such as these are acceptable, because the idea of complete freedom makes little sense. In fact, a libertarian could argue that complete freedom would lead to a kind of paralysis. The experience of complete freedom would be like being set down in the middle of a completely featureless, flat landscape and trying to decide which way to go. You would be rooted to the spot because the actual experience of freedom requires limitations in order to make sense.
5. The most common reason for arguing for Libertarianism
We experience ourselves as free, and we have a sense of moral responsibility (including guilt if we get things wrong). This is the 'common sense' argument from what is sometimes called 'folk psychology' - the opinion of ordinary people who make day-to-day decisions without doubting that they are freely made.
6. Libertarianism is 'forward looking'
Where Determinism looks back to the sequence of prior causes that determine an event or a moral action, libertarians are primarily concerned with future goals, precisely because the future can be self-directed. Libertarians have no problem with the idea that they can deliberate about the likely consequences of their actions without being hamstrung by the idea that those consequences are in some way determined.
For a libertarian, the emphasis is not on what has caused her actions but on the reasons for action, particularly future action. Where moral decisions are goal-directed, the libertarian can control her desires in favour of rational deliberation.
In summary, Libertarianism argues for the existence of a moral self. The moral self is able to override the personality and the demands of society, and can make a causally undetermined choice of what should be done for the best in any particular moral situation.
Evaluating libertarianism
As with Hard Determinism, Libertarianism carries with it a set of assumptions, none of which are known to be true. The determinist claims that the mind is subject to causal laws, but the libertarian argues that this is obviously false, otherwise there would be no argument about it.
Determinists argue that there is evidence for Determinism but no evidence for Libertarianism. Libertarians argue that the only evidence possessed by determinists is that physical systems are governed by natural laws, but there is no compelling reason to think that the mind is governed in such a way.
The most common argument for Libertarianism is that we consistently experience ourselves as being free, although determinists dismiss this as an illusion brought about by the great complexity of unconscious mental processes.
A strong argument in favour of Libertarianism is that if Hard Determinism is true, there is no point in discussing the question of whether or not we have free will. Yet discussing the question is precisely what we do, for two reasons:
i. Most of us assume that we are free. Our feelings of moral guilt arise because we realise that we have made a wrong free choice.
ii. Those who claim that we are determined are merely making a determined statement, so why should we pay any attention to it?
An equally powerful argument in favour of Libertarianism is its positive approach to decision-making in general, and to moral decision-making in particular. Libertarians feel that they are deliberating rationally about achievable goals, as opposed to following a predetermined and unalterable path directed by events determined in the past.
Compatibilism
First, a brief word on Incompatibilism. This is the view that Determinism and Libertarianism are incompatible with each other. It seems clear that if Determinism is true, then Libertarianism must be false, and vice versa. However, some philosophers think that Determinism and Libertarianism are compatible with each other.
Compatibilism is the view that human freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with Determinism. It is the view that we can be shaped by physical and other laws, and yet at the same time be sufficiently free to make moral and other choices.
Hume's compatibilism
The 'classic' account of the compatibilist position is given by David Hume. In brief, Hume thinks that we have 'liberty of spontaneity' rather than 'liberty of indifference'. Liberty of indifference is freedom from necessity - being free of causal necessity - which Hume saw as a delusion. Liberty of spontaneity is that kind of liberty which is consistent with necessity, and this is the ability to do what you desire.
Hume's account explained
1. Hume's definition of necessity
Hume believed that the controversy about freedom and Determinism has been made more difficult because philosophers have not defined their terms with sufficient accuracy. Hume therefore begins by giving his own definition of 'necessity'.
2. The kind of necessity required by Causal Determinism is not logical necessity
Logical necessity is the kind we find in mathematics, where the idea that is logically true. We have got into the habit of assuming that the laws of nature have this kind of necessity, but all we really see in nature is 'constant conjunction'.
3. Constant conjunction
Hume says that our idea of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of necessity. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity or connection.
Worked Example: Understanding Constant Conjunction
Wherever we look in nature, we see that (A) is constantly accompanied by (B). For example:
- Whenever we throw a brick at a pane of glass, we constantly find that the glass will shatter
- Whenever water is heated to 100°C at sea level, we constantly find that the water boils
Since these things always happen together, the mind makes a connection between them, so that through habit we have come to assume that (A) will always be accompanied by (B). But this kind of conjunction is not logically necessary, because however many times a brick shatters a piece of glass, it is always possible that at some point in time a piece of glass will remain intact.
We cannot, therefore, talk about necessary laws of cause and effect in nature. That understanding of 'necessity' is too strong. All we really find in nature is 'constant conjunction' - (B) constantly follows (A).
4. Constant conjunction is found also in human nature
If you think about people you know fairly well, you will probably agree with Hume that their nature is fairly consistent, so much so that we will often remark that 'people don't change'. According to Hume, people's principles and motives are as constant as the patterns of wind, rain and cloud in the weather.
People in all societies depend upon each other to the extent that there is hardly anything we do without reference to others. Hume points out that anybody who makes or grows something to sell, in order to feed himself and his family, expects to be able to sell his goods at a reasonable price. If somebody tries to cheat him, he expects the justice system to come to his aid. If he needs to travel to sell what he makes, then he expects to be able to get on a bus, or in a car, train or plane.
The mutual dependence of people is so great in all societies that scarcely any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others.
5. Liberty and necessity are compatible
Because constant conjunction is found in both nature and human nature, Hume sees physical events and human wishes and desires as one kind of operation: the actions of the will and natural causes form one linked chain. There is a kind of regularity between human choices on the one hand, and human actions on the other. It must be, therefore, that human actions stem from human choices, and that is all that is required for free will.
Freedom requires Determinism (in Hume's sense) because if our wishes and desires were simply random, the order of human life, by which we make sense of the world and ourselves, would be lost.
Hume defines freedom as a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will. In other words, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. This hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.
Hume claims that our freedom lies in being able to carry out our desires without interference and restraint from external factors. On this basis, freedom is not only compatible with Determinism, it requires it. It is essential that our desires are not random, that they flow from our personality that is genuinely our own. Our personality or character is the sum total of the causal conditions that have created us. Freedom is the expression of this character, to act according to one's desires (rather than focus on the choice of desires).
If the cause of my action is my own desire, then I am free in the opinion of a compatibilist. If I join a club because I want to, that is free will. If I join a club because my parents make me, that is coercion. Non-freedom for a compatibilist is not being able to do what I desire because I am forced to do something else through physical restraint or coercive threats.
Thus freedom is doing the following without interference:
- Thinking what I like
- Saying what I like
- Doing what I like
- Meeting whom I like
- Going where I like
It is 'doing what I desire' rather than 'choosing what I desire'. This is the liberty of spontaneity popularly described as 'doing what you want'.
This, then, is Hume's compatibilist thesis. We are shaped by physical and other laws, and at the same time we are free to make choices, including moral choices. We have the ability to do what we desire.
Evaluating Hume's compatibilism
1. Hume's philosophical method is brilliant
He insists that the whole debate about freedom and Determinism is about definitions, and that once we accept his definitions, everything becomes clear. That is correct. If necessity boils down to 'constant conjunction' in nature and in human nature, then Hume seems to be right: liberty is consistent with necessity, and we have freedom to do what we desire.
2. For twenty-first-century hard determinists, Hume's idea is too watered down
For the scientific determinist, Hume's 'wishes and desires' are the product of absolute causal forces, so the idea that wishes and desires can in any way be free is unscientific nonsense. 'Wishes and desires' are as determined as everything else.
For the determinist, all actions are caused, so if Determinism is true, then Hume's Compatibilism must be false.
3. For libertarians, Hume's Compatibilism ignores the very power of reason
On Hume's account, human reason becomes virtually redundant, despite having led him to Compatibilism. For the libertarian, reason allows us to make real moral choices by which our lives become properly meaningful. For Hume, reason seems to be indistinguishable from the forces of nature. Everything is watered down to 'constant conjunction'.
Synthesis
It is not possible, at this stage of our understanding of natural laws and of the mind, to decide whether determinists, libertarians or compatibilists are in the right. There are problems with each theory:
The problem with Determinism is that if it is true, then even the discussion or consideration of Determinism must be determined, and that seems to be counter-intuitive to say the least.
The problem with Compatibilism is that if Determinism is true, then for a compatibilist to say that we can still perform voluntary acts - that we are free to follow our wishes and desires - makes no sense, since voluntary acts must also be determined. The defining phrase for Compatibilism is 'could have done otherwise'. Faced with a moral choice, if an individual makes a choice, but 'could have chosen otherwise', then that choice would have been free. But if Determinism is true, then this is not a possibility.
The problem with Libertarianism is that most libertarian arguments claim that although physical systems are determined, the mind is somehow free. Although there are several accounts of how this might be the case (for example, that the brain works on quantum mechanical principles which are not deterministic), so far nobody has produced a convincing answer concerning how the brain manages to act freely, and exactly where and what part of the brain is involved.
Until some form of persuasive evidence comes to light, then the problem of free will remains unsolved.
Key Points to Remember:
- Hard Determinism argues that all events, including human decisions and actions, are determined by prior causes, so free will is an illusion and moral responsibility cannot be justified.
- Libertarianism maintains that humans are free moral agents capable of making genuine choices, despite various physical, psychological and social limitations.
- Compatibilism (particularly Hume's version) suggests that freedom and determinism are compatible - we can be shaped by causal forces yet still be free to act according to our desires.
- There are three main types of Hard Determinism: Scientific (based on physical laws), Psychological (based on conditioning), and Theological (based on God's omniscience).
- The debate remains unresolved because each position has significant strengths and weaknesses, and we lack conclusive evidence to decide between them.